The
NEW SPIRIT
In
ARAB LANDS

H. I. KATIBAH

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The
NEW SPIRIT
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ARAB LANDS

BY

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Author, *Other Arabian Nights, Arabian Romances and Folk-Tales, Patriotic Sermonettes (Arabic) etc.*

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PREFACE

The facts of Arab nationalism, particularly those relating to what is known as the *Palestine question,* have now become quite accessible, thanks to the indefatigable works of research and penetrating studies of such authors as *Hans Kohn, George Antonius, J. M. N. Jeffries, Philip Willard Ireland, Miss Elizabeth MacCallum* and many others. Of works of interpretation on the subject, in terms of inner dialectics and world-outlook, there have been few of outstanding quality. To be sure all those authors mentioned above have taken cognizance of the interpretation as well as of the facts, particularly *Prof. Kohn,* but the interest in this direction has been secondary. An exception is William Ernest Hocking's book, *The Spirit of World Politics*, published in 1932, to which I am much indebted. Prof. Hocking's approach in this admirable work has been, however, that of a philosopher looking in from the outside, interested primarily in the relation of Arab nationalism to world politics, international law, ethics and the fundemental principles that govern the life of humanity.

There was need for a book that essayed to study Arab nationalism from the inside, intimately revealing the inner spirit—the deep-rooted attachment to the past, the struggles and conflicts of the present, the yearning aspirations for the future.

The first incentive to write this book came to me when I was traveling in the countries of Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Iraq, from the summer of 1929 to the winter of 1931, as special correspondent for some American dailies. Since then the need and urgency of such a work have weighed on my mind. Much that is in this book is the result of long reflection and earnest study; but much more is based on the living experience of one who has accompanied the Arab nationalist movement, as an active participant and disinterested observer, for the last half of a checkered life in which East and West have met, mingled, clashed and reconciled.

A word of gratitude to the many authors who have written on Arab nationalism, and to many of whom references are made on the pages of this book. I am also deeply indebted to hundreds of leading Arab nationalists, political leaders, economists, reformers, here and abroad, who have given me freely of their counsel and help. The confidence and frankness with which many of them discussed the complex problems of Arab nationalism, have given the author a wider and more secure base from which to draw his own conclusions. That some of these conclusions may prove at variance with their views does not lessen the magnitude of the debt.

My warm thanks to Prof. Elihu Grant, Prof. Philip K. Hitti, the Rev. Dr. John H. Lathrop, Dr. George Kheirallah, Mr. Harry Snyder and Mrs. E. J. Audi for valuable suggestions in their course of reading the ms., and to Mrs. Alys Haliday for helping me in preparing it for publication. Due to pressure of time the main burden of reading the proof sheets fell on the author, who alone is responsible for the final shape the book has assumed, and for some inadvertent errors.

I must not end this preface without expressing my thanks also to those who helped in the material production of this book, particularly to my friend James Sayih, pressman, and to William J. Schuler, linotype operator, Claude Carter, compositor and Basil Kornienko, assistant pressman.

New York, May, 1940 H. I. Katibah

INTRODUCTION

THE REAL ISSUE

We are told that the present war is a war of ideologies. It is more correct to say that it is the prelude to a world-wide revolution in which many old concepts will be swept away and many new ones modified. The world is travailling for the birth of a new social order. Undoubtedly, Arab Nationalism in its wider scope, will be one important factor in this world regeneration.

The human race which has learned how to split the atom, measure the most distant stars, transmit voice and vision over thousands of miles, make cloth out of milk and coal, has not yet learned the simple lesson of how to live together in peace and harmony. World unity and world peace are still a dream. It is only in the hope that the understanding of the Arabs and the forces which brought about Arab nationalism would contribute ever so little to the realization of this sublime objective that this book finds its justification.

The new spirit in the Arab lands, rises from its long slumber, carries with it a message of cautious wisdom garnered from the bitter experiences of generations of wars, sufferings and unfathomable tragedy. The Arabs who have so little at present to give in a world of material values, of scientific progress and technical knowledge, have yet much to give in practical wisdom, in their persistence on values that enrich human life, that grow and multiply the more they are shared. For is not the true romance of the East today, and of the Arab East in particular, that on its stage a continuous human drama has been going on from time immemorial? It is a matter of significance, a challenge to our deepest interest that in those ancient lands new approaches to the perennial problems of life are being made, new experiments in the art of living are being carried out with the help of new knowledge and new social technique. There is food for thought in the remark of a great American historian that "the significance of the appearance of civilization along the Nile does not lie in the splendor of its buildings, but in the fact that it was rising there for the first time on earth."[1] More significant is the fact that this civilization has never been completely discontinued. The distant past in itself is neither necessarily impressive nor inspiring. The Bushmen of Australia or the Hottentots of Africa may be just as ancient as the Arabs, but no one would claim they are as important or as interesting to the world.

In appearance we may speak in this book of political obstacles that face the Arabs, of the conflct of Jews and Arabs in Palestine, of the rise of industrialism in Arab lands and of problems which confront Arab modernists in their efforts to create a new culture out of the old. In reality we are dealing with universal human problems that affect the citizen of Helsinki and Prague as they affect the citizen of ancient Damascus.

In the present war, as in the last one, the right is not all on one side nor the wrong all on the other. On the side of the "aggressors" there is some element of righteous indignation and on the side of "the democracies" something deserving of our severest condemnation and deepest contempt. If the fanatic vengefulness of a Hitler creates in us a revulsion that hides the original issue, let us not forget that the sale of the Arabs in the open market of political expediency and opportunism by a Lloyd George or Balfour does not exactly enhance the British claim to the espousal of democracy and the protection of weaker nations.

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[1] *The New Past* by James Breasted, p. 13.

As for the Arabs, they cannot say that they suffered from fascism, nazism or communism; but they can truthfully and definitely say that they suffered from a shabby and specious "democracy" that conformed to no pattern of "liberty, equality and fraternity." It is becoming more and more apparent that the present struggle is essentially between two imperialisms—an old, smug and self-contented imperialism, and an envious, unabashed and clumsy imperialism that has risen to contend with it and compete for the field of exploitation. Both imperialisms rest in the last analysis on force, and the essential policy of both is "power politics." Only in the older variety this power policy is camouflaged with high-sounding words of moral unction such as "the white man's burden," "a trust of civilization," "the protection of minorities," etc. That the Arabs decided to throw their lot with the Allies in this war was not at all a matter of choice. Between the two evils they had chosen the lesser one. If it is any moral consolation to British and French imperialists that their species of exploitation is a whit better than the worst sort of aggression known to modern times, it is but a sign of moral callousness, that precedes moral collapse. The last twenty years in which Great Britain and France acted as trustees beholden to civilization for the welfare of the Arabs, have proven conclusively that they have failed in their trust; that far from teaching the lessons of democracy to aspiring adepts, they were in sore need of instruction. Deliberate greed and indifference to moral obligations were the true and sufficient causes of this second European war on both sides of No Man's Land.

It is common practice now to condemn the Versailles Treaty as the source of all our major international troubles and conflicts. A few years ago to have hammered on this point would have been considered diplomatic bad taste, if not political heresy. We fear, however, that even today the wider and deeper implications of this condemnation are not always squarely faced and honestly scrutinized. Among these implications is the realization of the responsibility to be assumed by great neutral nations, such as the United States, in making the world safe from the repetition of such a treaty in the future. Certainly no nation can be morally justified in profiting by a system that condones plunder and exploitation while condemning this plunder and exploitation in the same breath. Equally important is the willingness of great sovereign nations to limit their sovereignty in the interest of collective security and the creation of a truly representative, effective and just league of nations or world court. From this follows as a necessary corollary the earnest and consistent regard for the political integrity and right for legitimate economic development of smaller nations.

Righteous indignation and prophetic condemnation nowadays are not enough. These must be implemented by men of good will and strong into a system that convincingly shows a better way of life. Only in helping us to orient ourselves in this forward-looking direction would our criticism of the Versailles Treaty and similar international instruments for legalizing plunder be justified or effective.

Numerous criticisms of the Versailles Conference and Treaty have been made by competent critics.[1] Some of these are legalistic in their approach, and others based on wider and deeper premises of moral principles. A searching and devastating criticism is contained in a recent book by Edwin D. Schoonmaker in which he properly describes the infamous treaty as a clearly construed scheme by the victorious Allies "to have and to hold" all that could be squeezed out of the enemy, and of weaker nations which had fought on their side, by a series of unilateral agreements and arrangements.

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[1] See *Europe Since* 1918 by Herbert Adams Gibbons and *Ten Years After* by Sir Philip Gibbs. Both authors were war correspondents and students of international affairs during the first world war.

Of the preamble to the covenant of the League of Nations, which in parallel phrases declared its intent "to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security" etc., while it bound its members to "respect for all treaty obligations," Mr. Schoonmaker says:

> "Had the covenant of the League of Nations been laid before an assembly of peace leaders, they would have said as was said many times during the world-wide discussion which preceded its adoption, 'Sign it; it means everything.' On the other hand, had the Lords of Empire, anxious for the future of their vast possessions, submitted it to an able counsel, he would have said, 'Sign it; it means everything!' Nor would he, before giving the advice, have felt it necessary to read the whole document. The preamble would have been sufficient."[1]

There is even today, as nations are locked in a deadly conflict, a serious danger of repeating the same duplicity, only in another direction. This danger lies in a studied silence by spokesmen of the "democracies" over the fate of countries, such as India or Syria, which are still under nominal and actual domination by Great Britain and France. The voice of India has already been heard through its great patriot saint Gandhi and other leaders of the India National Congress, who have held up the challenge to Great Britain, that if she were fighting for democracy and the defense of little countries against ruthless aggression, she has an excellent opportunity to prove it first by giving India its liberty. For now India is asked to partake in the defense of democracy abroad, as it has been pointed out repeatedly by Indian nationalist leaders, while she is denied democracy at home. The Arabs, too, it is feared at this writing, will be dragged to fight the communist Russians on the borders of the Caucasus or the nazi Germans in the Balkans, while the heart of the Arab nation, Syria and Palestine, still bleeds from the oppression and terrorisms of "the democracies." What the Arabs would have done had they had free choice and unhindered control over their own destinies is hard to say. It is conceivable that they would have sided with the Allies; it is more conceivable that they would have remained neutral, as Holland or Denmark, as long as they could. At present "the democracies" happen to be entrenched in the Arab world which "is torn between a struggle to win independence for those sections still under real vassalage to those democracies and a mortal fear of the rising power of the totalitarian states."[1]

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[1] *Democracy and World Dominion,* p. 110.

In the war objectives so far announced by Chamberlain, Daladier or any of the responsible spokesmen of Great Britain and France, no specific mention has been made of Syria or Palestine. A blanket and vague assurance has been given the Arabs that "everything will turn out all right" at the end of the second world war. But it was precisely such vague promises made in the former war which these same democracies proceeded to forget so conveniently after winning the war.

But whether the democracies or the totalitarian states win, one thing seems certain at this point in our world's history: it is no longer possible to settle world problems and achieve world peace on the premises of patched-up, selfishly inspired treaties. Communism or nazism will not last forever, nor will that type of democracy-at-home, autocracy-abroad represented by our Churchills and our Chamberlains.

When so-called world statesmen realize that there can be no peace without limitation of sovereignty and the application of one single standard of political morality, they will find that the Arabs, as well as the Indians or Chinese, will respond with greater readiness to a universal order that will limit their own sovereignty as it would limit the sovereignty of the more powerful nations. The Golden Rule is just as applicable, and just as effective among nations as among individuals. Western politics has not yet discovered a better substitute. The least that we should expect of responsible statesmen of "the democracies" is not to give injustice and exploitation the blessing of their approval, tacit or otherwise. One can at least understand and be warned against the nazi philosophy which recognizes no right for the so-called inferior and weaker races, and which frankly comes out for Germany's share of the spoils. One cannot understand, and finds it hard to guard one's self against, the vague philosophy or the lack of philosophy of the Allies, which condemns the greed of the nazis and turns a deaf ear to just complaints against greed and illegal occupation by the same Allies. Intransigence and blind hatred of the west, always a lurking danger in nationalism, are direct offsprings of bad faith in the Western countries with which the Arabs have had to deal, since the days of the Crusades. They have nothing to do with religious fanaticism. They are sometimes stronger among Christian nationalists than among Moslems. And by now even the most callous and confirmed Western imperialist must blush with shame when he repeats the moth-eaten, monstrous lie that Eastern people can understand only force. On the contrary, the testimony of shallow observers notwithstanding, Arab nationalists have never ceased to avow their trust in the Wilsonian principles and to plead their cause before the League of Nations, when it was evident to them that they were hoping against hope, and when great powers were making a mockery of this League. As one prominent nationalist put it, the League of Nations was the last straw at which the Arab nationalists were grasping. The rise in Syria and other Arab lands of fascistic parties whose political philosophy is based on power politics, is a late and insignificant reaction, proving that even in the mellow, peace-loving East there is a limit to imposition on human nature. These parties in the East, as in Europe, are in the last analysis the crystallization of protest or spite movements that would never have had an occasion to gain strength and popularity had the viscious causes which gave rise to them been eradicated.

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[1] See the author's article in the *Living Age,* November, 1939.

Almost five years ago to the day from the declaration of the present European war, I proposed in a radio speech for the Foreign Affairs Forum (Sept. 3, 1935) a solution for our international troubles which has since been suggested for serious adoption on all sides, and which is destined to gain popularity the longer the war lasts. Even from the point of view of realism and self-interest, as I then approached the problem, following the Ethiopian invasion, the solution remains idealistically practical. I said then:

"...Let us disregard the League for the present. Let the statesmen and peoples' representatives who hold the destiny of the world in their hands call an international conference to discuss the whole question of mandates and colonies throughout the world, even the question of such nominally independent and undeveloped countries as China, Ethiopia, and Arabia.

There need be, indeend there should be, no political control contemplated in such an international regime. Such problems as a universal standard of wages, regulation of tariff to bring the world nearer to a universal free trade status, the protection of national rights and development of national industries, conformable with world market demand and supply, a strict enforcement of anti-slavery regulations, and like problems would form the main agenda of this international conference.

"Not Great Britain, France or Italy would then become the moral, or shall we say immoral, mandatories over the backward countries, but commissions appointed by and responsible to an international body, a real League of Nations that has the means and the power to enforce its mandates. No single nation can then claim any special sphere of influence or any special advantages, and room will be found for all the surplus populations of the world, ready tasks for all willing hands, too relieve all present international unrest and acute national depressions. At the same time no independent nation need feel the stigma of humiliation because of this arrangement. Any part of the world still undeveloped will be open for colonization by various nationals, indiscriminately.

"There are innumerable problems that this envisaged world regime would create. But they are at least real problems, and their solution would tend to create a more stable world order than the ficticious problems and patched-up international arrangements we have been witnessing since the War.

"Again and again it is becoming more evident that what the world lacks today, for a proper solution of its troubles, is not more intelligence or more devotion to empty ideals, but more honesty and more realism."

CHAPTER ONE

WHO ARE THE ARABS?

No question concerning the identity of a people in our post-war days has aroused so much bitter contention as that of the Arabs. It seems as if the right for independence, for well-being, even for existence itself, of the Arabs depended on the right answer. The British imperialists are much interested in who the Arabs are; the French imperialists likewise. The Zionists have their own theories, and Christian Lebanese, within the natural geographical boundaries of the Arab lands, jealously defend their treaty-fixed borders on the assumption that they are not Arabs. Yet it has never occurred to the British to ask, Who are the British, and what right have they to be in Palestine or Aden? Nor did the French stop to define French raciality and its relation to Syria, or the Zionists to ascertain if the Jews are a race at all. Only the Arabs, it seems, are asked to give the right answer, or, as in some Arabian Nights tales, have their political head cut off. One must admit the question is not an easy one, and somewhat of a riddle, as it would be in the case of any people as vital and old as the Arabs are, and as important in the checkered annals of our little world.

Not only is Arabia proper less known than our arctic regions, as Prof. Hitti says in an introductory chapter of his *History of the Arabs,* but the Arab himself—the conquering Arab, the Arab of the Middle Ages who contributed so much to Western science and culture, the Arab as troubadour and story-teller, and the nationalist Arab of today who demands the right to a natural growth of his economics and culture as a definite ethnic group—is equally little known.

To simplify the question, let us ask instead: Are Egyptians of today Arabs? There are some Egyptians who would claim they descend from a different race and constitute a different national entity. Zionist writers have pointed to this separatist movement, insignificant in number of followers, as a pretext for the existence in Palestine of a Jewish nation and state. A questionable majority of present-day Lebanon cross the centuries of eventful history to link themselves with the Phoenicians of the vague past in order to explain to themselves and to the world that they are not Arabs. Arab nationalists insist that both Copts and Lebanese are Arabs. Who of he two are right? Prof. Hitti helps to remove the ambiguity somewhat by making a distinction in his History between Arabs or those who speak the Arabic language, and Arabians, or inhabitants of *the Arabian peninsula.*[1]

The distinction, it seems to me, is only an apparent one, for the sake of convenience. And in Hitti's work there is ample evidence for this assumption. He calls Arabia the probable cradle of the Semitic race which "nursed those people who later migrated into the Fertile Crescent and subsequently became the Babylonians, the Assyrians, the Phoenicians and the Hebrews of history."[2] From time immemorial the gradual migration, sometimes swelling into a veritable invasion, from the Arabian Peninsula, and the slow but perceptible infiltration of cultural influences of the Mediterranean civilization into Arabia has been going on.

The word Semitic, indicating a peculiar language or group of languages, has no reference to race as such nor to cultural forces which constantly worked on these peoples and through them on the world at large. There was a perpetual flow of fresh blood from the desert into the sown. The antagonism between the dweller in the tent and the ploughman who settled in the border agrarian countries also represented constant interaction and interrelation between the migratory and the settled populations. Syria, because of its proximity to the Mediteranean and to the desert, became what Prof. Elihu Grant once called the "school of the Semitic peoples."[1]

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[1] *P.* 43, *footnote.*

[2] *Ibid, P.* 3.

There is no pure Semitic or Arabian race. The majority of Arabs, according to modern anthropologists, are "classical Mediterraneans." Along the costal fringe—from Kuwait to Hodaida—is a maritime population of mixed racial origin. Those designated as *Armenoid* are relatively few except in Oman. In Hadramaut, concentrated in the Dhofar and Quara mountains is the *Veddoid* element mixed with the Mediterranean. This element is similar to one found in southern India and in Baluchistan, a very old aboriginal race not found north of al-Rab'al-Khali. Some writers have spoken of a Hamitic element in Arabia. Prof. Coon of Harvard thinks that there is no such element except for recent immigrants from Somali.

When we come to the threshold of recorded history the Semitic or Arabic type, now fairly well mixed, had attained some cultural unity which left its imprint on the civilization of the Tigro-Euphrates and Nile valleys and all countries between to the present day. The ancient cultures of the Egyptians, Semito-Hamitic, and of the non-Semitic Summarians of Babylon were absorbed by the Semitic one. In Syria particularly the Hellenic civilization had considerable influence. However, in spite of efforts to Hellenize the Semitic countries in the days of the Seleucides and Ptolemies the Semitic nature of those countries predominated. In fact the

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1. In a lecture before the Damascus Lodge of Brooklyn, a Syrian Masonic organization.

Greek culture, as Byzantine and post-classical Greeko-Roman, was itself highly influenced by the civilization prevailing in Semitic lands.

Until we come to the days of the Islamic invasion in the seventh century A.D. we cannot speak of any predominating culture in the Semitic speaking countries. Spengler refers to a Magian culture, but this must be taken in a very attenuated and vague sense. It included the Babylonian, Persian, Egyptian and Syrian strains which later entered into the making of Moslem or Arab civilization and culture. From days immemorial, the Semitic people, with their monotonic desert background retained a certain vague racial continuity, a nexus with the old that has persisted to the present day. S. I. Curtiss, in this sense spoke of "*Primitive Semitic Religion Today,*" which is the title of a book by him on survival of Semitic religious folklore among the present population of Syria and Palestine, especially in the hinterland.

From roaming through the boundless desert, where he pitched his tent near some refreshing spring or followed the verdant grass with his flocks, to settling in cities with flowing rivers, was a sequence of stark necessity for the desert Arabian nomad. But wherever he went the Arab treasured in his heart racial memories of his desert homeland which found expression in his religious institutions, his folklore, his traditions, his daily habits, as well as in his fundamental outlook on life—an outlook which made Renan speak of an instinct for monotheism in the Semitic people.

At some distant past Arabia was not the arid desert we know today, as its dry wadis testify, and consequently was but a continuation of the Asiatic continent, to which and from which peoples migrated. In northern Arabia a great climatic change, we are told, came in the sixth or seventh millenium. Of this climatic change, and its profound consequences on our Western history, Henry Field says:

"This climatic change was the dominant factor in forming the civilization of Mesopotamia and Egypt, to which our civilization can be traced. There was an alternative for the early dwellers in North Arabia: They could remain as nomads in the hostile and barren wilderness, or they could trek to the east, west, and southwest. The former mode of life was chosen by the ancesters of our modern Bedwins."[1]

And it is precisely among the Bedwins of Northern Arabia, among the Rwala sub-tribe, the Suleib, and to a lesser extent among the inhabitants of the towns bordering on the Syrian Desert that we find today the best and purest specimens of the ancient Arab.

The Arab, physically viewed as a race or sub-race, perhaps is no more nor less baffling than any race or sub-race existing today. In some sections of his far-flung terrain he is as thoroughly mixed and impure as the modern Englishman or Frenchman.

Feeling I was dealing with a subject highly technical in nature and wishing to satisfy myself and thousands who have no access to purely scientific works of anthropology, I sought information mainly in the works of two of our foremost authorities on this subject—Profs. Earnest Albert Hooten and Carleton Stevens Coon, both of Harvard University, through the kind assistance of a correspondent. The following compendium is the result:

Hooton's definition of the Arab sub-race, from the purely physical aspect, follows:

"Arab (probably mainly Mediterranean with slight admixture of Armenoid and possibly Nordic.)

Racial characteristics:

Nose form: acquiline, very leptorrhine (thin, leaf-like) thin nasal tip, high bridge, compressed alae.

Head form: very dolichocephalic (long-headed) with protruding occiput.

Stature: medium, average 165 to 168 centimeters.

Hair color: black or dark brown.

Face form: eliptical (oval) long and narrow, leptoprosopic (thin-faced)

Eye-color: black or dark brown.

Skin color: brown, olive

Hair form: wavy or curly; texture medium

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[1] *Arabs of Central Iraq, p.* 78 - *Field Museum of Natural History, Anthropology, Memoirs, Vol. IV*

Body build: slender

Distribution: concentrated in Arabia, North Africa, sporadic in Spain and Southern Italy.

Prof. Hooton adds:

Except in pigmentation and in the greater prevalence of aquiline noses, this Arab sub-race is very close to the Nordic and is practically indistinguishable from it in skeletal characteristics although averaging somewhat shorter in stature.

We are told that Prof. Hooton has since discarded his theory of the Armenoid origin for the aquinility of the nose of the pure Arab; although the nose of the Arab of northern Iraq is said to be influenced by Armenoid admixture.

Prof. Coon states that ethnically the Nejdis, Transjordanians, and the people of the Syrian Desert are one . He divides the Rwala into two types: 1. The Grosser type—broader face; noses varying from the straight Mediterranean to the broad type. 2. The finer type—sheikyly families—narrower face; narrower, concave or beaked nose. The Shammar are taller that the Rwala and the sedentary northern Bedwins are even taller than the Shammar.

The purest Mediterranean types in Arabia are found among the Sleibis (Sleib) and among the Plateau Yemenis, who are lighter skinned than the other Bedwins. The people of the Yemen Coast, however, are of a very different racial type—being brachycephalic (having a short skull of excessive breadth), rather like Indonesians. The permanent population of Jidda, Mecca, Taif and Medina is very heterogeneous, being less than one-half Arab. Even the old families (which have kept aloof) of these cities are surely not of pure Mediterranean origin; they are from tall to medium in height; have broad shoulders; are heavy, muscular and fat; have large mesocephalic (medium heads) to brachycephalic heads; broad, long faces; frequently large-tipped, fleshy noses; prominent chin and heavy beard.

In Syria, the Desert border groups (people of Homs, Hama and Aleppo; districts of Mharda, Hafar and Hijana) are intermediate between the nomad Bedwins and the Mountain groups. The Mountain groups (Lebanese Alawiya, Mitwali and Druse) are fully brachycephalic; average 167 centimeters in height; are thicker set than Bedwins; some are corpulent; 80% are brunet-white, 20% have pinkish-white skin; thick wavy hair, occipital flattening of the head; convex nose, moderately thick.

In Iraq the people are taller (168-171 cms.) than in Arabia; their noses are broader and longer; the jaws are heavier, broader and deeper (especially in northern Iraq)—all of which is transitional to the Armenoid type.

As for the original Sumerians, they were definitely not of pure Mediterranean type. The Mediterranean type is absent from the remains of al-Ubaid and Kish; it does not appear till well after 3000 B. C., perhaps even as late as 2700 B. C. The 17 skulls from al-Ubaid are of the so-called Eurafrican type: dolichocephalic, large and heavy, with high nasal bones. In the earliest Kish graves there were found full-fledged Armenoid brachycephalec skulls."[1]

When anthropology however, has said its final word about a people, assuming its word is the incontestable truth, has it said anything definitive? It all depends on the point of view or interest. If all that interests us about the Arab is to know whether he is dolichocephalic, or brachycephalic, whether his face is elliptical, round or hatchet-shaped, whether his stature is medium or tall, then our scientific curiosity should be satisfied for the present. There is scant material from the distant past, and only skeletal remains from prehistoric times to go by, to determine how those race strains differed in their habits, mental traits and emotional reactions. These are the things that distinguish peoples one from another, definitive data. Our state of knowledge in comparative ethnology and racial psychology is still elementary. Perhaps the human race as a whole has not lived long enough on the stage of recorded history to make a scientific determination of these matters possible. Perhaps only ten thousand years from now, with data subjected to scientific observation over thousand year periods, will it be possible for future scientists to tell our distant descendants what race really is, and whether it is race or environment that determines the differences and variants in human culture and human achievements, and, if both, to what extent each.

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[1] *Up from the Ape* by Earnest Albert Hooton pp. 509 and 540
The Races of Europe by Carleton Stevens Coon, pp. 401-415; 623-88.
The Anthropology of the Rwala Bedouins by William M. Shanklin—Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. XLVII (1917)
The Ancient and Modern Inhabitants of Arabia by Henry Field, the Open Court, Vol. XLVI (1932) pp. 847-872
The Arabs of Central Iraq—Anthropology Memoirs of the Field Museum of Natural History, Vol. IV.
The Arabs of Iraq—American Journal of Physical Anthropology, Vol. XXI (1936) pp. 49 to 56.
Modern Arabs of the Kish Area—Field Museum News, Vol. 2
Racial Types from Southern Arabia—New Orient, 1935

In the meantime we have historic facts, as facts go, to state which is suffcient to define the Arabs as a people, if not as a physically distinctive sub-race.

Both the nomadic dwellers of the Arabian Peninsula and the Arabic speaking peoples in the fan of countries stretching eastward, northward and southwestward, including North Africa and Persia, constituted one cultural area. The civilization, or successive civilizations, that prevaled in this area influenced all the peoples therein, some more, some less, even those in distant and isolated spots of Arabia proper. This culture transcends the Semitic and overlaps it. It has elements of the Hellenic and of the Persian. Within this aura of economic, social, psychical and spiritual influences there were more intense developments, more congenial nationalistic community centres that would be respectively designated as Hebrew, Arab, Egyptian, Hellinic, Babylonian, Persian or Byzantine. The Phoenicians, whom the Lebanese of our day would adopt as their ancestors were one of those communities, closely related to the Canaanites of the interior plains, the Arameans of Damascus or the Bedwins of the Syrian Desert, and probably not as closely related to the Egyptians, Assyrians or South Arabians. But to think of those communities as insulated cells, to speak of pure Phoenician or pure Hebrew even in biblical days, is to speak of something incomprehensible and contrary to the facts of history. Generally speaking, all the peoples in those areas inter-married, and their ideas, habits and emotional reactions interacted and were influenced one by the other.

Most of them spoke languages which derived from one original tongue, designated by some orientalists as Ursemtic or original Semitic. This original language, unlike the Latin which gave rise to the Romance languages, has been lost forever because it was an oral language and never recorded. In the days of Christ one of those Semitic languages, the Aramaic, attained universality among all the Semitic peoples between the Two Rivers and the Great Sea.

But it was in the seventh century A.D. that the countries we now call the Arabic-speaking world began to assume a unified culture and civilization that has lasted to the present day. One must be on his guard, however, when evaluating the rise of Islam not to think of it merely as another religion superimposing itself on already existing monotheistic religions, nor to picture it as issuing from a comparative ethnic or cultural vacuity of an arid desert. Islam was not a new religion. It was a reassertion of a Semitic interpretation of religion which, in predominantly Semitic countries, was threatened by submersion and obliteration by a distinctly non-Semitic, Greek, interpretation. Nor was Arabia before Isiam completely isolated from the countries surrounding it, even in its darkest days of *Jahiliyyah* (ignorance.) Two Arabian dynasties, a Christian one in the interior of Syria and a heathen one, with a large element of Eastern Christians, in Mesopotamia, were intermediaries through which Arabia proper kept in constant touch with the ancient civilization of the Fertile Crescent. The Ghassanites to the northwest were pro-Byzantine, the Hirites to the northeast were pro-Sassinide or Persian. But in both the Semitic, Arabic, ethnic characteristics predominated. They were Arabs before Islam and Arabs after Islam. To the present day Christian Arabs of Syria and Lebanon talk of their Ghassanite origin with a racial pride as strong as in any Moslem families of Qureish or Tamim. Suleiman Bustani told the author that Christian Arabs of Syria (and Lebanon) have a better claim to racial purity than Moslem Arabs, because Moslems intermarried more freely with non-Arab Moslem nationals, whereas the Christian Arabs were more restricted in their marital choice.

Prof. Hitti, who seems to hesitate between one view which would regard the Arabians as somewhat distinct and different from the other Semitic peoples of the Fertile Crescent and another which would class them as fundamentally one, rightly speaks of the Arab Islamic civilization as "the logical continuation of the early Semitic civilization of the Fertile Crescent." "In it," he continues, "the unity of the Mediterranean civilization of Western Asia found its final culmination."[1]

More significantly still this unification and culmination of culture began to assume, for the first time in history, a nationalistic hue. At no time before were all the Semitic peoples under one rule, as they were since the Arab invasion. And, what is more important, they were unified for the first time not as conquered people under a native or foreign king, but as free citizens. The common people under the Arabs came to their own. Once within the fold of Islam, no matter what the antecedent or race of an individual, he became a member of a world-wide fraternity. This, perhaps, was one of the chief attractions of this religion to the Semitic inhabitants of the conquered lands. They had been under the bondage of a kingship which recognized no rights for the common man. Because Islam was both religion and nationality, morality and law, a spiritual influence and a mundane movement, the democratic, human principles which underlied it as they underlied Christianity and Judaism before it, became not merely idealistic objectives but a social code and a political charter. Thus the democratic spirit, innate in the individualistic Arab of the desert, gained a religious sanction. This spirit the fierce fanatics, who went out of Arabia to conquer an erring world of servile subjects and despotic kings, carried with them as they carried the message of the oneness of Allah and the messengership of the prophet Mohammed.

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[1] *History of the Arabs*, pp. 174-175

Yet this simple and inspiring religion was not destined to retain its pristine simplcity very long. It became amenable to the influences of the older civilizations and religions which it conquered. Semitic Syrian Christians, Persians, Copts, Jews contributed to a civilization which, because of its unifying agency and nationalistic inspiraton became known as Islamic civilization. Looked at from the purely nationalistic point of view it may be regarded as Arabic, looked at from the point of view of culture, it was Semitic, looked at from the point of view of religion it was Islamic.

One thing was certain. In the predominantly Semitic sections—Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Northern Africa, the Arabic language supplanted the native languages of Syriac, Coptic, Persian or Berber. In time this Arabic language, more than Islam itself, became the chief medium of unification. The Arabs are those who speak the Arabic language and share the traditions and associations of Arab history. And in this sense we speak today of an Arab nation and of Arabs, differing as these may do in their religions and pre-Islamic antecedents.

Thirteen odd centuries of political unity and religious supremacy, which left the "people of the book" a great deal of local autonomy in the realm of personal status law, and the unifying potency of one language have given all Arabic speaking peoples national unity unparalleled in many countries of Europe today. There is far less incompatibility and fundamental differences between the Christian Lebanese and Moslem Iraqi today than between the Welsh and the English within the United Kingdom, or between the Bavarian and Prussian. Indeed, it was Christians of Syria, and particularly Lebanese Christians, who must be credited with the renaissance of Arabic literature, and who contributed thus to the rise of modern Arab nationalism.

CHAPTER TWO

ARAB NATIONALISM AND WORLD UNITY

The modern concept of nationalism, as group idealism, is comparatively new in history—in fact the American colonies may well be called the first true nation, and the French revolution, patterned after the American one, was the first clarion call of national freedom and democracy to reverberate throughout the world. The older concept of nationalism may rest finally on racial affinity, religious belief or racial psychology; but modern nationalism has definite objectives, social, cultural, economic which are consciously adopted by a group or community, usually within definite geographic boundaries, but independent of them or of racial considerations. This conscious adoption assumes the tensity and devotion of a religion. Nationalism in this respect may logically be considered a religion of democracy. Arab nationalism at its golden age was the nearest approach to modern nationalism up to the eighteenth century. Instead of individual salvation, the keystone of the older salvation religions, social salvation becomes the banner inscription of this newer religion.[1]

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[1] Edwin Schoonmaker, in his *Democracy and World Dominion,* p. 228, speaks of the political ideologies, particularly communism, which are sweeping our world today, as a return to a world of faith which characterized the Middle Ages. Nationalism has many similarities, and many dissimilarities with these ideologies. It shares with them, however, this religious quality.

In Syria, or Palestine, today one has but to close his eyes to imagine the return of conditions almost identical with those under which Christ roamed the hills of Galilee, preached in the town synagogues and suffered martyrdom in Jerusalem. He, too, was contending for a democracy of the spirit which seemed in his days so hopelessly overwhelmed by the power and majesty of the existing order. One almost would think of Mahatma Gandhi as another Christ, and of other nationalist leaders—Sa'd Zaghlul, Mustapha Kemal, Hajj Ameen al-Huseini, and many others—as minor Messiahs, with their faces determinedly set against the Jerusalem of national independence, with their gospels, essentially alike in their fundamental principles, and with their disciples. Are not the British and French Empires of today analogous with the Roman Empire which kept peace among the Barbarians in order that the patricians of Rome might enjoy a life of lavish splendor and wanton epicurianism? Are not the friends of the nationalists abroad but a modern version of the God-fearers who sympathized with the Jews and from among whom the contemptible Nazarenes made first converts? The parallelism could be carried out indefinitely. We have the Sadducees in the coontries of the exploited natives who are in league with the powers that be, who scoff at heterodoxy and innovations and stick to the Five Books of order, sanity and the divine rule of those who have and who hold. And we have among the nationalists themselves, followers of the new religion, moderates, zealots and hypocrites—those who counsel against violence, those who lack vision and to whom nationalism has already become a dogma and a creed of dead letters, the furious, impatient, single-minded devotees, and the cynical, selfish opportunists who stand to gain by the waving of the flag of nationalism, and would step into the shoes of the foreign exploiters at the first opportunity. The Pharisees, good, bad and indifferent are also with us today. And again we may point in our day to the Essenes or pacifists and internationalists, who see no essential difference between a foreign Claudius os a native Zaccheus, both of whom equally fatten on the blood of the peasant and worker. Those modern Essenes would not lift a finger to drive the oppressing imperialist, and live in blissful oblivion of the enemy within and the enemy without. Their heads are in the clouds of lofty, benign humanitarianism, while about their feet thousands of victims fall exhausted and bleeding. Today also we have our nationalist martyrs who court death in the battlefield with the same reckless courage and sublime cheer that characterized the martyrs of early Christianity.

It took almost two thousand years to evaluate with its full stature, the meaning of Christianity and the simple gospel of the great Nazarene. And we are hard put, as we stand face to face before this cataract of human emotions and deep-seated, half-articulate impulses and reactions, to define this new religion of nationalism. It is almost superhuman. Yet unless a definition is given, convincing and objective, how can the new religion be understood? One of the poignant tragedies of nationalism is the strange suspicion with which it is regarded by the average man and woman in the street in the countries of the imperialist nations, even by intelligent individuals who devote considerable time to the study of social problems differing only in name and circumstance from those being faced by the nationalists. This suspicion rises not so much from ignorance of the general conditions and forces which have brought about the struggle between exploiters and exploited, imperialists and natives; it rises from fear that while the objectives of nationalism are generally-speaking just, they can be realized only at the expense of the common citizens of the imperialist nations. The same struggle for freedom in Asia or Africa, the same aspiration for liberty, the same yearning for happiness and well-being have been put forth by imperialists as a threat not only to the dominance, but to the very existence of Western nations. Even a keen observer and analytical critic as Mr. Schoonmaker fails to detect the docile and quite harmless Hindu or Moslem under the fancied masquerade of a yellow or Asiatic peril. Beyond this suspicion, undoubtedly, is a superiority complex and xenophobia that refuse to allow the Asiatic, Arab, Indian or Chinese, the same right to liberty, redress of social and economic wrongs or pursuit of happiness as the white-skinned Nordic or brunet Latin. It is as if one would admit that it is allright for Patrick Henry, a Celtic to say, "Give me liberty or give me death," but when the same impassioned cry escapes the lips of a Koomar Lal or an Ahmad Mustafa it becomes automatically a heresy that should be put down by airplane bombs and machine-guns.

There are large and increasing numbers of fair-minded and far-visioned Western students of world affairs who are beginning to realize the universality of human discontent and human aspirations, and whose keen sense of justice prevents them from discriminating against an oppressed brother in humanity simply because he lives on a *sampan* or under a flat roof. It was an American missionary, who had arrived at such a catholic feeling for humanity, who once said that the greatest political fact today is the discovery by oriental people that Christ was an oriental like them.[1]

It is now for the Western people generally, especially those who profess to follow Christ's way, to discover that Christ had his own Semitic kinsmen and other orientals in mind when He said, "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me." Probably He was not aware of any European people, and the Finns had not even come into existence.

What is nationalism? Again to revert to the parallelism of the days of Christ the statement of the question in itself raises as many doubts, misgivings and frank agnosticism as the question addressed by Pontius Pilate to the Master brought for examination before him: What is truth? And many today in Europe and America wash their hands as cavalierly as Pilate himself, avowing themselves innocent of the blood and misery of millions of Arabs, Hindus and Chinese. But history will not absolve them anymore than it absolved Pilate.

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[1] Rev. James Yard in an interview with the author for the Brooklyn Daily Eagle, June 13, 1926.

Undoubtedly one of the main obstacles in a true understanding of nationalism is its encompassing latitudinarianism. Communism, nazism, fascism, militarism, reactionism and half a dozen other isms have found their way into the inclusive range of nationalism. A bitter and savage war in Spain was fought between two camps each of which was as ardently convinced of its Spanish nationalism as the other. Today nationalism is a world menace in a country like Japan, fighting a neighboring country expressly for fear of its nationalism. In Germany nationalism has become a fanaticism far more dangerous and formidable than any *mahdiism* could possibly be.

All these movements have one thing in common; reaction against outside interference, repression or domination, against the right of national self-expression. This natural and healthy instinct is so easy to exploit, so pliable and amorphous that the temptation to turn it into crooked courses of mass exploitation for the aggrandisement and enrichment of the few is an ever present one. The result is the creation of evils within the nation seven times as bad as the evils which the nationalists seek to exorcise. Fed on opposition to aggression from the outside, nationalism tends to become aggressive and seeks to defend itself not only against actual enemies who thwart the nation's will, but against potential ones or against competition from a neighboring nation.

This common element, however, is not definitive and least significant. It is negative and has reference to the international aspects. From this aspect it is viewed as an element of disturbance and conflict between politically entrenched and economically superior nations and other nations seeking political independence and economic security, if not equality. But nationalism viewed as a disturbance of the status quo is a grotesque distortion. It is to look at the billowy waves and judge the deep and mighty ocean by this ephemeral surface disturbance.

In the past, nationalism took the course of natural evolution. It was subject to involuntary forces over which it could exercise little power or control. For the last two hundred years it has passed into the stage of conscious evolution, where will and moral values are violently contending with the laws of economic determinism. Many factors have contributed to this change, not least of which, paradoxical as it may appear, was imperialism itself. For to justify its immoral aggression, imperialism invoked higher moral values in the name of humanity, international amity and world peace and order. These moral values came at last to roost at the very door of imperialism, to plague it and exact from it their logical fulfillment.

At the same time nationalism has reached its most acute stage just at a time when the whole world has shrunk in space and time to proportions of a small kingdom of the past. The paradox of nationalism is that it seems to have reached a point of most intense and imperative will to live at a time when it is least appreciated or needed. The paradox is too deep and significant to dismiss with a light gesture. Like many paradoxes of this sort it implies the necessity for a higher reconciling synthesis. It is, in fact, one with the paradox of individualism versus social control which has become such a burning issue in the evolution of our social and economic interrelations within the one nation.

Prof, Hocking, who has given deep thought and philosophic reflection to this conflict between national individualism and inter-national responsibility, realizes fully that at present "there is no such thing as a purely independent sovereign state." Yet he himself realizes as few have realized the true meaning of nationalism,[1] and its justification within its limitations, its inner significance. Rightly he calls the state *an experiment in living* in which the independent state represents the aggregate will and self-expression of its members. Independence thus becomes, as I pointed out in an Arabic editorial over eighteen years ago, the condition without which national progress cannot be achieved. To withhold independence from a nation "because it is not worthy of it," to await a state of full political maturity and sapience before granting it the boon, is to deny it the very means by which it could most logically and securely attain its coveted end. To demand that a nation acquire a right through progress and reform for independence is to put the cart before the horse, not to speak of the temptation to perpetuate those very conditions of backwardness which are cited as obstacles in the path of independence.

It is in this group self-expression that we recognize the deepest spring and most vital force in national evolution today. This new self-awareness is the essence and substance of nationalism. They fail to understand it who interpret it as "a revolt" against this or that dominating power; they belittle and insult it who speak of it as a petulant demand for power and office by a handful of self-seeking politicians; they only add fire to its intensity who seek to strifle it with paltry bribing of economic improvements and more orderly government. Katherine Mayo and others sadly misunderstand it when they ridicule the college and university graduates of a country like India, going about with their diplomas in hand looking for some sinecure government appointment. Katherine Mayo displays the characteristic attitude of the nouveau riche who is the last to appreciate the hard efforts and struggles of less fortunate members of his or her own class.

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[1] *The Spirit of World Politics,* p. 162. The whole chapter in which this page occurs, "The Many Nations," is significant reading.

And it is in this insatiable instinct of group or national self-expression itself that we find the solution for our paradox. Adequate self-expression of the individual requires sufficient and congenial environment. This environment naturally presents itself within the physical boundaries and cultural affinities of the nation. A lesser sub-division, within the nation itself, leads to disintegration and artificial cultural values, a more inclusive one leads to stifling of the will to create and to conflict of ideals. As long as there are many languages and many historical traditions, there will be many nations and many cultures.

Whether this condition is a desirable one or not is only an academic question at our stage of historic development. We are still centuries removed from a world conditioned for a universal culture, let alone a universal language or universal government. Even with such a cosmic unity, if achieved at the sacrifice of particular expressions of the universal humanity which underlies all cultures and all self-expressions, something very real is lost. A world culture to be truly inclusive and appealingly colorful must be a composite of the world's various cultures, freely and naturally developed to maturity of world self-expression. A world in which Japanese painters are expert imitators of Italian masters, or Syrian musicians adept pupils of Chopin and Bach, is a sorry world. For if Japanese art is not developed within the congenial confines of Japanese environment, language and tradition by Japanese artists, where would one look for it? And if Arabic poetry is abandoned by the Syrian or Egyptian bard for the sickly imitation of English or French poetry, is not something lost that no Tennyson or Moliere can possibly give us?

All the prerequisities of nationhood—geographic unity, historical continuity, economic interdependence, cultural affinity—are present today in the Arab nation. All the countries which this national entity embraces are grouped around the Mediterranean basin and in-land—Morocco, Algiers, Tunisia, Tripoli, Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Palestine, Iraq and Arabia proper. The great majority of the population of this vast expanse, which leaves out of consideration Arabic speaking Moslems in Central Africa or the Somililand, is Moslem, and the great majority of those Moslems belong to one large division, the Sunnites or Orthodox Moslems.[1]

Arab nationalism may be adequately defined in relation to other manifestations of nationalism now rife in the world by showing not its resemblances to these, but its differences. For in these differences lie its true distinction.

Unlike communism, Arab nationalism is particularistic not universal. It is the resuscitation of a particular nation. The Arab nation, embracing and assimilative as it proved to be in its history, is today a particular, definite nation, with definite traditions and historic continuity. Beyond the consciousness of Arab nationalism that certainly came about with the Islamic invasion of the eighth century and was highly developed by the Umayyads, only to be merged and lost in a sort of Moslem internationalism under the Abbasides, there lies the substratum of Semitic civilization, as we have seen, in which Arabs and other Semitic nationalities before them shared. But it was this Arab invasion, and the melding, moulding power of Islam that gave this amorphous mass definite form.

Unlike nazism or fascism, Arab nationalism, with just as much historic claim within its borders, feels no urge for the revival of aggressive imperialism. All the parts of the Arabic-speaking world today are moving into a logical and harmonious unity, like parts of a picture puzzle that are brought together by invisible hands. There is no problem of an anschluss, because there is a growing conviction that any forced unity would work against the inner harmony, which is the essence of true nationalism. In the meantime, with the multiplication of modern means of communication, physical and mental, the movement for unity is gaining acceleration. The immediate problem is the creation of a state adequate enough to realize the inner objectives of Arab nationalism. For this security is imperative, and a sufficiently large population to make this nationalism economically workable. The nucleus of an Arab state-nation would be a political unity of Syria, Palestine, Iraq and Transjordan, where there is sufficient proximity of political outlook and aspirations. It will be a long time, perhaps, before a more extended Pan-Arabism would be realized politically, although culturally it is already in the process of realization. As an intermediary step for an Arab federation, an economic confederation of independent and semi-autonomous states may be first undertaken. This will assuage the misgivings of the Christian minority in Lebanon which fears engulfment in a predominently Moslem Pan-Arab state.

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[1] The figures, based on a population map in Hitti's History show 37,300,000 Moslems in a total of 41,500,000. Syria shows the biggest ratio of the non-Moslems (mostly Christians) to the Moslem population, and Iraq, the biggest ratio of Shiites, over 30%, to Sunnites.

The most serious obstacles to the ultimate realization of Arab nationalism, however, are not internal but external. Chief of these is the tenacious hold by Western imperialist powers on Arab lands inherently and potentially necessary for the fulfillment of Arab nationalism—Sudan, Algeria, Morocco, Tunnis, Libya—all lying in Africa, and Aden in Arabia. Unless it is secretly planned to obliterate every vestige of Arabic culture and national feeling in those countries it is hard to see how any of them could be permanently alienated from the Arab fold. Today Arab nationalism, conscious and articulate, is ten times more intense and tenacious than Islamism from which it sprang. And considering the countless centuries before Islam in which Semitic traditions and culture had been integrated in the masses of the peoples in those countries, the claim put forth for the Roman domination of some of those countries in the past pales into insignificance. Rome only ruled east of the Mediterranean and never possessed the people.

Nor is Arab nationalism the destructive, disruptive factor it is feared to be in some quarters. The danger of disintegration through the local application of the principle of self-determination is very unlikely. Equally unlikely is the assumption of military aggression and chauvnism that have vitiated nationalism in the cockpit of Europe. Under the goading of extreme provocation Arab nationalism has shown only slight symptoms of rabidness, following the pattern of fascism and nazism in Europe. These symptoms are unquestionably transient and definite reactions against imperialist chauvinism and bad faith.

Hans Kohn, with an insight into Arab nationalism that has not been surpassed among Western writers on the subject, thus sums up his evaluation of this nationalism and defines its departure from other manifestations of nationalism in Europe:

> "In the Hither East, nationalism is exercising the intellectual function that it exercised in Europe a hundred years ago. There nationalism stands approved in its original character as a struggle for freedom, the dawning consciousness of the national individuality as a creative force."[1]

It is well to remember this, for to study Arab nationalism only from the outside as an object of manipulation or an impediment in the way of sweeping Western domination, is to study it standing on one's head. But to study it from the inside, is to view it in its proper perspective. Then it will appear as a potent factor in our changing world, a force for construction capable of creating positive cultural values, indispensable in a world of vital variety groping for a higher, more glorious unity.

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1. *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East,* p. 50

CHAPTER THREE

TAPROOTS OF ARAB NATIONALISM

The rise of Arab nationalism, as the rise of all nationalism in the East, is directly and definitely traceable to the urgent necessity of sweeping reforms along lines of evolution followed by Western nationalism itself, and of adapting the ways of the East more closely to those of the West.

In his invaluable book, *The Arab Awakening,* George Antonius makes this quite clear by tracing the rise of Arab nationalism to the literary renaissance launched first in Syria by American and other missionaries. The foretaste of freedom which those missionaries gave to the small circle of proselytes and co-workers who came in intimate contact with them, the spirit of sacrifice and devotion in the service of an ideal, the contagious zeal and assiduity with which those missionaries worked to improve the condition of the poor and down-trodden people, were seeds which fell on fertile and thirsty soil, destined to bear abundant and rich fruits. It was not correctly nationalism that those missionaries inculcated in the hearts of the natives. It was patriotism of a sort that had almost been forgotten and obliterated in the unhappy history of the East. It was Christianity applied to the proper business of the community, a Christianity channelized and organized by the help of science and a new gospel of cooperation.

But it was only when this new spirit had penetrated to the masses of the peoples, when love of country was translated into terms of social awakening that patriotism assumed the aspects of organized nationalism with accelerated momentum. Only in the last few years, when the incubus of foreign domination has been sufficiently lifted to spare the latent energies of Arab nationalists for action in this direction, Arab nationalism may be said to have come to its own. Until very recently Arab nationalism has been practically preoccupied with and preempted by fighting, first Turkish domination and afterwards the enslaving encroachments of the mandatory regimes which sought to snatch away the newly acquired liberty, so dearly bought.

Arab nationalism received its nurture from two living streams of vital evolution. One was an extensive reform movement within the Ottoman Empire and championed at its start mostly by Turkish reformers; the other was primarily and preeminently a religious movement for the purification and revivification of Islam. It is important for the full understanding of the rise of Arab nationalism to remember some fundamental historical facts that stamped their imprint deep into the hearts of the masses. One of these facts is that the majority of the people in the Arab lands, and in some parts, almost the whole population, were Moslems. And because Islam, for centuries past had become a statehood and nationality it was almost impossible for the great majority of the Arab Moslems to think of the Ottoman Empire as something distinct and different from themselves. Another is the fact that sovereignty had long ago passed from Arab hands into those of Mongols, Kurds, and Turks who wrested the sceptre of Islam from their hands and saved it from subjugation and annexation by the Christian Crusaders. The Turks in the eyes of most Arab Moslems became not only the rightful rulers, who succeeded other non-Arab rulers, but also the defenders of the faith and the custodians of the holy places and of the traditions of Islam. Inversely, Christians living within the Ottoman Empire were regarded somewhat as semi-autonomous communities alien to Islam and its institutions. For these reasons the furtive efforts by the early Christian literati, of which George Antonius speaks in his book, did not have a telling effect until Arab Moslems joined hands with the Christian nationalists in a fight for a common national ideal that transcended considerations of religious loyalties and religious differences. This also explains the stolid attitude of apathy and even opposition to Arab nationalism by many enlightened Moslems who were no less sincere or patriotic despite their attachment to the Sublime Porte. They saw no need of an Arab nation cut off from the larger body of a Moslem empire.

In the early days of Arab nationalism, preceeding the proclamation of the Ottoman Constitution of 1908, there was no conscious or well formulated trend to separate from the Turks. The Arab nationalists then considered themselves in all earnestness and without any feeling of disloyalty to their own Arab nationalism, as Ottoman subjects like more progressive Turks. This was true even of many Arab Christian patriots who had also come under the influence of Western missionaries. Nor was there a consciousness among Turkish reformers themselves of an opposition to Arab national reform, even local semi-autonomy.

There is a parallel in Turkish history to the rise of Arab nationalism, and a community of interests between Turkish and Arab reformers from the early decades of the nineteenth century down to 1908. The Arab writer of Turkish origin, Waliyy-al-Din Yaghan, who was one of the pioneers of the Arab renaissance and of Arab nationalism has given an enlightening account of the work of Turkish reformers and their influence on the development of nationalism throughout the Ottoman Empire.[1] Foremost among these comes

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[1] *The Known and the Unknown* (*al-Ma 'lum wa-I-Majhul*)

Midhat Pasha, the father of the Ottoman Constitution of 1876 which was resurrected in 1908. It is quite true that this constitution does not take into account the distinction between the Turks and other races within the Ottoman Empire.[1] But it must be also remembered that to the mind of Midhat Pasha, as to the minds of the majority of Arab Moslem patriots there was no pronounced consciousness of a desire to separate completely from the Ottoman Empire.

Many of the Turkish governors of Syria or Iraq even encouraged local movements for enlightenment and self-rule. An interesting story illustrating this is given by Suleiman Bustani, literary figure and nationalist leader.[2] He related that when Midhat Pasha was governor in Baghdad, in the early seventies, he called the members of the local Administrative Council and told them that it was to the interest of the Ottoman Empire to increase taxation. The docile and complying councilmen replied that he was eminently right and taxes should be increased. On the following day Midhat Pasha told the councilmen that on second thought he found it a wrong policy to ask for an increase in taxation and that the project should be dropped, to which also they submissively consented. At this Midhat Pasha angrily reprimanded the councilmen, saying, "I was the author of the first proposal and also of its opposite, to both of which you gave your approval. Of what use, therefore, is a council?" He then gave them a lecture on self-confidence and told them that in the future they should not be afraid to express their opinions freely even if they disagreed with his. Rashid Pasha, a Turkish governor of Beirut, is credited with encouraging the renaissance of Arabic letters in Syria.

The world remembers the Turks mostly as they have been mirrored in accounts of the Western press and those of Christian emigres of the bloody reign of Abdul

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1. *The Arab Awakening,* pp. 63, 86 and 106.
2. *Warning and Recollection* ('Ibratun wa Dhikra) written immediately after the proclamation of the Ottoman Constitution.

Hamid II, the Red Sultan on the Bosphorus. Little cognizance is taken of the earnest efforts of the Sultans preceeding him, back to the days of Sultan Selim III at the close of the eighteenth century. For it was this Sultan who struck the first blow for reform and regeneration in the Ottoman Empire. He sought to abolish the mercenary army of the Janissaries, but was assassinated by them after a very brief reign. His successor, Sultan Mahmoud II, more astute and fortunate, succeeded in ending with a great massacre the terroristic and chaotic rule of a military cast that had dominated the sultanate for generations. In its place he organized a regular army raised by conscription and instructed in Western methods of warfare. Sultan Mahmoud II introduced other reforms, among them woman education in Constantinople.

When Sultan Abdul Majid succeeded to the throne he issued in 1839 what is known as the *Kalkhanah* or *Hamayuni Writ,* which was one of the most momentous steps in the evolution of secular nationalism in the Near East. This writ was in fact an introduction of the civil law in the Ottoman Empire, drawn mostly after the Napoleonic Code. It was the first move in the direction of the secularization of nationalism in the Islamic world, and its divorce from the canon law. And while the promulgator was careful to state in his proclamation that nothing in the writ shall be contrary to the spirit or letter of the noble Qoran or Sunna, the mere fact that a civil code was found necessary for the implimentation of the various reforms was significant enough to be revolutionary. If Mohammed Ali can be said to have "rescued Syria from medieval feudalism,"[1] Sultan Abdul Majid must be said to have given this rescue for the whole Ottoman Empire the seal of royal decree and canonical approval.

Sultan Abdul Majid by his great reform unknowingly laid the cornerstone of Arab nationalism. His famous writ made it possible for secular nationalism to develop within the Ottoman Empire. He also gave a common neutral ground for Arab Moslems and Christians to work together in the field of Arab nationalism. The brief reign of Ibrahim Pasha, son of the founder of the present Egyptian dynasty, encouraged secularism for the realization of his father's dream to separate the Arab section of the Ottoman Empire and rule over it. For this purpose it was important for him to consolidate the loyalty of the Christians of Lebanon and Syria. And for the same reason the Moslems in those countries finally turned against him.[1]

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[1] Hans Kohn, *History of Nationalism in the East,* p. 269.

The reign of Abdul Hamid, in retrospect, should be considered as an atavism. Abdul Hamid was a ruthless tyrant who arrogated to himself all authority and power, contrary to the specific limitations of the then existing constitution. Not only Arabs and Armenians suffered under him but also the Turks of Anatolia themselves. In his mad anxiety to bolster his tottering throne, he conceived of the ill-advised policy of setting one nationality or race within his empire against the other, a policy that had been employed before by Turkish Sultans, but with moderation and tact. Strangely enough this policy as Suleiman Bustani points out, was credited with the strengthening and consolidation of Arab nationalism.

In the first days of excitement and exultation which followed the restoration of the Ottoman Constitution patriotic emotions ran high. Everywhere in the empire Christians and Moslems embraced, Turks and Arabs fraternized. Even the Armenians joined in the general celebration and high optimism. The common people were not aware of the sinister shadows gathering in the distance, moving nearer and nearer, to dismember and devour the emancipated *Young Turkey.* That emotional complex which seemed to infect everyone and of which, in my college days, I was a youthful spectator, contained incompatible elements that sooner or later were bound to clash. The Turks construed this regeneration as a renewed opportunity for the unification of the Ottoman Empire through centralization in Constantinople; the Arabs as an opportunity for increased self-rule, with a vague and undefined loyalty to the Ottoman Empire. It was a situation not much different from that which obtained in the Balkans and within the Austrian Empire, where Magyars, Croatians, Czechs and others were clamoring for some sort of autonomy.

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[1] *The Arab Awakening,* p. 33.

In its two extreme types, this undifferentiated patriotism was polarized into two bitterly opposed political camps. The *Young Turks* were not only determined to keep the non-Turkish *wilayahs* securely bound to the Ottoman capital, but openly talked of Turkifying them. The Arabs who were being gradually alienated began openly to clamour for decentralization. It was not until a few years before the outbreak of the World War that Arab nationalism may be said to have evolved from its embryonic state. At this stage, more definitely after the convening of the Ottoman Parliament in which views of Turkish and Arab representatives began to clash, we begin to witness the rise of Arab secret societies plotting for complete liberation from the Turks.

The conflict of loyalties among Arab nationalists gave rise to a class of sycophants who were later stamped by Arab nationalists as traitors and renegades. A story told by the veteran Arab nationalist, Dr. Abdul-Rahman Shahbandar, refers to this period or a little after: It was in the early days of the war when Jamal Pasha, stern exponent of Turkification, was seeking to suppress Arab nationalism in Syria by imprisoning and executing Arab leaders. On one of his visits to Damascus, he called the various leaders together for a demonstration of loyality to the empire. One speaker after another stood up and delivered a speech of fulsome praise. One of them, a wiley and unprincipled politician, while delivering his speech came to a sentence in which he said: "As for those who seek to separate between the Turks and the Arabs, etc." As he pronounced these words he turned to the Arabs and winked in the direction of the Turkish officials and immediately turned to the Turks and winked in the direction of the Arabs.

It was the intensified nationalism of the Ottomanists or national Turks that brought about the alienation of the Arabs from the empire, and the birth of Arab national awareness. "Centralization" of authority in Constantinople and the consolidation of the Ottoman Empire became synonomous in the minds of those Turks with "Turkification." The rise of political Arab nationalism was a reaction to Turkish nationalism and a protest against the submergence of the Arab race in the Turkish one.

The year 1913 marks the beginning of this brief stage. It was in that year that the various Arab political societies, all believing in decentralization and local autonomy of one sort or another, held a congress in Paris. Arab representatives and spokesmen went to that congress from various Arab lands, from the United States and from South America. The deliberations of those representative Arab leaders convinced the Turks that the Arab nationalists were irrevocably committed to local autonomy and ultimate independence. Later the Turks tried to win Arab leaders by diplomacy. They conceded many reforms to the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire; but the Arab national movement had already progressed too far to be effectively curbed. Among the concessions granted by the Turks were: Recognition of the Arabic languages as official language in the Arabic-speaking parts of the empire; local administration of the *awqf* and of public works; restriction on enlisted Arabs to service in parts not distant from their own; appointment of three Arabs in the council of ministers and proportionally in other high positions of the state, etc.[1]

One thing should be said here. Long before the Paris

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[1] *The Arab Awakening,* p. 116-17 also in *Tali'ah* magazine (Damascus), January-February, 1938.

Congress there were many sincere Arab leaders who believed that the Arab nation could not come into existence without outside aid. They sought such help from France and Great Britain. But French and British diplomats never took Arab nationalist aspirations too seriously. They regarded the whole movement as an opportunity for their governments to step in and dismember the Ottoman Empire, in accordance with secret plans and understandings tentatively arrived at long before the Sykes-Picot Treaty. Almost every Arab school child knew that Palestine was supposed "to go" to the British and the rest of Syria to the French. In justice to those Arab nationalists of the school of Emir Shakib Arislan and Abdul-'Aziz al-Tha'alibi who sided with the Ottoman Empire during the war, it must be mentioned that they warned of the intrigues of the French and British chancelleries. They counselled the Arabs that they would get a far better deal from the Turks after the war than from their newly acquired allies. But Arab blood had been shed and Arab nationalists were irrevocably estranged from the Turks. The terrorism of Jamal Pasha was a decided factor in the crystallization of Arab nationalism. It prepared the way for complete Arab independence.

With equal truth it may be said that there were many among the spokesmen and leaders of Arab nationalism before the Paris Congress, and long after it, who were imbued with motives not quite nationalistic, in any critical sense of the word. Some were Pan-Islamists whose main interest was to wrest the caliphate from "the infidel Turks," some were disgruntled aristocrats gunning for greater local power, and some were out and out Francophiles or Anglophiles who distrusted the ability of their own people to rule themselves. In the days following the war many of those anti-Turks nationalists became strong pro-French advocates, discredited by the Arab nationalist movement. It was evident that liberation from the Turks, to their minds, was only a means to bring their countries under the domination of an alien Christian power. This group on one hand and Pan-Islamists on the other represented two extremes incompatible with the general trend of Arab nationalism.

In an ethnological sense the taproots of nationalism go deep in the subsoil of Arab consciousness. Not withstanding their power of adaptibility to and assimilation with other nationalities among whom they cast their lot, in Arab lands the Arabs kept their identity as much as possible from the non-Arab races. The Mongols, Kurds, and Turks who overran the Arab lands passed away, leaving little to be remembered by. On the contrary, the Arab religion of Islam became the religion of the conquerors, and with it Arabic culture and Arabic traditions. Before the World War it was estimated that forty per cent of literary Turkish consisted of Arabic words. Even at the lowest ebb of their history, Arabs never forgot the heydays of the Umayyad and Abbaside dynasties when Arabic literature, Arabic philosophy, and Arabic science dominated the cultured world of that time. Throughout the period of Arab stagnation, from the decadent days of the latter Abbaside dynasty in the 11th century down to the opening of the nineteenth, Arab nationalism was subconsciously translated in the minds of Arabs, Moslems and Christians alike, as an inseparable aspect of Islam. True enough, Christians, Jews and Sabaeans had a substantial share in the development of this Arab or Moslem civilization; but theirs was a subordinate role. In the light of medieval ideology they felt as strangers and outsiders. Since they were not Moslems, they shared not as fully and freely in the communion of Arab nationalism. They were less supressed, be it said to the eternal credit of Islam, than Jews were in Christian Europe. Nevertheless they were *dhimmites,* proteges of Islam, whose fate as well as security were entrusted to the conscience of Islam and the sacred protection of the Qoran.

With the rise of secular Arab nationalism, which tended to subordinate and minimize the religious connotations of Arab history and traditions, there was a corresponding revival of religious sentiment among Moslem Arabs, and a realization of the abject degradation and corruption of Islam. Secular nationalism reacted on Islam, as the rejuvenation of Islam itself lent power to the rise of secular nationalism. Nor it is surprising that among the staunchest leaders of Arab nationalism, even to the present day, are Moslem religious leaders whose concept of Islam does not preclude a free and independent Arab nation. The name of Hajj Mohammed Amin al-Huseini suggests itself to mind. For it was as Grand Mufti of Palestine, head of the Palestine Moslem Supreme Council and highest administrator of the Palestine Moslem religious endowments, and as descendant of the Prophet, that his leadership of the Arab nationalist movement of Palestine received its popular support among the masses of that country. In neighboring Syria men like Shaykk Abdul-Hamid al-Zihrawi, who presided over the Paris Arab Congress, Shaykk Salim al-Bukhari of Damascus and others were both religious and nationalist leaders. And while Sa‘d Zaghloul Pasha is associated in the minds of most students of Arab nationalism as a secular leader, it is not often remembered that he was a graduate of al-Azhar. This famous Moslem theological school of Cairo, of which we will have more to say in another chapter, was an important center not only of religious agitation against Western, Christian, imperialism, but more definitely of Egyptian secular nationalism.

The deeper, historical trends of Arab nationalism crystallized into two movements which have much in common—Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism. It is not our purpose here to trace their historical developments, but to study their implications, their significance and their probable infiuence on the future of Arab nationalism.

The point of contact between the two movements is the restoration of sovereignty and leadership in the

Moslem world to Arab lands. In this light the Wahhabi reform which took rise in the heart of the Arabian desert in the latter part of the 18th century becomes doubly significant. For it was a source of inspiration both to Moslem religious reformers and to Arab nationalists. The nationalistic significance of Wahhabism is that its rise was the first serious challenge to the Ottoman claim of the caliphate, the first serious bid to wrest Moslem leadership from the decrepit hands of the sultans on the Bosphorus, and in so doing to bring back the centre of gravity in Moslem nationalism to an Arab land. It was a contest between Mecca, the mother of Islam, and Constantinople, its step-mother.

Contrary to a prevailing notion among many writers on the East, Wahhabism is not a progressive movement. In many respects it represents a retrogression which brushes aside precious liberal gains made through centuries. It is a puritanical movement, not unlike Protestantism in Christianity, which frowned on what it considered *innovations* in Islam. Its appeal to the single-minded and fanatical tribesmen of Najd is quite understandable when we realize that, except for its costal fringe which had faintly come in contact with the West, Arabia proper had hardly changed since the days which saw the rise of Islam itself under the inspiring leadership of its Prophet in the seventh century. Sent by his father as a little child to study in Damascus, Mohammed ‘Abdul-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism, was shocked by the corruption and laxity of Islamic life around him. He came in contact with pupils and followers of a religious reformer of the 15th century known as Ibn Taymiyyah, who revived the school of Ibn Hanbal, the most rigorous and the most narrow of the four *madhabs,* or schools of Moslem Sunnite jurisprudence.

Wahhabism inspired many leaders, both religious and secular, and lent moral strength to their struggle against Turkish domination. Moslem religious leaders with a liberal trend of mind, who differed greatly from the Wahhabis in their theological concepts but shared their reform aspirations, were pointed out in the streets of Damascus as "the Wahhabis of this nation." Both the Wahhabis and the more liberal reformers were in deadly earnest on cleansing Islam of corrupt religious leadership which prostituted itself to the whims of worldly rulers. Liberal reformers would frown on the attitude of Wahhabism which considered Shiites and other sectarians as heretics and which would restore them to orthodoxy by the sword. But both Wahhabis and liberal Moslems agreed to a return to a simpler and more objective interpretation of the Qoran and the traditions.

Behind the ambiguity that surrounds and envelopes Pan-Arabism in the minds of many lurks the subtle confusion between it and Pan-Islamism. In his article on *Pan-Arabism and the Palestine Problem,* Robert Gale Woolbert discerned this confusion, claiming that Arab nationalists are constantly making this confusion "intentionally or otherwise."[1] As Mr. Woolbert rightly points out, the two movements cannot be the same thing, for one affects only 40,000,000 at most, while the other comprises some 250,000,000 Moslems of various nationalities and races.

Pan-Islamists speak of the restoration of the caliphate when vaguely they still invest the caliph in their minds with temporal power and authority over all Moslems throughout the world. They are not discouraged by the dismal failure of the Ottoman caliph to arouse all Moslems in a call of jihad against the infidel Christians in the world war. They insist that if the caliph had been an Arab his appeal would have met with more response. There are two distinct schools of Pan-Islamism which are beginning to take more definite form. One might be called the Wahhabi school which would be satisfied with nothing short of a strictly orthodox caliphate, democratically selected, with temporal and spiritual powers combined—a sort of super-Moslem state. The other school, which might be designated as the Egyptian school, reveals itself in the growing propaganda of Egyptian Pan-Islamists in favor of King Farouk as caliph of Islam. His caliphate, if materialized, would be more of a spiritual leadership of the Moslem world with as little conflict with local Arab nationalism as possible.

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[1] Foreign Affairs, January, 1938.

Similarly there are two schools of Pan-Arabism: One envisages it as a political domination of one state over the rest, or a homogeneous Arab empire with centralized authority. The other takes its pattern from the Constitution of the United States of America in which each state is sovereign in its internal affairs with a federal government in which interstate interests of defense, communication, taxes, etc., are centralized. It is the opinion of this author that the latter interpretation is gaining steadily, as Pan-Arabism in general is supplanting Pan-Islamism in the minds and sentiments of a growing number of Moslem Arabs.

Arab nationalists have not hesitated to appeal as frequently to sympathies of non-Arab Moslems as to fellow Arabs. Such an organization as the Young Men's Moslem Association of Egypt, with branches in various parts of the Moslem world, openly appeals to the Moslem world "to retain the Islamic identity of Palestine," even when their appeal is addressed to Christian as well as to Moslem nationalists. But while most Christian nationalists resent at heart the injection of the religious issue in a purely nationalist movement, the cleavage is not correctly between Moslems and Christians. It may be safely said that there are many Christians who are willing to envisage an Arab Moslem hegemony if that will rid Arab lands of Western imperialism, and that there are many Moslem nationalists who object to a religious Moslem interpretation of Arab nationalism or Pan-Arabism as strongly as most Christian Arab nationalists. Should the Christian objection be completely removed there still would be sufficient opposition among liberal Moslems to Pan-Islamism to make a clear distinction between the two movements in the near future a grave issue and a matter of compelling necessity. It was the late Feisal, Arab king and descendant of the Prophet Mohammend, who made the statement, which was taken up as a slogan by political Pan-Arabs, that the "Arabs were before Islam," and to which another Arab king, Iba Sa'ud, made the rejoiner that "Islam was before the Arabs." Behind each of these statements is a distinct theory of nationalism and a distinct interpretation of Islam.

Strictly and historically the Pan-Islamists are on orthodox ground when they speak of Arab nationalism in terms of religion. The same, however, could have been said of Austria or Russia a few decades ago, when the emperor was styled "his most Catholic Majesty" or defender of the Orthodox faith, in fact as in name. Exceptionally tolerant as the treatment of the Christians by their Moslem conquerors, it is a matter both of history and doctrine that the former occupied an inferior status in the Moslem empire.[1] It was only after the first world war that Mustapha Kemal Pasha, Attaturk, succeeded in completely separating Islam as religion from Islam as a state within the bounds of the Turkish republic. In such countries as Egypt, Syria and Iraq, the Moslem law is tacitly, and in many cases openly recognized as the fundamental law of the land; whereas in Hijaz, Yaman and other countries within the Arabian peninsula it is still the supreme and only law. Even in an advanced country such as Egypt there always lurks the danger of a revival of the canon law and of the reorganization of the country's government on purely religious Moslem lines. A Moslem party in that country has recently made its appearance, with an estimated following of 35,000 whose platform espouses these objectives.

Pan-Islamists, therefore, whose background has been strongly influenced by religious traditions or education find it naturally hard to dissociate Islamic nationalism from Islamic religion. When Pan-Islamists are closely questioned on their nationalism it is quite as often as not that they will frankly admit their religious bias, assuring with quotations from the Qoran, of the absolute equality before Moslem law of Moslem and Dhimmite. One Moslem shaykh, a great authority on Moslem jurisprudence, argued with this author that the fate of Christians under a purely Moslem state would be better than under a secular one. Innocently enough, he declared that Christians then would not have to bear arms and fight, their security being guaranteed by their Moslem protectors! I could not then but recall the reaction among many Christians of Syria including my own father, who were elated at the declaration of the Ottoman Constitution of 1908. "Now," they said, "Christians will take their part in the empire on the ground of equality, even if it means military service."

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[1] See Hitti's *History of the Arabs,* Chapter XV.

Christian
under
authority
Muslim

The suspicion in the minds of many Christians that Pan-Arabism is a guise or veil for Pan-Islamism has kept many of them from participating fully in the Arab nationalist movement. It is among this group of Christians, especially in Lebanon, that we find the strongest objection to a Pan-Arabism that would include such states as Sa-'udia Arabia, Yaman, or ever Iraq. The most tolerant of them would restrict Pan-Arabism to a sort of confederation of Arab states at the same stage of political development—Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and possibly Iraq. To many liberal Arab Moslems Pan-Islamism not only represents a confusion between religion and secular nationalism, but implies also the fear of the revival of a narrow religious view inimical to free thought.

The question of the relation of state to religion, however, is not hopelessly beyond adjustment and reasonable settlement in time. In Western democracies this same question took generations of earnest striving and struggle to bring it to its present state of partial success. As late as 1928 the fear that a Catholic might be elected president was a live and serious issue in our enlightened and democratic United States. The incubus of doctrinated religion is still felt in the reactionary laws we have in many of our states, and in the blocking of liberal ones that affect the lives and happiness of millions. There is no reason why a slow process for the gradual elimination of religious obstacles from the path of social progress, as in Egypt, should not be preferred to violent reform. A forced change, as in Turkey, would be sure to breed rancor and intensified religious bigotry in Arab lands.

Gradually but surely the Moslem canon law is assuming in the more advanced Arab countries the limitations and potency of a personal status law. Be that as it may, Christian Arabs weaken their status considerably when they insist, as some of them do, on being considered a minority and ask "protection" of their rights from a foreign power.[1]

In some of my press articles I called Pan-Arabism a barometer of western imperial pressure, waxing strong when that pressure rose and waning when it was alleviated. This was before the revolt in Palestine took a serious turn. The effect of this revolt has been to cement Arab sentiment and national cohesion as nothing has done before. Pan-Arabism is no longer a dream, nor even a vision. It is a nascent reality awaiting its hour of birth. The post-war duplicity of the mandatory powers—Great Britain and France—did as much to hasten the development of Pan-Arabism as the spectre of fascism which threatens the whole Arab world with a consistent and rigorous imperialism, based on a discriminatory theory of race. Since no single Arab state is strong enough to face the threat of foreign invasion, Pan-Arabism is the only alternative.

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1. For a discussion of Moslem canon law and its relation to civil law in the Near East see recent book by Mrs. H. C. Miller Davis, *Religious Liberty in the Near East.*

One vital taproot which fed the Arab national movement has not been sufficiently brought to view by Antonius and other writers on the subject. I refer to the influence of Syrian immigrants in the United States and the republics of South America. The air of liberty breathed by those imigrants had refreshing effects in almost every town and hamlet of Syria, particularly of Lebanon. Under the rule of Abdul-Hamid many Syrian liberals and political agitators found refuge in the United States, Brazil or Argentina. Their intellectual freedom was more complete than that of fellow immigrants who settled in Egypt, and they were even farther removed from the nemesis of the Hamidian spies or of zealous and ignorant censors.

Before the war the activities of those Syrian political liberals spotted them as dangerous enemies to the tyrannous Sultan, and more than one had been sentenced to death in absence and his property at home confiscated. One active Syrian journalist who had returned from the United States to his hometown of Tripoli, Syria, was among the Arab patriots hanged by Jamal Pasha during the war. Arabic newspapers sprang up in New York, Sao Paulo and Buenos Aires which gave the Red Sultan sleepless nights. We shall have occasion to refer in another chapter to the influence of Arabic literature that flourished in the Americas, particularly New York, on the Arabic renaissance. The political significance of this new and invigorating literature was not less than the literary one. The essays of Ameen Rihani and Khalil Gibran, the editorials of Al-Ayyam, Meraat-ul-Gharb and al-Hoda, all of New York, the articles of Jurji Haddad, radical editor, and of Dr. Khalil Sa‘adah of Sao Paulo, had a tremendous political effect on the Syrians and other Arab nationalists on the other side of the Atlantic. There were political societies in America which espoused openly the same principles and objectives adopted by the secret nationalist societies at home. This was especially true of the Syrian Union Society of New York, which openly defied the Hamidian tyranny.

After the War, the nationalist activities of the immigrant Syrians were redoubled. The New Syria Party was formed almost immediately after the armistice, and as a result of its agitations for the assumption of the mandate over Syria and Palestine by the United States, the Rev. Abraham Mitrie Rihbany was sent to plead the cause of the Syrian nationalists in America at the Versailles Conference. Rihbany became a confidant of Emir Feisal and his interpreter on many occasions when the Arab question was a subject of heated discussion between the Arab prince and Lloyd George. When the Syrian revolution broke out great financial and moral support came from the Syrians of the United States, Mexico and South America. More recently the Arab National League did its share in presenting the Arab case before the American public in the mooted Arab-Zionist controversy and in contributing to the cause of the Arab revolt in Palestine and the relief of Arab victims.[1] Al-Bayan, of New York was instrumental in raising substantial contributions for the Syrian revolution, and in consolidating Arab nationalist sentiment in the Americas, particularly the United States.

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[1] In his *History of Nationalism in the East,* (pp. 272-73, 276) Hans Kohn gives an interesting side-light on this phase of the rise of Arab nationalism. He does not seem to us, however, to have realized the direct political conneitions and import of the movement among Syrian immigrants in the U. S. A. and South Amerira.

CHAPTER FOUR

PROMISES, BETRAYALS, FAILURE

Greed, treachery and cynicism, the three witches who stirred the caldron of trouble now boiling over, first met ere the battle was lost or won over the hills and plains of lands now inhabited by the Arab people. Over the possession of these lands a keen rivalry between Great Britain and her allies and Germany and her allies broke into a frenzied race that led inevitably and fatalistically into the Armageddon of the first world war. And over these same plains and hills the unexorcised evil spirits met to plot—as men by the million were laying down their lives with the happy smiles of simple faith that they were making the world safe for democracy.

The story of the betrayal of the Arabs forms one of the most sordid chapters of the last war. Hitherto only unsatisfactory accounts, scattered through many works and stored in various archives of Europe and of Arab lands, had been given. But thanks to the painstaking efforts of an Arab scholar and historian, George Antonius, the piecing together of the dismaying picture has been accomplished.

It had been known to many, and revealed by writers like Hans Kohn, Elizabeth MacCallum, Jeffries, Hocking, Vincent Sheean and others, that the British made promises to the Arabs which were never meant to be carried out. For these promises were in utter contradiction to promises made later to the French and to the

Zionists. Deceitful designs and selfish interests were openly renounced only to win the unselfish support of a great neutral power, the United States of America, without whose help the World War may well have ended in a draw. By his full translation and publication, for the first time in any European language, of the notorious McMahon-Husein correspondence, and the circumstances and background of the negotiations which preceded and followed them, Antonius has rendered an invaluable service.

The British entered into a treaty with King Husein, as Sharif of Mecca, to sway the Moslem world away from allegiance to the Caliph in Constantinople and thus offset the Ottoman propaganda of *jihad* let loose among the Moslem subjects of the British Empire. On the military side the Arab help was urgently sought to stem the expansion of the combined Turkish and German forces southward to the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. Both objectives were admirably achieved by the Arab revolt. The impression was soon created after the war, by combined British and Zionist propaganda, that the Arabs were amply rewarded by the creation of a few Arab kingdoms and their liberation from the Turks, and that after all King Husein got more than he bargained for. A completely different impression is gained after the delineation of the circumstances that led to the Anglo-Arab negotiations. It appears from the notorious correspondence, especially from the letters of King Husein to McMahon, that the sharif of Mecca was not speaking for himself, or in his own name only, nor in the name of his nomadic followers in the Arabian peninsula, but as spokesman of the Arab national movement and in the name of Arab patriots in Syria and Iraq. These were political and literary leaders who had come under Western influences, officers who had received their education in Turkish military academies and who were plotting secretly to overthrow the yoke of Ottoman domination. Emir Feisal had held out against any overt siding of the Arabs with the British against the Turks. He was afraid that a victory of the Allies would mean only the substitution of a European, British or French domination for the Ottoman. At least the Turks were Moslems and shared much of the common traditions and Eastern philosophy of the Arabs. Having been initiated into one of the two principal Arab secret societies and coming in contact with members of the other, Emir Feisal, Antonius informs us, "found there the same congenial attitude: desire to break away from the Turks held in check by fear of the French ,British, Italian and Russian designs."[1]

The perfidy of the British and French betrayal therefore becomes doubly treacherous as we realize that when finally Sharif Husein and his sons, and above all Feisal, joined hands with the British they did so in behalf of all Arab nationalists. The minimum price asked by the Arabs was a full recognition of their rightful national aspirations. In the protracted controversies over the boundaries of the domain of Arab independence King Husein wrote McMahon that these boundaries "represent not the suggestion of one individual whose claim might well await the conclusion of the war, but the demands of our people who believe those frontiers form the minimum necessary to the establishment of the new order for which they are striving."[2]

Almost while the Anglo-Arab negotiations were still going on British, French and Russian diplomats were carrying on another set of negotiations that were, in effect, a "double crossing" of the Arabs, a stab in their backs. The Sykes-Picot Treaty, dividing the Arab lands into zones of influence was concluded in the spring. In spite of the fact that both Sykes and Picot had visited Jedda at different times, King Husein was never ap-

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1. *The Arab Awakening,* p. 153.
2. Ibid., p. 417. Throughout his notes to McMahon Sharif, Husein speaks of "the Arab nation" and "our people," leaving no doubt that he was speaking for the Arab nationalists. The boundaries set in his first letter are literally those proposed in the joint protocol of the two secret Arab societies, *al-Fatat* and *al-'Ahd* which Feisal secretly carried with him back from Damascus. p. 157-159.

praised of this treaty. It was the Bolshiviki who first made it public, after they had seized power in November of 1917. The Turks lost no time in forwarding the published treaty to Sharif Husein. But so unshaken was Husein's faith in the "English spoken word" that he disbelieved the Turks and suspected a trick to disrupt the alliance with his British friends. Time proved that the Turkish word was more truthful than that of the British.

And yet a third time the Arabs were betrayed, when the British, almost on the heels of the Sykes-Picot Treaty, were entering into negotiations with Zionist leaders to exchange support of the Jews of the Central Powers to the Allied cause for the realization of the Jewish nationalist dream of a homeland in Palestine. These negotiations resulted in the Balfour Declaration, of which we shall treat in another chapeter.[1]

With the exception of the promise relating to freeing the Arabs from Turkish rule, none of the promises were fulfilled. On the contrary, many evil features of the old Turkish regime were perpetrated upon the Arabs while the Turks themselves cast them off. This applies especially to the legal recognition by the Mandatories of sectarian and petty sectional rivalries which had been imposed and encouraged by the Turks.

In the few years following the declaration of the Ottoman Constitution and throughout the World War, the various parts of Syria and Palestine enjoyed a sort of spiritual unity that has never been realized since. The effect of the occupation of Syria and Palestine by Allied troops was in fact a reversion to a state of affairs which years of nationalist striving had tried to remove. Both in the case of Palestine and of Syria there seems to be almost a preconceived policy of shutting in Syria proper and blocking its access to the sea. With Beirut and Trioplo falling under the protection of the French

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1. For the circumstances leading to the Sykes-Picot Treaty and the Balfour Declaration, and their political implications to the Arabs, see—*The Arab Awakening,* pp. 248-270.

military authorities, tantamount to occupation, with Alexandretta back in the possession of the Turks, the Arab nationalists of Syria have not a single large seaport which they may call their own.

At the conclusion of the world war and the first deliberations of the Versailles Conference, the peoples of the Near East generally and of the countries that came under the French and British mandates in particular, were in the position of one who had been rudely awakened from a pleasant dream. The friendship of the Arabs with the Allies, which had been carefully nursed throughout the War, suddenly turned into bitter antagonism and hatred.

The fears of the Arab peoples from the Great River to the Great Sea and beyond, were fully justified in the years that followed, in which the two Mandatories exercised unlimited power and authority. The Arabs never legally recognized the mandates, and have always fought for their rights as originally promised them by the Allies. In Iraq several successive governments came to grief because of their attitude of mediation with the British. Thousands of Iraqis and British were killed in revolts that flared up from Mosul to the Persian Gulf. In 1930, Premier Abdul Muhsin al-Sa‘dun committed suicide because he could not bear the humiliating accusation of his countrymen that he betrayed them to the British. The state of King Feisal, who had been driven from his throne in Damascus and placed by the British on the throne of Iraq, was little better than that of his premier. It was only because of his undisputed sincerity and inborn tact in trying to harmonize the demands of the Iraqi nationalists with the pressure of British imperialism that he could retain his magic hold on the people. In Syria, a major revolution broke out in 1925 and lasted two years claiming thousands of lives and millions of dollars in property. In the beginning of her book, *The Nationalist Crusade in Syria,* Miss MacCallum counted no less than eleven uprisings preceeding this revolution. The same story could be repeated of Egypt.

From the end of the War Great Britain took an attitude toward Egypt which was incompatible with its promises. When the British Protectorate in Egypt was declared in December of 1914 it was explicitly stated by British statesmen that the measure was a temporary and expedient one for the successful carrying out of the war. The Egyptians, like the Syrians and the Bedwins of the Arabian Desert, had stood by their British Allies during the war in their common fight against the Turks. But it was not before February 1922, after bloody uprisings, that Great Britain finally abolished its protectorate and conceded Egypt its sovereignty. It was only after strenuous, if indirect and seemingly constitutional efforts to suppress the Wafd party, that Great Britain finally withdrew completely from Egypt. It is a sorry comment on the purely opportunistic mentality of imperialism, that Egypt finally won its independence not on the strength of the moral and legal claims of the Egyptians, but on the strength of a direct threat to British prestige and power from another European nation—Italy. Where could one find a better proof that it is the Europeans, not the people of the East, who understand only the language of force?

Vernon A. O'Rourke has shown in his monograph, *Juristic Status of Egypt and the Sudan,* that British occupation of Egypt until 1914 and after 1922 was a violation of sovereignty, first of the Ottoman Empire and then of Egypt itself. The Suez Canal always loomed in British diplomacy, in its relation with Egypt, above all ethical or international considerations. Nevertheless it was precisely this note of mutual self-interest, the advisability of the friendship between Great Britain and a free Egypt that was stressed in the presentations of the Egyptian Wafd party to the British government. This fundamental principle of national policy was explained to me in and interview by one of the foremost Wafdites. He said:

"The Wafd is not a party in the ordinary sense of the word.

> It is representative of the collective will of the Egyptian nation...The present leader (Mustafa Nahhas Pasha) simply continues the principles which animated the Wafd founder. Contrary to what some persons think, Zaghloul Pasha was never anti-British, not even in his earlier life. There is a small group, a residue of the party of Mustafa Kamil Pasha which was anti-British, pro-Turkish, pro-Islamic. The present national movement in Egypt is animated by different motives. It is not religious or racial; its ideal is to live on friendly terms with Great Britain on the basis of equality as allies."[1]

The failure of the British and the French to come to an understanding with the Arab nationalists contributed directly to the rise of reactionism and radicalism. Had it not been for the hopelessness and disillusionment in the so-called democracies which ruled them, fascism today would have found no receptive soil in the Arab world. Likewise the recrudescence of militaristic nationalism that characterizes some of the youth organizations of Egypt, Syria and Iraq was a direct resultant of desperation. In the face of this desperation, any counsel of wisdom or moderation was ineffectual. It should have been obvious to Western imperalists, as Miss MacCallum observes, that "peoples who have reached 'a state of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized' may have wills of their own."[2] But the Mandatory Powers treated the peoples of the Arab lands as though they had neither wills of their own nor any inherent rights.

On the less tangible, moral, side the evils of the Mandatory regime were even more devastating than on the material side. Chief of these was placing a premium on dishonesty and treachery. The same type of inefficient, sychophant, petty tyrants were encouraged to cling to governmental offices as under the Ottoman rulers. It was not so much the rigor and tyranny of the Mandatory powers that irked the freedom-loving peoples and enlightened Arab nationalists as it was the fact that such rigor and tyranny were employed to perpetuate an inherently unjust state from which the great majority of the people had seen no hope of emancipation. The time required for the creation and nurturing of democratic traditions was frittered away in fruitless bickering and conflict. Instead of being shown the light of democracy and the realization of their high aspirations, the people were flung into the dark abyss of despondency and bitterness against democracy itself. The Arabs finally came to the realization that the Wilsonian idealism to which they had clung has died away in the West, and that the last hope of the East in Western democracy has set behind the horizon of darkening materialism. Even in the ensuing darkness the Arabs held blindly and tenaciosly to the Wilsonian ideals.

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[1] Detroit News, Dec. 29, 1929. See the eloquent and fair appraisal of Zaghloul Pasha by an informed author, Felix Valyi, in his book, *Spiritual and Political Revolution in Islam,* p. 93-94.

[2] *The Nationalist Crusade in Syria,* p. 12.

We are forced to the paradoxical and amazing conclusion that it was not the Arabs who were learning the lessons of democracy from the French and British authorities among them, but, those emissaries of imperialism were the ones to be constantly reminded of the fundamental principles of democracy. For democracy had long ago crossed the Mediterranean and has been sweeping the East like wild fire independtly of Western influence. It was a case of a newly liberated people standing by their guns and fighting the battles of democracy against their supposedly democratic guardians.

The Allied powers did not betray the Arabs so much as they betrayed democracy itself. By their predatory conduct in the mandated area they actually set a precedent in international diplomacy that has come back to plague them and has rocked the peace of the world today to its very foundation. Try as they will British and French imperialists cannot convince fair-minded critics that their acts in those mandated areas differed materially from the acts and policies followed by the Italian Fascists in Ethiopia or the German Nazis in Sudetenland or Poland. Just as Mussolini trumped up an excuse to invade Ethiopia in spite of all the pleadings and reasonable offers by its former emperor, Haille Selassie, General Gouraud had made up his mind to invade Damascus in the summer of 1920 despite all concessions Arab nationalists were willing to make. Neither the Italians in Ethiopia, the Japanese in Manchuria, nor the Nazis in Austria and the Sudetenland may be considered the original authors of the "power diplomacy" in international affairs. The bombardment of Damascus by the French in 1925 was the first shocking instance of a type of warfare that was practiced by General Franco in Spain, the Japanese in China, the Italians in Ethiopia, and the British in Palestine. At the very time that the British were protesting the bombardment of peaceful cities and towns by the Insurgents in Spain, British airmen were dropping their deadly bombs on little towns in Palestine, killing innocent people and destroying their homes. The sanctioning of *fait accompli* contrary to international commitments and the terms of the mandate was a common practice of the British and the French in the mandated areas. It seems that it makes a great deal of difference who attempts those "deeds accomplished" and against whom they are attempted.

CHAPTER FIVE

REINTEGRATION OF NATIONALISM IN THE ARAB LANDS

With the awakening of the middle and lower classes in the Near East there has come about an articulateness of political thinking that was quite absent in the prewar days and that was nascent in the troubled days of the mandatory regime. The empty and high-sounding generalities of the crusading nationalists of the prewar days now seem to have lost their spell. The simple issue of uniting elements of the nation against the foreign oppressor is no longer sufficient in such countries as Syria and Egypt to rally the masses around some silver tongued orator. The people are demanding from their leaders concrete and constructive plans for social reconstruction and economic reforms, for relief and redress of the masses.

Looked at from an ideological point of view the progress of political thinking in the more progressive Arab countries has reached a point where the general notions are being broken up into their component elements. It is a stage of reintegration of elements which had passed through a long and slow stage of integration and a much shorter one of disintegration. In their fight against imperialism progressive Arabs ignored their political differences with the reactionaries. Liberals and conservatives, "effendis" and peasants, bourgeoise and proletarians united in the common cause. Now these differences are being crystallized into contending political theories motivated by contending interests. For various reasons, some of which will become more evident as the reader proceeds in this book, we do not believe that these forces will clash in a destructive class war, as they have done in Russia or Spain. The contest between the forces of political liberalism and conservatism, however, is taking definite shape. In most probability it will lead to a compromise along lines of practical considerations, rather than consistency of theory. Social and economic ideologies are still things which Arab nationalists take with a grain of salt. Even among extremists ideology is secondary, and realistic objectives take precedence.

The two types of totalitarian ideologies which would naturally appeal to oppressed peoples and which now threaten to deluge the world in a welter of chaos, have had surprisingly little appeal to the Arabs. Taking advantage of the unsettled state of the people and their unequal struggle against imperialism, communism and fascism lost no time in securing a foothold in the urban and industrial centers of Arab lands.

Communism has appealed to the more humanitarian and internationally minded Arabs who seek a solution of their particular problems through a universal liquidation of imperialism and economic inequalities. Fascism has attracted the extreme and chauvinistic type of Arab nationalists who think more of vengeance against their present oppressors than of their own salvation. Like a blind Samson in the temple of the Philistines they would pull the pillars down upon themselves and upon their enemies.

Depending on the passing mood and the local conditions sometimes communism and sometimes fascism seems to have the upper hand. But neither of them could be said to constitute a serious problem in any of the Arab lands today. Communism, equivalent in fact to moderate socialism, has been encouraged and instigated in Syria by the French Popular Front and in Palestine by the Jewish Communists.

An excellent magazine edited by a group of socialistic and progressive Arab youths in Damascus has had a precarious existence. Some splendid articles on the various social and economic problems of Syria and the Arab movement in general appeared in this magazine. Salim Khayyatah, a confessed communist, wrote two books, one of editorial essays, and the other centering around the rape of Ethiopia, in which the communistic world view is ably, if acrimoniously, presented.

In the spring of 1938 when the Popular Front Government was still in power, two communist members of the French Chamber toured the French mandated countries and were wildly acclaimed by their communistic comrades and by Arab nationalists generally. This was followed by a visit by M. Herriot, former premier and prominent French socialist. Denouncing French imperialism in most violent and not uncertain terms and calling on the Syrians to throw off the yoke of French capitalists, the voice of these two French communists threw consternation into the camps of the French authorities of Syria and Lebanon.

The Syrian Communist Party has issued several pamphlets dealing with labor and agrarian problems and has gained a sizeable following among laborers and the poorer peasants. The *Saut al-Sha-‘b,* a daily communist newspaper has helped to consolidate the Syrian communists and to spread the message of communism to distant parts of the Arab world. Even as far back as 1930 there was a labor party in Lebanon with communistic leanings. A forerunner of *Saut al-Sha‘b* was a little newsmagazine published in Judaidat Marj-‘Uyoun. Supported mostly by emigrant countrymen in the United States, it daringly voiced its socialistic opinions and its vitriolic attacks on the local government. Since the war broke out in Europe the Syrian communist party has been dissolved.

A fascistically inclined party, calling itself the Syrian

Nationalist Party (al-Hidhb al-Qaumi Al-Suri), has its headquarters in Beirut with thousands of followers scattered through Lebanon, Syria and Palestine. At one time it appeared that this party was destined to sweep Lebanon, but the stand its leaders and spokesmen took on the Pan-Arab question, restricting themselves to the political objective of a United Syria (to include Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan) lost for it thousands of followers who were ardent Pan-Arabists. Alarmed by the intransigence which this party has adopted in combating the separatist movement in Lebanon and by its militaristic tactics and discipline, a similar organization sprang up among the youths of the Lenanese separatists (mostly Maronite Christians). This has given rise to still a third party among Moslem youths in opposition to the Christian youth party. This emulation among youth organizations which adopt the same chauvinistic nationalism has weakened the effectiveness and influence of the Qaumi Party itself.

The Qaumis disclaim any direct connection with either the Italian fascists or the German nazis. None the-less, the methods of organization they have adopted, the technique of propaganda and general ideology are strongly reminiscent of the European brand, particularly nazism. The leader of the Qaumi Party is styled *al-Za'im,* Leader, which is clearly in imitation of Der Fuehrer or Il Duce. He is rarely addressed or referred to by name, Antoun Sa'-adah, by his followers. Even the emblem of the Qaumi Party closely resembles that of the nazis, and the salute is a modification of the nazi one. The ardent admiration with which the Qaumis look up to their leader, the affectation of discipline and efficiency are in ludicrous contrast with the impotency of his followers and out of pace with a spirit of strong individualism and genuine abhorrence of regimentation which characterize the Syrians. The Qaumis were the first to incorporate effectively in their political program a clear concept of nationalism that is not based on racialism, historic traditions or religious cleavage.

A brochure explaining the principles of the Qaumi Party and written by "the leader" himself gives a definition of Syrian nationality in terms of the people's sovereignity. "The millions of peasants, workers, artisans, professionals, merchants and industrialists," reads the brochure, "who constitute the Syrian nation have a will and interest in life which must remain their concern collectively, and of none others." Thus the Qaumi nationalists take a realistic view of nationalism that is based on community of interest, the result of a long chain of historical events that unified the people living in the same land—be what may their racial or ethnic origin. First among its "reform principles" the party places the separation of the state from religion. "The leader" makes it clear that his party does not fight against religion as such—"the philosophical, theological ideas of religion which have to do with the soul, immortality, the Creator or what is beyond matter (metaphysics), but against the determination of religious bodies to retain civic authority within the state." In this way Sa 'adah strikes at the very root of Pan-Islamism which tends to identify Islam as a national movement with a religion of definite dogmas and social doctrines. The Qaumi Party rejects the prevailing concept in the East of personal status jurisdiction as something distinct from the rest of the corpus juris and flatly denies the minority status for Christians.

Both the fascistic and the communistic groups espouse agrarian and industrial reforms, with the emphasis of the former on the rights of labor, and of the latter on the rights of industry. The Qaumi Party, I am told by one who had a personal interview with its leader, would do away with strikes by compulsory arbitration, even to the extent of sending recalcitrant strikers to prison. The communist party has shown a willingness to cooperate as much as possible with the Syrian government and the National Bloc Party of Damascus. Both extreme parties are more nationalistic than internationalistic; both are in bitter opposition to the foreign imperialists. A well informed and intelligent correspondent writes me that in Palestine a clear distinction is drawn between all forms of Jewish communism, social and labor movements on the one hand, and communism among the Arabs on the other. Jewish communism he says, has always striven to join hands with Arab communism, but without success. Zionism was the strong barrier that stood in the way of such an alliance. Thus Arab communists in Palestine also have definitely identified themselves with the Arab nationalist movement in its struggle against imperialism, British and Zionist. During the recent troubles in Palestine Arab communists took a very active part on the side of the nationalists. Several of their leaders were imprisoned and some were exiled. The membership of the Arab Communist Party in Palestine is meagre. In Iraq, my informant adds, communism had a different career. It did not have to face the problem of national freedom. At the same time it did not pay much attention to Pan-Arabism. In fact, it has stood in opposition to the idea. Its main concern has been to concentrate upon the reconstruction of Iraq along communistic lines with little success. The present government of Nuri al Sa'id is decidedly Pan-Arabic, and communism is not in favor. In Egypt, too, communism is negligible.

Steering a hazardous course between the extreme right and the extreme left of political absolutist theories, Arab nationalism has shown creditable progress along the middle course of democracy in the short period since it has been placed on trial before the whole world. Considering the debacle of misrule, corruption, favoritism and suppression which the independent or semi-independent regimes carried over from the Turkish and mandatory ones, and the unprecedented problems with which they have to contend, the mere fact that the machinery of government has not broken down is highly significant and encouraging.

The developments in the countries most recently removed from the vassalage of the mandatories indicate that the democratic spirit in them is robust. These developments further prove that the Arabs have reached a point where they could be recognized as independent and responsible members in the family of nations.

SYRIA AND LEBANON[1]

Syria's natural divisions of mountain and plain, of littoral and hinterland, its semi-isolated terrains such as al-Jazirah to the northeast or Jabal al-Duruz to the southeast, have stood as obstacles to a true national unity and encouraged local mores and traditions to which the inhabitants clung tenaciously. Often this local separatness coincided with religious divisions and sectarianism. True, the great majority of the population of greater Syria is of one religion and one sect—Moslem Sunnites or orthodox—yet the religious minorities, both Moslem and Christian, have been sufficiently vital to make national cohesion a serious problem for the newly liberated national government. In itself the national spirit might easily have overcome this obstacle in a reasonably short time. Unfortunately, however, foreign imperialists and short-sighted religious orders and missionaries have raised the issue of the Christian minorities to strengthen their hold on their followers. The protection of these minorities has been made an excuse to perpetuate the influences and prerogatives of the foreigners and thus delay the national unity and uniformity of laws. And as if the complexity of the indigent inhabitants of Syria were not enough of a problem, the French with the approval of the League of Nations first settled thousands of Armenian refugees from Cilicia around Beirut and Aleppo, and later created a large colony in northeastern Syria of nationally intransigent and militant "Assyrians" from Iraq.

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[1] For the post-war developments in Syria, Iraq and Palestine, see *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 350 ff.

The Syrian government before the outbreak of war showed every evidence of good will in an equitable disposition of this problem, especially with dissident minorities which have demanded special securities and local concessions. Arab nationalists, however, have wisely refused legal recognition of minorities. It may be said that Christian nationalists are as insistent upon this as the Moslem nationalists.

One of the serious obstacles facing any nationalist government in Syria is its economic insufficiency. Agriculturally, Syria is much poorer than either Iraq or Egypt. Important foreign concessions are sapping the wealth of the country, returning very little to it in taxes or profits. Industrially, Syria is quite limited both as to resources and export. Even under auspicious circumstances Syria's balance sheet always showed a preponderance of import over export. First the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and then the world war took away much of the transit and exchange trade with neighboring countries. Aleppo, once a thriving industrial city was almost ruined when its trade with Anatolia was practically discontinued after the war. With the rise of the Turkish republic a high tariff wall was raised between two former provinces of the Ottoman Empire. To a lesser extent this is true of Syria's trade relations with Iraq, Palestine and Egypt.

The abolishment of tariff barriers between Syria and its Arab neighbors, the unification of communication, etc., are now receiving the serious attention of the Syrian government. It is being realized, more keenly than ever, that Syria cannot stand by itself economically. Economic Pan-Arabism is being pressed by Arab nationalists as an urgent necessity which need not wait for the realization of political Pan-Arabism.

The relations between France and Syria have not been settled enough to give Syria sufficient economic control. One of the first questions to be faced is the abolishment of foreign capitulations and the restoration of the tariff to the hands of the native government.

This may entail the creation of a mixed commission, representing foreign investors and native economists and a transitional period in which just foreign claims would be settled.

The Franco-Syrian Treaty signed in Paris on September 9, 1936 was a compromise that came after protracted negotiations between Syrian nationalist leaders and representatives of unstable and changing French ministries which did not have a common and consistent policy in Syria. The accusation by some French tory critics that the Franco-Syrian Treaty was "concocted in 24 hours" is not true. As far back as 1930 negotiations were going on for consummation of this treaty. In fact Syria, was accorded tacit recognition of its independence before the formal revocation of the mandate regime. In consultation with the French High Commissioner Henri Ponsot, Syrian nationalists drew up a constitution with a republican form of government and a unicameral parliament. Difficulties arose between the French and the nationalists over certain articles which, in the opinion of the French, negated the free exercise of authority by the mandatory and hampered the execution of its "international commitments." The former president of the Syrian Republic, Hashim Bey al-Atasi, head of the National Bloc Party, became the second president of the Syrian Republic in point of fact. The first, Mohammed Ali al-'Abid, son of Ahmad Izzat al-'Abid of the days of Sultan Abdul-Hamid, was discredited by the nationalists and had until then practically taken no hand in the public affairs of his country.

The treaty negoiations received a severe jolt with the fall of the Blum ministry. Almost from the start M. Daladier and M. Bonnet set their faces against the ratification of the Syrian and Lebanese treaties in the French Chamber. This change of attitude was apparent even before the rise of the Italo-French crisis, which was used as a pretext to revise the treaties and retain France's grip over Syria and Lebanon. Commenting on this turn in French policy, the Syrian Eagle of Brooklyn, wrote: "If the French Parliament has the right to turn down an alliance with Syria it cannot deny her natural right of independence, acknowledged in the Covenant of the League of Nations itself." (January 21, 1939.) It is highly questionable whether reversion to the imperialistic policy in Syria by the new French government will achieve its professed aims—the securing of its hold on North Africa. The contrary is more likely to be true. A revolt in Syria, caused by the revocation of the treaty, will have serious repercussions in North Africa and other parts of the Arabic speaking world. It is hoped that the siding of Syrian nationalists with the Allies in the present war will be rewarded by the ratification of this treaty.

Two sore spots have created great resentment and chagrin against the French mandatory before the present war. These are: the unsettled state of al-Jazirah, the district lying to the northeast and bordering on Iraq, and the annexation of the Sanjaq of Alexandretta.

Until the war broke out it was understood that the Frenrh insisted on concessions in al-Jazirah, placing obstacles in the way of the Syrian Government. Reliable news from that section corroborated by eye-witnesses, leaves no doubt that French military authorities have taken a hand in instigating sectarian dissentions and open defiance to the authorities in Damascus. A Christian governor was sent to al-Jazirah to win over the Christian elements. He had been there only a short time when he was "kidnapped" by agitators. This audacious act was designed to ridicule the Syrian government at a time when its Premier, Mardam Bey, was making strenuous efforts to come to an understanding with the French government in Paris. Syrian nationalists were not slow "to smell petroleum" which had been recently discovered in that region.

The other serious setback to the new nationalist government was the sudden change in the status of the Alexandretta region and its relation to the Syrian state. The region or "Sanjaq" of Alexandretta, about 10,000 square miles in area, has been since annexed to the Turkish republic, creating a serious irredentist movement in Syria. To secure the friendship of the Turks and win the Turkish Republic away from a possible alliance with the nazis, France sacrificed Alexandretta as she had sacrificed Cilicia after the war. The intransigent attitude of both Syrians and Turks over the Alexandretta question resurrected the mischievous ghost of Turkish-Arab enmity that had slumbered peacefully during these many years.

The Syrian nationalists base their claim to the Sanjaq both on historical and administrational considerations. The Sanjaq falls within the natural northern boundary of Syria—the Taurus Mts. Its Arab inhabitants go back to the settlement of Christian Ghassanite tribesmen before the Moslem invasion, augmented by fresh waves of immigration, both Moslem and Christian, since then, together with its Armenian and Kurdish inhabitants who clearly indicated their allegiance to Syria. In the abortive plebescite of 1938 the non-Turkish population constituted a sizable majority.

The Alexandretta annexation, the events leading to it and the surrender of the French in the face of war-threat by the Turks afford a remarkable parallel to the annexation later of Sudetenland by the nazis.

Less serious than the two forementioned problems the relation of Lebanon to Syria has been a thorny question and a serious hindrance to unity in that part of the Arab world.

In 1920 Gen. Gouraud, French High Commissioner, proclaimed in the name of his government the independence of Grand Liban, adding to the original small, mountainous state the rich valley of Buqa‘, the districts of Sidon and Tyre, Tripoli and the City of Beirut. There was not even a semblance of plebiscite to determine whether the inhabitants of these neighboring districts and cities, with a preponderant majority of Shi‘ite and

Sunnite Moslems, wished to be forcibly separated from Syria and annexed to Lebanon. In 1926 Greater Lebanon was proclaimed a republic by High Commissioner Jouvenal. Following the announcement of the Franco-Syrian Treaty a similar treaty between France and Lebanon was signed on November 13, 1936, giving the French more control in Lebanon than in Syria. The relations between the two neighboring republics may be said today to be those of friendly rivalry and jealous safeguarding of respective rights and privileges. It is a state in which friction is always a potential danger, leading to tariff reprisals and boycotts. Thus in a country of less than four million population the French succeeded in creating two politically independent republics, two sets of ministries, two different administrations and two "armies."

Syria is a land of political paradoxes. Its proximity to Europe, lying athwart the route to India and the French Asiatic colonies, has been the cause both of its progress and of its political misfortunes. More truly so than in the case of Iraq or even Egypt, the rise of nationalism in Syria was indebted to the advent of westernization and the influence of the missionaries. Yet, because of British and French imperialistic expediencies, Syria was treated more like a directly ruled colony than a class A mandate. And it is precisely in Syria that one found a more genuine appreciation of Western democracy and the spirit of Western culture than in any other Arab country. Neither in the case of the French in Syria nor of the British in Palestine has there been any sincere effort to reciprocate the good-will of the people or their leaders. Distant and foreign interests that derive their mandates from London, Paris, Delhi or Hanoi have fashioned the imperial policies of Great Britain and France for the Syrians. In no country, perhaps, the advance of world democracy and the defeat of predatory imperialism has a more direct and immediate bearing on the political destiny of the people. For this reason Syrian nationalists have staked their political future on the future of democracy itself, on collective security among nations and a regenerated League of Nations.

It is a pity that proponents of democracy in the West, even in the United States, have shown little aptitude to understand and appreciate the democratic aspirations of the Syrians. Before the first world war, even among Pan-Islamic nationalists, independence was never divorced from some consideration of Western assistance and friendly cooperation. Its nationalist spokesmen were never isolationists or chauvinists, animated by blind hatred of the West. The intense antagonism engendered since the war was the direct result of misrule and violation of every principle of democracy by the mandatories. The poignancy of this antagonism is heightened by the keen realization of the frustration of great potentialities that have been ruthlessly suppressed and denied every avenue of free and adequate expression.

IRAQ[1]

Great Britain relinquished its mandate over Iraq in 1932, bringing comparative peace to a country of many races and a mixed nomadic, semi-nomadic, and settled population. What Iraq lacks in political development it has made up in a passion for independence and a determination for national solidarity and progress that are stronger perhaps than aywhere else in the Arabic-speaking world. Politically speaking Iraq occupies a middle position between the one-man rule of Sa‘udia Arabia and Yaman and the more democratic one of Syria or Egypt. The intense spirit of independence among its peoples more than offsets the tribal clannishness of its nomadic districts and the entrenchment of feudal and religious leadership that has prevailed there for generations untold. Democracy in Iraq is more virile than in Syria, more secure than in Egypt even when less articulate and advanced than in either. The Iraqi parliament acts more as a check or balance on the rival districts than as a guide and cohesive agency. Iraq's tribal notions and prerogatives are being slowly supplanted through education and political experience, preparing the nation for unification and economic adjustment between its vast population of oppressed tribesmen and city dwellers and its tribal chieftains and leaders.

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[1] For an objective and thorough study of this part of the Arab world see *Iraq: A Study in Political Development* by Philip Willard Ireland, especially chaps. XXI and XXII delineating the political conflicts between Iraqi nationalists and British authorities.

The peculiar problems of Iraq take color from the nature of its population and their state of political evolution. It is a country with a small group of leaders, enlightened and patriotic, contending with an equally small group of feudal lords and religious leaders, whose concept of nationalism is still tribal and sectarian. The rest of the population is still an amorphous mass that could be swayed one way or the other. It is said that more than 99 per cent of the educated youth of Iraq are absorbed by the government machine and the army. The latter is dominated by officers who are highly nationalistic and Pan-Arabic in inclination. Because of their intense nationalism these army men have come to conceive of themselves as custodians of the political fate of their country; and while there is no military dictatorship in Iraq, the army looms as a Damoclean sword over the heads of the government and of the parliament. It was directly responsible for a coup d'etat in 1936 and the rise of a brief dictatorship under a scheming and ambitious politician, Hikmat Suleiman, whose fall was also due to the intervention of the army. Hikmat Suleiman's ministry was followed by that of Jameel al-Madfa'i, and then by that of Nuri al-Sa'id, one of the military leaders of the Arab revolt under Husein. In spite of racial differences between Arabs and Kurds, mostly in Mosul, and religious differences between Sunnites and Shi'ites Iraqi nationalists are welding a progressive and democratic state out of the unwieldy mass.

EGYPT

It was Lord Cromer who said that if Egypt were to be given its independence the fellah would soon find himself reverting to his oppressed state, ruled by the pashas' whip. Egypt has attained its independence and the Egyptian fellah's state was never better than it is today. It was also Lord Cromer who pointed out that almost all political leaders of his time were non-Egyptian, of Turkish, Albanian and Mamluke origin, and that those showed a capacity for efficient administration lacking in the Copt or Arab Egyptians. Today the native Egyptian has demonstrated not only his capacity and efficiency in government bureaus and in the university lecture room, but also his idealism and devotion to the cause of the common people, lacking in the old pashas of Cromer's day.

Likewise the fear that abolishment of foreign capitulations, through the international treaty signed at Montreaux in May, 1937, would have drastic effects on foreigners or their investments in Egypt has been dispelled. Considering the long dreary ages of despotic rule, and the succession of one foreign domination after another, the sense of moderation displayed by the Egyptians at the successful consummation of their nationalistic independence is reassuring. Long before the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of August, 1936, Egypt had passed its primitive and demonstrative stage of nationalism. In fact Egyptian national chauvinism was curbed only after this treaty was signed and the Egyptians were left to their own resources. For the first time the Egyptian parliament has an effective opposition party and it cannot be said anymore that the Egyptians are blindly following one leader who holds ninety per cent of the Egyptian voters spellbound by his tirades against the British. Even the Wafdists could not keep their magic hold on the Egyptian common people without some show of agrarian reforms and economic constructive legislation.

The conflict between Nahhas Pasha and the youthful

King Farouk may be represented as a heritage of the policy of the throne, under the late King Faud, to dominate the parliament, or at least to have the upper hand. The Egyptian constitution of 1923, abolished in 1930, was restored in 1935. Mustapha Nahhas Pasha, in his eagerness to obviate future incursions on the people's rights and constitution organized the Blue Shirts, a military semi-fascistic youthful order. A counter order sprang up and clashes between the two threatened the peace of the nation. King Farouk insisted on the abolishment of these orders, and this led finally to the resignation of the Wafd ministry. The influence of Nahhas Pasha seems to be on the wane. It was claimed that his sympathies with totalitarian ideas and his aspirations for dictatorial powers had much to do with his defeat. More probably the intransigence of the Wafd leader, coupled with the popularity and democratic spirit of the youthful king, had more to do with this downfall. The leadership of Nahhas Pasha, so effective when he was fighting the British, fell down after the treaty assured Egypt's formal independence. One after another of the original Wafd Party who worked side by side with Sa'd Zaghloul Pasha, left it to join other parties or to form new ones. The legacy of Sa'd is now contested even by the enemies of Mustapha Nahhas, and a party has risen which calls itself the "Sa'di Party" under the leadership of Ali Maher Pasha former colleague of Nahhas and former president of the Egyptian Parliament. Maher, wiser, broader and with a winning way, has stolen much of the fire of Mustapha Nahhas and won away many of his former adherents.

THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

Since the termination of the war between Saudi Arabia and Yaman, in 1934, and the conclusion of a treaty of Islamic unity and Arab brotherhood between King Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud and Imam Yaha peace has reigned in the Arabian Peninsula. In 1937 a similar treaty was concluded between Saudia Arabia, Yaman and Iraq, providing for other independent Arab states to join the alliance.

Arabia presents peculiar problems to students of the Arab nationalist movement, and has given more misgiving to separatists in the Arab world than any other section. In it one finds the only outright colony, the colony of Aden, east of the Mediterranean and the Red Seas. Its two independent states, Saudia Arabia and Yaman, recognize the *shari'ah* as law of the land, that of the former being Hanbalite or conservative orthodoxy and that of the latter *imamite,* Shi'ite. The rest of the fringe countries are either dependencies of these two states or under British protection. The extension of British authority over the sultanates of the Protectorates of Aden, Hadramaut, Masqat and Oman and the emirates of the Persian Gulf, is a chapter in imperial penetration that should be the subject of investigation by an impartial international committee.[1]

Much progress has been made in political institutions and civic life in the kingdom of Ibu Saud. Special mention should be made of the hundred or more villages which sprang up in Najd and other parts of this kingdom through the initiative and foresight of King Ibn Saud, centering around artisian wells, and the converting of thousands of nomad bedwins to settled communities.

The dream of an Arab empire under King Ibn Saud, implying conquest of Syria and Iraq by force of arms, is passing away. The revolt of Ibn Dawwish in 1929 represented this extremist attitude among the Ikhwan, or Wahhabi followers of Ibn Saud. The Ikhwan, loyal to the fundamental teachings of Wahhabism, which considered all Moslems who do not believe like themselves as heretics or renegades, urged Ibn Saud to carry the *jihad* beyond the borders of his kingdom. But he was wiser than they, and realized as they never seem to realize that the Arabs were living in an age quite different from that of Mohammed Abdul-Wahhab and the decrepit Ottoman Empire.

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[1] See *Philby's Sheba's Daughters*

Instead of an armed conquest Ibn Saud and his advisers now seek closer economic cooperation with the Arab states to the northeast and northwest. As a first and necessary step toward this end he is seeking to restore the Hijaz railway to Arab control and restore to it the important economic role it was destined to play between Hijaz and Syria. There seems to be truth in the contention of many Arabs that the Allies sought to destroy the Hijaz railway in the first world war not merely for reasons of strategy, but in order to bottle up the Arabs of Arabia proper.

NORTHERN AFRICA

The countries of northern Africa were the first in the Arab world to feel the impact of Western domination, and possibly the last to be liberated from that domination. Within the scheme of pan-Arabism they are usually neglected by most Arab political writers, or, if remembered, included as an after-thought. Yet to the present day northern Africa has kept burning the fire of Moslem civilization and traditions, and its political leaders, with their large followers, are ardent Pan-Arabs. Some of those leaders, such as Mohammed Ibn ‘Allal of Fez, Abdul-Aziz al-Tha‘alibi, Ibrahim al-Kittani and Abdul-Hamid Ibn Badis are progressive, liberal men of wide culture and thoroughly taught in the Western ways.

Nowhere has "democracy" relegated its role to imperialism and subordinated its functions to a deliberate policy of breaking the morale of the people and making them docile subjects as in the countries of northern Africa. In these countries, long before the rise of fascism and nazism, identical methods used now by the Germans in Poland and Czeckoslovakia have been employed to the present day. This policy includes such practices as expropriating farm lands of native peasants on trumped up and flimsy pretexts and turning these lands over to European colonizers; suppressing Arabic teaching, especially among the Berbers of the hinterlands; persecution of Moslem religious teachers and discouragement of Moslem religious teachings; the deliberate and systematic encouragement of proselytizing; persecution and exile of nationalist leaders; thorough censorship of the press and the supression of the national press and of national organizations and religious societies. This policy is carried out not only in Algeria, a French colony, or Tripoli, an Italian colony, but also in the protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco. In the latter this intensive and ruthless process of colonization has been even stronger than elsewhere in northern Africa. For decades the imperialist French have carefully evolved a plan to convert northern Africa into one extensive French colony for the purpose of drawing on its man power in times of war, thus offsetting the declining birthrate in France. It is not conceivable that the great French nation can condone for long such conditions as exist today in northern Africa, but as far as we know no declaration has yet been made about the French war objectives for that part of the world.

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The case of Palestine has gained more attention than its size or its place in the scheme of Arab nationalism would merit. This has been only due to the injection of an element that is not inherent in the Arab national development, and had never been seriously contemplated before the end of the war. The Zionist claim for Palestine, however, has raised many irrelevant problems which have occupied the attention of the whole world and which, for that reason, deserve an extended discussion and analysis.

CHAPTER SIX

ZIONISM VERSUS ARAB NATIONALISM[1]

Reduced to its simplest terms the bloody conflict in Palestine is a conflict between two irreconcilable nationalisms. The issue is often clouded through a lack of distinction between the claims and demands of Arab and Jewish nationalists as such and the consideration whether these claims and demands can possibly find adequate expression within the boundaries of Palestine. This is the crux of the whole matter, all other considerations being either irrelevant or inadmissible.

One line of argument followed by Arab nationalists and Zionists alike is based on promises or declarations made to either side during the war. We have already referred to the McMahon-Husein correspondence which was in effect a tacit recognition by the British of legitimate Arab national aspirations. The Zionists have held with equal tenacity to the Balfour Declaration given on November 2, 1917 by Arthur James Balfour to Lord Rothschild and which reads:

> "I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of His Majesty's Government the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations, which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet.
>
> "His Majesty's Government views with favor the estab-

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[1] For this chapter read *Palestine: The Reality* by J. M. N. Jeffries; especially chaps. VII to X inc. disclosing an atmosphere of unbelievable Machiavellism surrounding the birth of the Balfour Declaration.

lishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and the political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

"I shall be grateful if you will bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Confederation."

We are quite cognizant of the fact, now clearly demonstrated by Antonius and others that this declaration came later and is directly in conflict with the stipulations of the British-Arab agreements. These stipulations are found not only in the McMahon-Husein correspondence but also in the joint declaration of the British and French governments on November 7, 1919 and the Declaration to the Seven (June, 1918), both of which are dwelt upon at length by Antonius and other nationalist writers.[1]

What we cannot appreciate is the contention that the whole destiny of a people should depend on such commitments or declarations by governments whose interests are far removed from the real and deep-rooted interests of the people involved. International law, even at its best and backed by unanimous approval, cannot determine the nature or content of the national aspirations of a free people, but only the relations of these aspirations as they affect the common welfare of the community of nations. It is not for Great Britain or any nation to limit Arab national aspirations unless they are in conflict with world peace and world security.

It is therefore beside the point whether the McMahon-Husein correspondence came before the Balfour Declaration or whether the Balfour Declaration is binding on Great Britain to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Nor was it in the province of President Wilson himself and his government to approve or not approve this declaration. The enunciation of idealistic and humanitarian principles of self-determination for the little nations is not in itself a condition for the liberation of those peoples. It was more correctly a formulation of a principle that is self-evident; a condition without which all democratic relations among free peoples would be impossible. The question therefore resolves itself into whether or not the Arabs are, in fact or provisionally, a free agency possessing the right to determine their own life and the course of their own national evolution. Even the most rabid imperialist cannot deny the essential truth of this contention. The same thing may be rightly said of Jewish nationalism with these important variants: Are the Jews entitled to dual nationalism? Can they demand their national rights as Jews and at the same time as British, Polish or American citizens? And granting that they can do that, can they establish a homeland in a country already inhabited by a different people whose title of possession to it goes back at least 2,000 years?

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[1] See Dr. T. Canaan, *Conflict in the Land of Peace, Chap. II.*

The most effective argument used by Zionists to win support has been the array of material and spiritual advantages which Zionism has brought to Palestine. This argument has won to the Zionist ranks sincere liberals and idealists not only among non-Zionist Jews but also among a large section of Christian sympathizers. When this is coupled with the argument from sympathy to the swelling exodus of persecuted and suffering Jews in central and eastern Europe, it becomes almost tantamount to a demand to keep the gates of Palestine open as the last refuge of a harried and persecuted minority.

One has only respect and admiration for this humanitarian and liberal motive. But one's sympathies and admiration suffer a shock when one fully realizes that the Zionists are not merely seeking refuge and shelter in Palestine, but the establishment of a Jewish state and a Jewish government. This the Zionists seek even if it means the suppression of an aroused people, the breaking down of their morale, through the agency of

British bullets and British bayonets. Liberalism is made to beg for its justification at the hands of imperialism and tory reaction. Liberal Jews should instinctively rebel against an arrangement which places a whole people under a system differing only in name from occupation in order that a small minority may become a majority by hastened measures. There are many so-called liberals among the supporters of Zionism who would not recognize this situation in Palestine today, or recognizing it would openly condone it.

The claim of the Zionists that they are bringing liberation and enlightenment to the Arabs of Palestine raises the question whether there is any difference between liberty forced on a people against thir wills and tyrannism. Are not communists and fascists condemned by liberals not so much because of their objectives as because of the means they employ to reach these objectives? In Palestine Zionism does not differ fundamentally from these two reactionary philosophies. It, too, points out with pride to what it has done in Palestine, but turns away in silence when asked how this has been done and by what means the end has been accomplished. Liberalism is neither too lofty nor too sacred to submit to the moral law. It is of the very essence of reactionism, not liberalism, to save a man's soul, or body, by breaking his will and negating his right to self-expression. In its relation to the Arabs Zionism is doing this very same thing, while fighting against it in other lands.

Dr. John Hayes Holmes, one of the foremost and most publicized liberals, who recently recanted his espousal of Russian communism, or Stalinism, does not seem to realize that his ardent championing of Zionism is of the same warp and woof. For with little modification he could also say of Zionism what he said of his connections with communism, as quoted recently in the press:

> "We liberals condoned tyranny. We apologized for horror. We denied massacre. We explained away concentration

> camps...We have learned that immoral means never lead to moral ends." etc.

What a damaging confession by a professional liberal!

In a very true sense political Zionism of the Herzl school, was a capitulation both of Jewish idealism and Jewish realism. Rather than keep up the role the Jews have assumed as saviors of society, of the suffering Messiah, Zionists gave up that role in despair, seeking to save themselves. They forgot that neither they nor any other people could save themselves by overlooking the fate of the rest of humanity. Political Zionism became more a defiance of a Jew-hating world than a solution for that hate. Events of the last twenty years have more than justified this conclusion. The formula of political Zionism, namely that a nation must have its own country and its own flag for its people to be recognized and respected by other nations, came back to plague those of them who partially succeeded in securing the desired homeland and flag and those who were left behind. Zionists at the outset placed themselves at a disadvantage with their enemies, the anti-Semites. They admitted what the anti-Semites have always contended; and they admitted it not only in their own name, but in the name of all Jewry.

The late Prof. Morris Jastrow, one of the true prophets of modern Jewry who could not have been accused of not knowing the history of his own people or their racial psychology, fully realized the anachronism implied in Zionism when he wrote these phophetic words:

> "It seems strange indeed to find Zionists engaged in exerting every nerve to take a step backward, while the whole world seems bent on moving forward. It seems still stranger that Zionists should grow enthusiastic over the prospect of establishing a Jewish State in a land which can only hold one tenth of the entire number of Jews in the world. It seems strangest of all that they should favor a state which necessarily involves a recognition of some bond between religion and nationality and sets up again the older conception of a nation formed on single nationality, whereas the history of Palestine itself during the past 2000 years points

unmistakably to its reorganization according to the modern democratic view of the State, based on a national unit formed by peoples irrespective of descent or ethnic qualities. What is needed is a Palestine State in which all who agree to adhere to the principles on which the country of their birth or adoption is to be organized shall have an equal share."[1]

Whatever may be said of the present interpretation of Zionism, of its shifting from a religious to a political ideology, the incontrovertible truth is that the fundamental ground for the clamor of the Jews for Palestine is a religious tradition. Divorced from the religious consideration there is no pertinent reason for their claim to Palestine, certainly no legal or even truly historical one. It is only the Bible and the prophetic doctrines relating to the return of the Jews to Palestine that almost instinctively link them in the minds of many Western, particularly Protestant, Christians with Palestine.

This may be considered *a fact of history,* as Zionists emphasize, more potent than any argument. On closer examination it will be found to be not really a fact, but an interpretation of a fact, a one-sided, dogmatic interpretation that cannot stand the scrutiny of logic or meet the mandate of justice—an interpretation squarely clashing with other interpretations, equally valid or invalid. We speak admiringly of the *"eternal people"* and marvel at the tenacity of their national consciousness. We often forget, however, that we are speaking of only a *residue* of this people who, for reasons we need not dwell upon at length, cherish undying attachment to Palestine.

This strange attachment is predicated on the identity of the Jewish religion with Palestine. Political Zionism, however overlooks two serious qualifications. To the strictly orthodox Jews the return to Palestine must come about in a heavenly manner, through the intercession and agency of Jehovah himself; to the liberal

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1. *Zionism and the Future of Palestine,* p. 9.

Jews the possession of Palestine is not a condition for the fulfillment of their religion. Notwithstanding either of these attitudes Palestine, legally and internationally speaking, is an Arab land. Said Prof. Elihu Grant.

> "Because one is a Jew, Christian, or Moslem does not mean that one is to go with tape-measure and knife and take a slice of the territory, nay but that one associates the Holy Land, mentally, spiritually with one's Savior and sacred scriptures somewhat as an admirer of Shakespeare associates the poet with English scenes."[1]

The great majority of Jews who settled in Babylonia, Egypt, Italy and the Pontus lost both their racial and religious identities by assimilation with the various peoples and races in whose midst they lived. History records that a large number of the ancestors of the Jews of Eastern Europe descended from the Tartar Khazar tribes whose home was around the Caspian Sea and who were converted to Judaism around the middle of the 8th century. The Arabic name for the Caspian Sea, *Bahr-al-Khazar,* still perpetuates their memory.

Zionist writers are agreed that the concept of Zionism rests on the inseparability of Jewish religion from Jewish nationalism. In this respect Judaism is like Islam. Granting the truth of this thesis Zionists must face an inevitable dilemma. Either they must admit the validity of the religious claims of Christians and Moslems to the same country—Palestine—or they must repudiate the only ground for the selection of Palestine as the locus of their nationalism.

Islamic claims for Palestine are a sort of recapitulation of Jewish claims. The Hebrew Prophets—Moses, Elijah, Jonah, Job, Zechariah, etc., were appropriated by Mohammed and automatically included in the Islamic hagiography. Conscious of this deficiency Mohammed found it necessary to introduce a new legend, that of his miraculous transplantation from Mecca to Jerusalem on the mythical *buraq,* the green mule or horse with the human face that was supplied him by Archangel Gabriel. Moslem theologians have bravely wrestled with the proper interpretation of this flight, and from the earliest times there have been some who viewed the whole thing as an allegory. The great majority of Moslems however, interpret the flight as a physical event. When Zionists question the truth of this legend they must be equally willing to question the truth of many of their religious traditions which might appear equally legendary or fantastics, even including the appearance of Jehovah's angel to Abraham and the promise that Abraham's seed will be like the sands of the sea in number and that Palestine will be given to them for an eternal heritage. In all likelihood both legends were incorporated in the light of past events or future aspirations. They served to strengthen a national consciousness in the making or justify a national gain after centuries of struggle. Moslem legends which helped to identify Palestine with the Moslem Arabs since the 7th century may be said to be as real to the Moslems as Jewish legends are to the Jews. True, the hope of the return of the Jews to Palestine has ever remained an integral part of their religion; but it must be put down as a tragic feature of that religion in the light of present events. If Palestine were truly "a land without a people" as Zionists of a decade ago used to proclaim, it could have been an easy matter to bring "the people without a land" to it. But it simply was not true a decade ago and it is not true today.

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[1] In a recent pamphlet: *Palestine, Our Holy Land.*

And what about the Christian claims? Can Zionists deny that Palestine, in a very intense sense, is as dear and precious to the hearts of millions of Christians as it is to the Jews? Is it not an historic fact of the most stupendous significance that Palestine became known as the Holy Land mainly because Christ was born in Bethlehem, reared in Nazareth, and crucified in Jerusalem? If Palestine is the land of the promise to the Jews, is it not true that Christians believe sincerely and piously that this promise has been fulfilled, and that they, Christians, have become the true sons of Israel and the true heritors of the promise? Saint Paul in many passages of his epistles makes this not only obvious but an occasion for triumphal exultation.[1] To Christians the prophecy of the coming Messiah was fulfilled in the incarnation of Jesus of Nazareth, the Son of David. Many of the Old Testament prophecies which the Jews consider as peculiarly applicable to their own nation are considered by orthodox Christians to have been already fulfilled with the coming of Christ, and many others are to be fulfilled at the Second Coming. These prophecies have nothing to do anymore with the re-establishment of the Jews as such in Palestine. Dr. W. D. Herrstrom of Findlay, Ohio, is typical of many Fundamentalist Christians who take the latter view. He says:

> "A careful study of the scriptures reveals the fact that the Jew will never be permitted to peaceably occupy Palestine until he repents 'nationally' and accepts the land from his coming Messiah and King, the Lord Jesus Christ."[2]

Even if Fundamentalist Protestant Christians of the Western world are willing, in the kindness of their hearts, to concede Palestine to the Jews, and to help Zionists not only by their prayers but by their donations and their votes in the British Parliament or the American Congress, there remains still a great faction of Catholic and Greek Orthodox Christians who would consider the possession of Palestine by the Jews a great calamity. Western Christians forget that Jerusalem was the real mother of all the Christian churches, that Antioch in neighboring Syria was the place where the followers of the Nazarene were first called Christians, and that Christians have been in Palestine continuously since the birth of Christianity itself. Whatever may be said of the religious claims of Jews or Christians outside of Palestine, we cannot ignore the claims and rights of the native Christians of Palestine. They are the ones who have borne the brunt of privations throughout the centuries in the preservation of their faith, who steadfastly held to their posts and defended their heritage against all aggressors.

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[1] See Romans 9: 6-7

[2] *The Jewish-Arab Conflict*

On the exclusive religious ground, therefore, the Jewish claim is not so strong to non-Jews as it appears to the Jews themselves, or those of them who can still honestly believe that the fulfillment of the Old Testament prophecies may come through the help of British guns and bayonets. Granting that the prophecies of the Old Testament are true, in some sense or other; granting the right of the Jews to believe in them, are we not, in fairness if not in reason, bound to respect other prophecies and different interpretations of the same prophecies?[1]

An American friend of the Arabs who spent many years in Palestine once said that he used to be quite tolerant of Christian Fundamentalists who earnestly believe in the return of Israel to Palestine, until he began to realize that this belief is bringing suffering and oppression to an innocent people who, for no fault of theirs, do not share it.

Present day Zionists who may be quite sincere in their accusation of British duplicity cannot be free of blame in the present debacle of Palestine when they minimize the reality and earnestness of Arab nationalism. Today Zionism is by necessity forced to take one of two alternatives: Either ignore Arab nationalism and deny the rights of the Arabs for self-government, or admit the reality of this nationalism and grant it the same right which they grant their own nationalism. In taking the first alternative they are covertly or overtly assisting and abetting a form of oppression from which they have valiently struggled to free themselves in the last forty years. This Zionists do when at the very same time they are calling on the world to respect their own rights as minorities, or to recognize them as a separate national entity. They are denying the rights of an Arab majority by refusing that majority its insistent demands for national recognition.

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[1] See Compendium of my Debate with Ittamar—Ben Avi in *New History,* June, 1937.

Political Zionists who persist in ignoring the national rights of the Palestinian Arabs and who justify their policy on grounds of "practical politics," may well ponder the words of a great Jew and a spiritual Zionist, Dr. Judah Magnes, Chancellor of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem:

> "No Jewish policy can be predicated upon quick results. Individual Jews may know how to 'get rich quick' but not Jewish policy. Jewish policy must be of such a nature that the Jewish people can look it in the face without shame over a long period of years and despite every difficulty. Any Jewish politician who denounces this as mere 'idealism' and not practical politics, shows that he does not know Jewish life, and that as a politician he has become 'assimilated.' The one kind of Jewish 'Real Politik' with any chance must be based upon simple justice, because this is the Jewish tradition."[1]

The view expressed in the above quotation is not a new one born of a counsel of despair in the face of Arab opposition. Gottheil quotes K. Kohler, a contemporary of Herzl, as opposed to "official Zionism." Kohler contrasts this Zionism to "true Zionism" which demands of the Jews "to be martyrs in the cause of truth and justice and peace."[2]

The views represented by Dr. Judah Magnes and others of the school known as spiritual or cultural Zionism point to the only ground of understanding between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. Cultural Zionism, as I understand it, is essentially non-political. It envisages Palestine as a haven for the secure and free cultivation of Jewish culture and Jewish life. For this purpose all that is needed is a spiritual centre or nucleus which would show the world what could be done by Jews when untrammeled by the discriminatory and inhibitive domination of other races among

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1. *Like All Nations* p. 56-57
2. *Zionism* p. 100

whom Jews have lived. It could insist on and has right to expect no discrimination in the historic land of the Jews, but could not nor need insist on a state, an army or political status recognized internationally.

To what extreme the insistence on political recognition by Zionists may lead is shown in a movement which sprang within the ranks of Political Zionists and has followed merciless logic in the exposition of its views. The Revisionist Movement, headed by Vladimir Jabotinsky, is frankly and avowedly predicated on extreme nationalism that would not stop at violence and force for the possession of the whole of Palestine. The name of the movement is derived from the demand by those Zionists to revise the terms of the mandate so that it would include Trans-Jordan. A Jewish army and a full Jewish state internationally recognized are among the main objectives of the Revisionists. That such extreme nationalism tends to ape extreme nationalism—fascism—of Europe is only natural. On the occasion of recent uprisings in Palestine, Revisionists were heard to sing:

"Germany for Hitler,
Italy for Mussolini,
Petah Tikva for us;
Heil, Heil, Jabotinsky."[1]

If anything could be more embarrassing to Zionists and Jews in general than manifestations of fascistic symptoms just at this juncture we do not know what could be.

There is a third choice left to Political Zionists who frown on Jabotinsky and turn away from Judah Magnes. It is to identify Zionism inseparably with British Imperialism; to take the Jewish State as a boon from Great Britain, and thus to compromise seriously on a fundamental condition of Jewish settlement in Palestine on the basis of "right" not "sufferance." Col. Wedgwood among British imperialists has openly and loudly espoused this interpretation of Zionism which would convert Palestine outright into a crown colony. Among Zionists themselves, Lord Melchett, British industrialist and chief beneficiary of the Dead Sea concession, has shown his British patriotism and appreciation of British protection by handing the Jewish Homeland on a platter to the British Tories.

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[1] *Zionism Today* by Paul Novick

All of which leads to this question: Does it pay Zionists to depend on methods for the building of their homeland in Palestine that are as unfair, if not as ruthless, as those by which they were driven from other countries in Europe? Is there any explanation, otherwise, why Zionists have fought the establishment of democratic institutions in Palestine to the present day? Jews who have consideration for the fair name of their race, who are proud of their liberal and humanitarian traditions, who have fought on the side of liberty, democracy and liberalism in Europe and America cannot barter these even for a national homeland in Palestine.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ZIONISM VERSUS ARAB NATIONALISM—II

It is strange, but apparently true, that political Zionists could be socialists or communists when socialism or communism affects the world of the *goyim,* but not when it affects the Jews. They could be ardent patriots on all matters which do not affect the Jews, but they place loyalty to their race and to their nationality above loyalty to any country. If this were not true, why should good Germans, before the advent of nazism, or good Americans aspire for any homeland outside of Germany or the United States? Undoubtedly most Jews proved loyal citizens during the war in whichever country their lot had been cast. This could not be said of the political Zionists among them who were accused in Germany and Austria of siding with the Allies and of influencing other Jews to betray the cause of the Central Powers *only* when the British came out with the notorious declaration in favor of a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine. We have Lloyd George's own admission, quoted in the *Palestine Royal Commission's Report* that Zionist leaders who gave the Allies their promise to "really Jewish sentiment and support throughout the world," did actually keep their word! Even after the Balfour Declaration, the authors of the Report inform us, Zionists were carrying on negotiations with the Germans ant Turks for some dispensation which would guarantee them a national homeland and free migration to Palestine.

Political Zionists first predicate the solution, then try to fit the problem to it. Not only do Zionists consider inassimilability the reason they should seek a homeland of their own, but do encourage such inassimilability to the extent that it constitutes in itself a perpetual problem never to be solved until the very last inassimilable Jew goes to Palestine. That the launching of the Jewish National Home after the war meant a revival of opposition to Jews in various countries was a matter in the minds of Zionist leaders who dictated the form which the Balfour Declaration finally assumed. The enjoinment in that declaration that nothing shall be done to prejudice "the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country" must have appeared fortuitous even to its own framers. It also indicates the awareness that Zionism would naturally raise this question. H. G. Wells alludes to this when speaking of Zionist activities during the world war. He said:

> "But throughout those tragic and almost fruitless four years of war Zangwill and the Jewish spokesmen were most elaborately and energetically demonstrating that they cared not a rap for the troubles and dangers of any people but their own. They kept their eyes steadfastly upon the restoration of the Jews and, what was worse in the long run, they kept the Gentiles acutely aware of this."[1]

Because Zionists did not seriously want a realistic solution of the question of inassimilability, they never attempted an objective and serious analysis of the problem. They have left it intentionally vague. As a consequence they sometimes raise imaginary obstacles and lead sympathizers to think that the "Gentile" world is unreasonable in its demands of assimilation, and at others conceive of assimilation as something that even the most ardent assimilationist would not demand. Assimilation and non-assimilation are matters of social interaction. It is a mutual process in which the assimilator and the one to be assimilated profit. It cannot be consummated with one side taking the attitude: assimilate us if you can! It is also a natural process in which the undesirable elements of social conduct and behavior drop out of their own accord. Certainly the problem of assimilation cannot be solved by the creation of a homeland thousands of miles away from the centers of social contact and conflict which create the problem. Nationals of any one country could be composed of different groups with different ideals and different philosophies of life, even different racial strands without doing violence to their national loyalty or nursing a feeliny of estrangement to the rest of the nation. It is possible to assimilate in unimportant matters of social usage, conformity to the social *mores,* without compromising on one's fundamental and distinctive principles. A religious community satisfies all the conditions of essential non-assimilability.

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[1] *Liberty,* magazine, December 24, 1938.

In view of all this Zionism not only solved no Jewish problem, real or imaginary, but has become itself the Jewish problem *par excellence.* The patient is not suffering now from the malady but from the medicine which was administered to it by quack medicos more interested in therapy than in healing.

The Royal Commission Report of 1937 is itself sufficient proof that Zionism as a solution has failed, that the experiment in Palestine, like the prohibition experiment in the United States, may have had some merits about it, but not enough to justify its being called "noble." And like the notorious American experiment it is also making cowards out of brave men who dare not oppose the tide of bigotry and hatred that has been swelled and deepened by the shedding of blood in Palestine, dishonest men out of honest ones who normally would have challenged the premises and suggested different conclusions and different solutions.

The Report makes two admissions, one of which would doom Zionism by itself, without help of British bayonets, to utter failure, while the other negates and makes void the very cornerstone of political Zionist aspirations. Throughout its pages the Report admits that the mandate, on its present terms is unworkable and has failed. In its conclusion it throws the solution back into the lap of the Arabs, appealing to their good nature and generosity to solve the Jewish problem at their own expense. "If Arabs at some sacrifice," pleads the report, "could help to solve that problem, they would earn the gratitude not of the Jews alone but of all the Western world."[1] A whole volume could be written in paraphrase of this one sentence! The mendicity and unchivalry of a plea by a mighty empire which begs of the small and poverty-stricken Arab nation to accommodate the Jews by appealing to their characteristic "Arab generosity." Could the authors of the Report have had in mind a certain parable which Nathan the prophet addressed to King David about a rich man who had many flocks and a poor man who had only one ewe lamb? Should the Arabs grant the request of the British Royal Commissioners, however, what would become of the political Zionist contention that Jews must be in Palestine as of right and not by sufferance?

Let us forget for the present the political issues which divide the Zionist Jews and the Arabs into two bitterly opposed camps; let us forget about historic claims and inherent rights, and look at Palestine from an objective point of view, to determine the reality of the developments and improvements accredited to Zionism. Here is a country with an area of a little over 10,000 square miles, about the size of Vermont. In natural resources Palestine is admittedly as barren as its rocky hills, excepting for the problematic resources of the Dead Sea. The total acreage of Palestine is equivalent to 27,009,000 dunums (a dunum is about one quarter of an acre), of which, according to an official government estimate, 7,120,000 are classed as "cultivable area." This estimate differs from that given by a Jewish authority quoted in the report of the Palestine Royal Commission as 9,197,000. The Commission Report presumes that the Jewish estimate includes the forest area of Palestine, about 695,000 dunums, and is exclusive of the Beersheba area of 12,577,000 dunums.

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[1] *Royal Commission Report* p. 395.

Zionists have given the impression that with intensive agriculture vast lands which fall now in the category of uncultivable area could be reclaimed and used for settlement of Jewish immigrants. Even the arid expanse of the southern district known as Beersheba, Zionists envisage as potential farms and orchards once the water is dug up and the desert dotted with artesian wells. Even if Jewish capital could accomplish the miracle of turning much of what is now waste land into productive terrain, there is such a thing as the law of diminishing return, which has been actually reached in many parts of Palestine today. Jewish agricultural authorities have challenged the government estimate of cultivable land and its definition of cultivability, claiming that many factors should be taken into consideration which cannot be determined beforehand and must depend on actual examination of the land in question and on the general economic development of the country. On this potential absorptive capacity, and not on the present one, the claims for the settlement of the Jewish homeland and incessant demands by Zionists for public lands are based. When I was in Palestine bitter complaints were made to me by Arab landowners which prompted me to write that the most serious danger of Zionist expansion is the fact that it is mortgaging the future of the land in the interest of Jewish immigrants. The Royal Commission Report senses this danger when speaking of these improvements. It recognizes that intensive cultivation must necessarily depend on capital and education. It says:

> "The Arab peasant has at present neither the capital nor the education necessary for intensive cultivation. The Jew has. But the lack of these two essential requisites does not justify the expropriation of the Arab to make room for the

richer and more enterprising colonist, even though the Arab's conservative methods, and in some cases system of land tenure may delay development."[1]

An interesting example of how Jewish capital has succeeded in developing what has been advertised to the world as waste lands and has converted it into verdant orchards is the strip of the littoral extending roughly between Haifa and Gaza. This elongated area of "sand dunes" is generally known to the people of the Near East as the most suitable soil for the growing of citrus plants. It is not quite correct, and not even honest, to call such specifically suitable soil "sand dunes." While less fertile than other parts in the interior of Palestine and unsuitable for ordinary agriculture, it is admirably suitable for the planting of lemon and orange trees. Between Tul-Karm and past Jaffa grows a variety of orange, not unlike the California orange, with a slightly tarty taste, that has gained wide reputation. There are many who consider the orange of Jaffa the best in the world. The lucrative income from the growth of citrus orchards has always attracted capital from Palestinian and Syrian investors.

The *bayyarah,* so-called from the fact that irrigation was accomplished by means of a well, became a symbol of wealth profitably invested. Long before Zionists came to Palestine shrewd men with capital bought land in this district and converted it into *bayyarahs.* Undoubtedly the chief obstacle in the way of a more rapid development of this littoral was lack of capital. It takes a sizeable sum of money to develop a citrus orchard of 40 dunums and the farmer has to wait five years before he can realize any return on his investment. Before the unprecedented increase in citrus fruit production the return in Palestine ran as high as 20% on the dollar, which is about twenty times more than the income on cereals.

That Arabs were not lax to share in the rapid development of the citrus area may be gathered from the figures in one of Phelps Adams' articles in his series, *The Truth About Palestine,*[1] where he says that before the war the total output of citrus fruits was one million boxes of which the Jews produced only about one quarter. During the 1936-1937 season, Adams quotes the figures as eleven million boxes, of which the Jews produced a little more than one half. In other words the Arabs increased their output of citrus fruits in the period since the war by about seven times. Much of this was accomplished by thrifty and progressive peasants who sold parts of their "sand dunes properties" to the Zionists and invested the money in the improvement of the balance of their farms. I consider this a tribute to the progressiveness and level-headedness of the Arab *fellah.*

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[1] p. 235.

Judging from Zionist reports one gets the impression that no progress in agriculture or industry was achieved by the Arabs before the advent of Zionism. Yet the first orchard grower to introduce the oil motor pump for the irrigation of citrus orchards long before the war was a Christian Arab of the Burtkush family, said to be descended from the Frankish Crusaders of Bordeaux. Another Arab, A Moslem of Jaffa, installed a sorting and packing machine as far back as 1929. It is undeniably true that with unlimited capital and enthusiasm Zionist settlers have managed to keep their citrus orchards neat looking and well watered. But the same thing could be said of progressive Arab peasants even with less advantages. The irreparable loss to the Arabs is the passing permanently of this valuable land from their hands. The increase in the growth of citrus fruit was going at a slower and more normal rate before the Zionists came. Today there is a problem of over production of citrus fruits—a problem that is traceable, in Palestine, directly to feverish eagerness of Zionists to buy lands .

In the field of industry Zionists have pointed to an amazing growth which has made it possible to absorb a large number of Jewish immigrants. Little, however, has been said about a proportionately rapid increase of native Arab industry within Palestine itself. The Arab *fellahin,* left completely at the mercy of greedy money lenders, after the war, were forced either to sell their lands to the incoming Jews or fall into the hands of rapacious usurers. Only since 1935 has the British government awakened to its bounden duty as guardian of the mandated country to lend a helping hand to the Arab peasants. Instead it zealously went about its assumed task of facilitating the economic conditions for the realization of the Jewish National Home. In the last few years the British created cooperative agencies among Arab peasants from which they might borrow money at reasonable rates on the collective securities of their farms. I am told even this step was not due to the initiative of the British Mandatory but at the instigation of the Village Welfare Service, of which we shall speak in a later chapter.

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[1] *New York Sun,* Jan. 29, 1938 ff.

How much of the progress in agriculture and industry could have been achieved by the Palestine Arabs without the benefit of Zionist example and Zionist capital could be guessed at from actual results in Palestine itself and the surrounding Arab world. A group of far-sighted Arab business man have undertaken a few economic projects to safeguard the future resources of their country from the engulfing wave of Zionism. Among those is the Arab Bank of Jerusalem one of whose founders and promoters is Abdul Hamid Shuman, a former Palestinian immigrant of New York, and an argricultural bank also in Jerusalem. Besides these is a company for the development of Arab lands, a company for agricultural projects and a system of chambers of commerce which held a congress in the first part of February, 1937.

Compared to the well organized, heavily capitalized ventures and institutions behind the persistent efforts of the Zionists, these brave efforts of the Arab nationalists must look puny and well-nigh hopeless. The Arab of Palestine had been scarcely freed from the subjugation to the Ottoman Turks when the Zionists, armed with unlimited capital and political protection, rushed in to exploit what little resources the country could offer. There is more than envy or petulance in the bitter opposition of the Arabs to the hurried, highly geared economic methods of development employed by the Zionist settlers. It is in the light of frustrated ambitions and immense disparity of opportunity, that we understand the "psychological repercussion upon Arabs who are confronted with the irritating spectacle of improvements they themselves cannot afford."[1] G. K. Chesterton was quick to detect the paradox of Arabs dreading the very elements of efficiency and prosperity with which Zionists were seeking to win them. He said:

> "If the Zionists wish to quiet the fears of the Arabs surely the first thing to do is to discover what the Arabs are afraid of. And very little investigation will reveal the simple truth that they are very much afraid of sharks; and that in their book of symbolic or heraldic zoology it is the Jew who is adorned with the dorsal fin and crescent of cruel teeth."[2]

No fair observer of the economic development in Palestine today can fail to realize that it is an unstable and unnatural one. Immigration into any country always stimulates business; but there is a point of saturation after which any new influx will necessarily mean taking away jobs from those already in the country. The intensified movement of Jewish immigration to Palestine has dislocated the normal economic life both of the peasants and of the laborers. According to the *Simpson Report* over 29% of the peasant population in Palestine in 1931 were landless.[3] The *Palestine Survey Commission,* under the auspices of the Zionist Organization reported in 1927 overcrowding in Zionist settlements. The commission recommended as a minimum

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1. *Great Britain and Palestine,* 1915-1936, p. 35
2. *New Jerusalem,* p. 294.
3. See Canaan, *Conflict in the Land of Peace, Chapter V.*

60 acres for dry farming and 20 acres for irrigated land per family. Actually the Arab *fellah* family has managed to live on a much smaller area. Furthermore, only a small proportion of Jewish immigrants today live on farms in Palestine. In 1935 it was established that 284,000 of the Jewish population, or 75% was urban. Of the remaining 91,000 about one half lived in semi-urban areas. After reviewing the conditions of Jewish industrials up to 1920, the *Simpson Report* found that, "There is not any reason to believe that Palestine offers special attractions to large industrial concerns. The industries likely to succeed are those based on local products or, being based on imported products show special vitality." Phelps Adams alludes to the sudden variation from abnormal to normal immigration and vice versa. Jewish immigration becomes an artificial stimulus to busines when time is not allowed to absorb the new waves of immigrants into the normal economic life of the country. New immigrants need houses, clothes, and food, but once these are supplied from capital brought by the immigrants, the real problem is to find jobs for them. And these jobs must be new jobs, not ones taken away from the Arabs. The large percentage today of unemployment in Palestine is a direct result of this intensified, artificial importation of Jewish settlers. In 1935 the Histadruth, Jewish Labor Federation, estimated the number of idle Jewish laborers as 6,000 according to the government report of that year. There is every reason, however, to concede the objection of Mitchel Mitry, late head of the Arab Labor Union of Jaffa, that the figure given by the government or the Histadruth is inaccurate and that the figure should be put at 9,000. Taking the latter figure, Mitry estimated the number of Arabs unemployed at 15,000. But even at the figure of the Histadruth the number of unemployed Jewish and Arab laborers together, at the end of 1935—21,000—is a large figure in ratio to the population of the country—then less than 1,400,000. It stands to reason that an economy which depends for

its rejuvenation on constant immigration is an artificial economy. The case would be different if Jewish immigration were directly dependent on labor demand and were distributed on a great area embracing the whole Near East. It would then be said that fresh capital is seeking investment wherever it is needed, an investment that brings with it new jobs to those already there, as well as to the immigrants. There is no point in the Jewish argument for prosperity in Palestine when they import not only the capital, but the labor and the consumer as well.

Another serious set-back or element of discord in the economics of Palestine is the artificial foisting of a different, even if higher, standard of living on a country and forcing the economic factors to conform to this standard. Adams observes that wages to Jewish workers are often quadruple the wages paid to workers in surrounding countries, "against the products of which Palestinian industries must compete for its market." To protect Jewish industry, therefore, it becomes necessary for the government to impose high tariffs on these products, which is not to the interest of the Palestinian consumers, and to raise artificially the high cost of living.

Dr. Canaan refers to an article by Alfred Marcus in which the latter says that the anticipation of a rapid expansion of Palestine trade of industrial products in the Syrian markets has not been realized.[1] About 75% of the industries in Palestine today are in the hands of the Jews, while only 5% of the total production is dependent on Jewish purchases, according to an anonymous British authority residing in Palestine.[2] This writer also shows how the double standard of wages between Jewish and Arab laborers is working to the disadvantage of the latter, when the standard of living has also risen with that of wages. A Jewish orange picker, he writes, receives from four to five shillings a day; while an Arab orange picker, who usually does twice the work of the Jewish picker, receives from two shillings sixpence to four shillings.

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[1] Dr. Canaan, *Conflict in the Land of Peace,* p. 59.

[2] *Who is Prosperous in Palestine,* p. 32.

Thousands of able-bodied Arab peasants evicted from farms now swell the cities of Palestine and congest the labor market. Yet the Zionist "experiment" has not rid the Jewish people of the very curses of congestion and dependence on petty trade competitions which have caused so much irritation against the Jews abroad. Paul Novick, a communist Jewish writer, estimates that about 244,000 Jews in the Yishub (Palestine) are now engaged as "professionals, middlemen, officials, luftmencschen, Menachem Mendels, speculators."[1] Thus the Ghetto, from which the Jews are running away is following them to the Yishub. As in communist Russia, so in Palestine, tourists and newspaper reporters are usually taken to model farms, heavily capitalized with free contributions, leased on ridiculously easy terms, and shown young men and women in shorts working in the exhilirating environment of a sunny, clear climate. The transient visitors are naturally led to conclude that all Jewish immigrants to Palestine are of this type of *chelusim.* One has only to take a stroll in Jerusalem along the Jaffa road to meet a large number of Jews who look as though they had just emerged from the Ghetto.

Zionists usually challenge the statistics of their opponents and offer statistics of their own, with the sly implication that their opponents' trustworthiness or knowledge of facts is questionable. This is supposed to leave the reader more inclined to listen to them on all matters favorable to the Zionist point of view, when neither the reader nor the opponent has the opportunity to make effective investigation. There is a fairy tale in Grimm Brothers, a variation of the Cinderella one, which must have been the crystallization of this human failing. Aschenputtel, a beautiful step-daughter, is shoved into the background to grovel in the ashes while the homely daughters of the step-mother are taken to parties and given all consideration. In the same manner Zionists marshal their "facts" and arguments, carefully keeping the "facts" and arguments of the Arabs in the background.

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[1] *Zionism Today,* pp. 17-18.

If a Jewish state is a solution of the Jewish problem it has become increasingly obvious that such a state must be outside of Palestine and the Arabic speaking world. Such a solution has been suggested lately both by persons friendly to the Jews and by others. There is food for thought in the suggestion made by Il Duce to hold a world congress for the discussion of the whole question of a Jewish homeland somewhere in the world but not in Palestine.

The problem of Palestine has now frankly become the problem of Zionism and the tragic debacle it has created. Today there are about 500,000 Jews in Palestine, many of them through no fault of theirs, and because they had implicit faith in British promises. What course must be followed to remove the hatred and ominous friction between those Jews and the Arab population? Essentially it is a humanitarian problem, and the solution should also be humanitarian, conceding much on both sides which may not be strictly in accordance with nationalistic ideology.

The essence of the tragedy in Palestine is that two races which have had so much in common in the past are now in deadly enmity because each has awakened relatively recently to the vital importance of reasserting its national sovereignty. The Jewish state in Palestine is not only a limitation of Arab sovereignty, but under its present conditions a thorn in its side, a means of saddling British imperialism on Arab lands as long as Zionists feel they need its protection. Many Zionists are beginning to realize that the only ultimate solution of their problem in Palestine is through a hearty recognition of Arab nationalism in the broader sense as it applies to Palestine and other parts of the Arabic speaking world, and the working through this recognition on the side of the progressive forces for the regeneration of the whole Arab East. Sereni and other Zionists who hold this view have given up the concept of a Jewish state which rests on a community of interests with Great Britain. They realize that these interests "have definite limits." Equally, they realize the limitations and unreality of the League of Nations, to which Revisionists for a time turned. This new orientation takes as its start a substitution of Arab-Jewish interests and sanctions for the Balfour declaration. They urge immediate recognition of Arab national rights, and even seek to work with them for the realization of the wider aim of Pan-Arab union or federation. "The place of partnership is not Palestine but the Arab empire."[1] Even the insistence on Jewish majority is given up by the holders of this view. In its place Jews, now friendly with the Arabs, can settle in colonies anywhere in the vast Arab world. In this vaster economy Jews are pictured as a progressive force aligned with similar Arab progressive forces in a common struggle against reactionism, whether Jewish or Arabic. Zionists would consolidate their position by extending expert help to Arab labor and peasant forces in their struggle for organization and recognition of their rights. A leader in this group rejects the favored Jewish economy and accepts the lower Arab economy as the only natural one where a large, unorganized labor market militates against the hedged and protected Jewish colonies.

This may not be orthodox Zionism and Sereni may or may not command the necessary influence over a large section of Zionists to convert them to his views. But his words seem to our ears far more reasonable than anything political Zionism has to offer. It is a view, further, which would obviate the only serious obstacle in the way of peaceful Jewish settlement in Palestine—Arab enmity and opposition. How far removed this stand is from that of a typical political Zionist who would solve the Jewish problem even at the cost of bloodshed and urges his fellow Zionists to "risk" the fateful step no matter what comes."[1]

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[1] *Jews and Arabs in Palestine,* p. 273.

Arab Jewish friendship could also be achieved through cultural cooperation. Palestine, now that it has a large block of Jewish population, could be very well considered a national homeland of a people who have depended on no land for the expression of their particular culture throughout centuries of *diaspora,* and to whom a political state in the strict sense of the word can never solve the problem for millions of their race who must necessarily remain outside that state.

Political Zionists make the wrong approach altogether when they speak of "right" and "sufferance." The formula for the restoration of peace in Palestine should be one which would avoid both "right" and "sufferance." The Jews are not in Palestine by right, in the political sense of the word—but they are there by human right. They were tricked into going there by the British and by their own leaders who willfully or otherwise hid the ugly facts from them, who did not fathom nor wished to face the depth and intensity of Arab fear and hatred of the Jewish state in Palestine. Nor are the Jews there by sufferance, as long as they are there as peaceful citizens of Palestine or of the larger Arab federation. Arabs would be more than anxious to welcome into their midst Jews who came, not as assertors of a claim that had lapsed for almost 2,000 years, not as belligerent nationalists who cut the Arab's nose to spite the anti-Semites, but as friends willing to help and to share their valuable experience and knowledge gained throughout the Galut with their Semitic cousins. The same help, the same knowledge and experience would be resented and flatly thrown out when dangled before the Arabs as a temptation to barter therewith their national independence and self-respect.

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[1] S. M. Melamed, *Galut* vs. *Geulah* in the *New Palestine,* May 27, 1938.

It is for the Jews to consider this cooperation with Arabs as the supreme opportunity to redeem themselves, to win Arab friendship through service. To win the right to be in Palestine in this manner and with this spirit is far more lasting and secure than to take shelter in equivocal promises conceived in the bowels of treachery and opportunism. Today, as in the days of the Old Testament, Judaism is suffering from false prophets and bigoted leaders who have led a great many of the "eternal people" after the baal of worldly security and grandeur. To do like other nations was the first step in the downfall of Israel, and today it threatens to close the only avenue for the spiritual reorientation of Judaism, the only justification for the international role of the Jews. It is the reactionaries and racially bigotted who wish today to isolate the Jews in a single country and as a distinct nation.

Once the right intent is born, once the Jews and Arabs come to some understanding for living together in peace in Palestine, avenues undreamt of would open to the enrichment of both. The Jews then would find the whole East open to them, as it has always been, for peaceful settlement, industry, commerce and cultural achievements. It is far vaster and nobler a vision than a little spiteful state around Mt. Carmel, inciting by its very presence the perpetual hatred and opposition of the Arabs to all the Jews.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE CHALLENGE TO IMPERIALISM IN THE ARAB LANDS

There was a time, in the distant past, when imperialism wore a halo around its head; when wholesale murder on the battlefield assumed a mystical quality of divine vindication, if not exultation. There was a time when Jehovah was called the Lord of Hosts, when the almighty God judged among the nations of the world by the sword and the javelin. The great Thothmes III, whom James Breasted called the first empire builder of history, could then appropriately put in the mouth of his God the words of a paean which has come down to us as a monument at Karnak:

> "I have come that I may cause thee to tread down
> them that are in the marshes;
> The lands of Meten tremble for fear of thee."

We feel a thrill of vicarious pride and majesty as we listen to Ammon-Ra, the supreme Egyptian God, addressing his favorite son, the king:

> "I cause them to behold thy majesty as a fierce-eyed
> lion,
> While thou makest them to be corpses throughout
> their valley."

That day has long past. A different philosophy of life has come to the world to disturb those who deify selfishness and glorify greed. Today imperialism has fallen on evil days; it has "lost face" with all people of intelligence and integrity. It slinks about like a cowardly villain, taking refuge in hypocritical self-justification. It has stooped to apologize and to defend itself like a convicted criminal before the bar of justice. The secret pang of conscience and blush of shame which we now feel as we grimly go about our business of bombing innocent women and children from the sky were blithely absent in a Thothmes, a Nebuchadnazar or a Genghis Khan.

This most illustrious of Egyptian monarchs, whose conquests extended from upper Egypt to Megiddo and the confines of Mesopotamia in the 16th century before Christ, would feel quite out of place among the conquerors of our present day. How absurd would it sound to our ears if the Karnak monument had recorded that Thothmes III had conquered the Tehenu and the Utentiu in order to bring them the bounties and beneficences of Egyptian civilization, to prepare them ultimately for self-rule! It would have been equally absurd for Thothmes to have announced to the world, perhaps with his tongue in his cheek, that he was carrying the "brown man's burden" in darkest Africa, or in white Syria. No such thoughts disturbed the mind of Thothmes III. If some of his unfortunate enemies were spared; if some war slave rose to the rank of a Moses and was brought up with the Pharaoh's children, that was only incidental to a social system that recognized no freedom or rights for the vanquished. The threats of Thothmes were as fearful as his favors were condescending.

If we argue that there is somt grain of truth and honesty in the humanitarian claims of the modern imperialists, let us not forget that Thothmes and his peers did not so thoroughly crush and annihilate their enemies, as their boasts would indicate; their cruelties on the battlefield were not so grim as one would gather from reading their monuments. We have the authority of Breasted himself that Thothmes "launched his

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1. *History of Egypt,* p. 320.

armies upon Asia with one hand and with the other crushed the extortionate taxgatherer."[1]

That was ancient imperialism at its best, unmasked, yea naked, standing like a beautiful and mighty savage in the face of the sun, fearful and fascinating like a very God, of one piece with the thundering torrents, the lightning and the earthquake. Not so is modern imperialism which looks more grotesque than grand. Its savagery is atrociaous and cunning; the breath of its lying propaganda, like that of a repulsive monster, kills ere it reaches its victim. It is a reversion to barbarism shorn of its innocent beauty and majestic grandeur.

The fundamental thesis of imperialism rests on the contention that the supreme qualities of man are not ultruism and goodness, not love of one's neighbor, but might, both physical and moral. That is the ruling force in creation—the self assertion of those who have something to do and something to say. In democratic America William Randolph Hearst has identified himself with this Nietzschean philosophy. In an editorial on the invasion of Ethiopia he gave his pontifical approval of ruthless nations attacking weaker and less fortunate ones. He wrote:

> "Jungles are cleared to the inconvenience of tigers, jackals and the tse-tse flies.
>
> "Civilization advances at the expense of the uncivilized. *"Even in civilization* progress is made at a cost to those who will not or cannot progress."[1]

Is it progress to have nations feverishly piling up arms and ammunitions in a mad race of destruction? Is it of the essence of advanced civilization to conscript boys and girls in their teens, drill them in the arts of warfare and poison their minds against other boys and girls they have never seen? But modern imperialism seeks refuge in rationalizing and moralizing.

Several years ago F. H. Giddings, the great American sociologist, spoke of imperialism as a medium for the

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1. *N. Y. Journal and American,* Jan. 26, 1938. Italics are the author's.

propagation of democracy. He conceived of no alternative between narrow, provincial nationalism, based on religious and racial loyalty, and a leveling imperialism that made backward nations conform to the modern rules of the game of democracy. World trade and world communications were not safe with the old concept of nationalism which sought to keep out foreign influences and foreign ideals, good and bad indiscriminately. The impact of imperialism was necessary, it seemed to him, to open the way for the benign and liberating influences or world democracy.

Giddings took for granted, as Nietzsche, Spengler and many others have done, that there will always be a small class of superior beings, and a much larger class of shiftless, incompetent ones, and that the former must always rule and exploit the latter. The fallacy of this reasoning, upon which both capitalism and imperialism stand, consists not in the perpetuation of slavery of men and women "already doomed to it" by their own incompetence and helplessness, but in the fact that it dooms to slavery *already free* men and women who are sovereign in their own rights and by their own inner worth and dignity. Imperialism often discriminates *against* the truly competent and creative members of society, prostituting talent and knowledge to its own ignoble ends. And often, as we see daily before our own eyes, it concentrates power in the hands of knaves and wealth in the hands of numbskulls of sickly imagination who know not how to live on five thousand dollars a month!

Do the truly wise always rule in our democracies? Do the truly strong always excercise power over others in imperialism? Are the truly worthy and gifted always the ones who are granted the means of unlimited wealth and self-expression? The extension of democracy abroad by imperialism is something with which natives have no special quarrel or grievance. It is the extension of all the contingent evils of an adulterated democracy that has done the great harm and has finally discredited democracy itself at home and abroad. Let the strong and superior first rule at home, then ask if they have the imperious and divine right to rule abroad. And must we not ask what it is to be strong, and what it is to be superior? Must we accept without questioning a definition of strength and superiority that has been imposed by ruthless autocrats upon an unconvinced world?

When imperialists have been exposed and stripped of all moral and rational justification they have taken refuge in the vague "instinct" of self-preservation. A modern apologist of British imperialism calls the humanitarian or internationalist enemy of imperialism a "mugwump," borrowing an invective once made famous by Theodore Roosevelt. A mugwump, in this version, is one who subverses this imperial "instinct" or ascends above it, one who "does not possess instincts" or refuses to consider them as safe guides, and is eager to impress his views on the community!

> "Racialism, patriotism, respect for national honor," continues this apologist, "are anathema to him. The methods by which a healthy community will vindicate itself, punish dissidents, suppress the foreign foe, are, therefore, in his views, sinful. The national ideals, the national religion, the national morality, are all susptct to him as being tainted with particularism."[1]

Does not this have the ring of fascism, now so jarringly familiar to our ears? One truly does not know what to make of this statement, for one naturally is expected to ask what part of our actions and policies are supposed to be governed by instincts and what by reason. Is it a matter of convenience when we summon instinct for the defense of our crimes and wrongs and when we call on intelligence to justify them? What are those vague terms in which Carthill indulges—racialism, patriotism and national honor? By no means do we doubt their existence or their justification, but what are their qualifications and limitations? Is the greedy exploiter's sense of national honor the same as that of the humanitarian physician, scholar or the suppressed ditch-digger? And what does the author mean by "punishing dissidents," and from whom or what are they supposed to dissent? What are foreign "foes," and of whom are they foes? What about the domestic foes and what means have our imperialists taken to suppress these first?

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[1] *The Lost Dominion,* by Al Carthill, p. 73.

Carthill raises a very interesting question: If imperialism rests on instinct its appeal should be instinctive. It should stand in no need of "intelligent" defense or apology. Carthill classes among the "mugwumps" some of the greatest and noblest souls in history. He mentions Socrates, Plato and Dante by name. He should have had the courage of his convictions and named the greatest "mugwump" of them all—Jesus of Nazareth, the humble subject of a mighty empire.

Propaganda, the art of concealing truth by revealing only that part which is favorable to the propagandist, is the very lifeblood of imperialism. It is the element without which it cannot live. But, as the Arabic proverb says, the rope of lying is short. Like habit-forming narcotics, its poison works slowly on the system of imperialism itself, enslaving it and enervating it. The lies it propagates make imperialism impervious in time to the simple truths of life which may be counted upon as corrections and guides. All honest men of sound minds know that *prestige* cannot rest on the practices of force and coercion, that the obeiesence of slavish souls is not a sign of respect and adoration. The same "ruling" and "superior" imperialists who at home would aspire to the praise of their peers and would not count the fulsome adoration of their lackeys and servants for more than they are worth, surround themselves in the East with a halo of prestige emanating from a class that differs only in name and circumstance from their own "inferiors" at home. Of fear, envy and cringing submission imperialists could rightly and freely speak, but of the right to command admiration and respect very rarely.

The ghost of imperial prestige has long ago been laid low, but it still stalks the abodes and paths of Westerners who, in their knowledge of, or relations with the East, live on the level of Mother Goose Rhymes and the fairy-tales. Imperialists think they have fallen on evil days and that their prestige has waned among the conquered races of the East, ascribing this to the insidious influence of nationalism, especially to the brand fanned to fanatic hatred by the Westernized native graduates of missionary universities. The truth is imperialism never enjoyed any true prestige in the East.

Not long ago the world witnessed a rivalry for prestige in the Arab lands that would have made a fitting subject for a Gilbert and Sullivan operetta. The Italian fascists had created a great deal of agitation against Great Britain by daily broadcasts in Arabic from Bari, Italy. The British imperialists were alarmed. These broadcasts became a topic for memorializing the Italian government and even for personal remonstrances with Premier Benito Mussolini. Finally the British thought of the brilliant idea of doing their own broadcasting to the Arab lands to offset the Italian propaganda. Their agents distributed receiving sets freely to cafes and public places. The Italians, who in a short time had learned all the tricks and lengerdemains of British imperialism, went the British one better. They engaged a famous Arab singer of Cairo, "the foremost Arab crooner," as he was described in the press dispatches, to broadcast his moaning music at the very time scheduled for the first British broadcast. As a result those who had accepted both Italian and British receiving sets, on turning on first one then the other soon shut off the British sets to listen to the favorite singer whose records are in every Arab home. The British Empire shook to it foundations and British prestige suffered a humiliation hard to swallow!

The humiliation, however, was as much of an illusion as imperial prestige has always been. The Arab radio listeners, even the most ignorant or illiterate of them, take no more stock in fascist assurances of friendship than in the lame explanations and naive news comments of the British propagandist. Nobody save deluded Italian fascists at home took seriously the self-assumed role of the "sword of Islam" by Premier Mussolini. Moslems are getting tired of one humiliator of Islam after another bidding for its patronage and protection. As *al-Bayan* of New York put it, there was no need for so much laboring by the British, "one word of truth was sufficient"—to assure the Arabs that Great Britain would respect their rights in Palestine and carry out those promises she made for them in the first world war.

The present war has clouded the issues, exactly as the first one did, twenty-five years ago. The greater and more acute danger of totalitarianism, tends to make us forget that essetially all imperialism is alike, and behaves the same way. The only difference is that totalitarian imperialism is consistent and takes us back to the days of Thothmes III while the British type is hypocritical and inconsistent. Herein lie the seeds both of the destruction of imperialism and of the rebirth of true democracy. For hypocrisy at least assumes decent regard for the avowed truth. But it is precisely, on the other hand, because totalitarianism is the illegitimate child of imperialism, left at its door, that we must search out its prude, philandering progenitor.

One of the most bitter and sweeping indictments of British imperialism comes not from an Arab but from a British source, an English scholar and author of note This is as it should be, and as poetic and moral justice would demand.

Although the outbreak of the war in September 1939 would make several changes necessary and although the author often leans backward in his defense of communist Russia, now allied with nazi Germany, Briffault's little volume, *The Decline and Fall of the British Empire,* will remain one of the most significant political critiques of our time. For in it the author has not only unmasked British imperialism and torn its pretenses to shreds, but has also demonstrated the inherent weakness of this imperialism at its source, in England itself. For British imperialism is in essence industrial exploitation, and, as Briffault admirably expounds it, it was possible only with the advent of modern industrialism, and thus would last only as long as Great Britain enjoyed its unique industrial supremacy. It is not the place here to dwell at length on Briffault's thesis and show how industrial capitalists gradually merged with the feudal "gentlemen" of England to form the ruling, imperial class, nor to show how the main source of English capitalism was derived from India, following the dawn of the modern industrial age. For us the importance of Briffault's book lies in its ridicule of those aspects of British imperialism that have won admiration, even adoration, abroad, and particularly in the United States. British imperialism, far from being the preceptor of democracy, is pointed out as the reactionary force which has stood in the way of every reform in Europe, that consistently "rode the wrong horse," and was as ruthless in exploiting the Welsh miners at home as the Hindu coolies abroad. He reveals the impotency of opposition in England from "the non-conformists," whether in religion or industry. The capacity for "muddling through" by British imperialism, a quality curiously admired in some quarters, and even boasted of by British imperialist apologists, Briffault attributes to the great abundance of its resources and economic means, and he doubts that this capacity can persist under circumstances which deprive Great Britain of her economic supremacy.

Now that other countries have caught up with England in industrial development, they find her precedence in enslaving other nationalities for their raw materials and markets a convenient one. If Great Britain could do it, with moral unction or without, why could not Germany or Japan? But the time of reckoning is near, and the avengers of the wrongs of imperialism are first its victims at home. Said Briffault:

> "Decadence is a phenomenon common to all imperial powers ant civilizations that have hitherto existed, for none has ever constituted a truly social, and therefore stable structure."[1]

And precisely this has been the real weakness of imperialism abroad. The incidental democracy allowed the countries dominated by Great Britain was fought with tooth and nail by the British imperialits when the nationalists, taking their cue from the imperialists themselves, tried to propagate it among their own peoples.[2]

For it is the nationalists in the East today, who are taking up the task of the thorough and wholesale democratization of their own people, a thing that would have spelled the doom of imperialism had it been attempted, but would have saved Western prestige and Western friendship. Paradoxical as it may appear it is those nationalists who appreciate true Western culture more than the imperialists themselves and may be counted upon to preserve whatever Western prestige is worthy of preservation. Secretly imperialism realizes this, which explains its intensified hatred of nationalism the more this nationalism tries to emulate it, and in emulating it industrially inevitably hastens the processes of democracy. That which imperialism has failed to do at home and abroad, nationalism has sallied forth with rejuvenated vigor to do in the ancient lands of the East, the lands which first were engulfed with the darkness of imperialism, and from which the light of democracy first emanated.

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1. *The Decline and Fall of tne Britisn Empire,* p. 235.
2. See the admirable book by Prof. Earnest Wood, an English educator of long residence in India, *An Englishman Defends Mother India,* also *The Vanishing Empire* by Chaman Lal.

CHAPTER NINE

FOUR CITIES, FOUR ATTITUDES[1]

Four cities in the Arab lands of the Near East—Cairo, Beirut, Damascus and Jerusalem—aptly symbolize today four types of attitude toward what has come to be known as "Westernization." Each of these cities has its own historic associations, its peculiar distinctions and charms, one could almost say its own aura of antiquity. In the recent cosmic detonations which have awakened them from their deep and long slumber, the peculiar attitude of each is evident, and all together, sometimes running parallel, sometimes overlapping, sometimes clashing, these four attitudes are fashioning the destiny of the Arab lands.

In Cairo, for instance, East and West mingle quite freely and indiscriminately in its modern, wide thoroughfares and winding, antiquated lanes and bazaars, but they do not mix. Like the mythical Centaur, or like its own Sphinx, Cairo is two-natured; and one half has obviously been superimposed upon the other. The Barbar *farrash* in the fashionable hotel may dial your telephone message, run you up and down on the automatic elevator and draw your bath, but, as he stands immutably before you, his dark, stalwart features as ineffable as those of a captive slave on some Egyptian monument with his white flowing gown, his red sash, his fez and his enigmatical smile, he seems like a ghost of the past amidst modern surroundings. The difference between him and the modern Egyptian whom he serves, whether of the Westernized type or the product of Moslem traditions and the Azharite background, is that the *farrash* when he is through has no further concern with the Western contraptions and innovations which he manipulates with nonchalant skill in the course of his daily routine. But both the Westernized and the avowedly native Egyptian of higher station are grimly determined to make their attitudes towards these things unmistakably clear.

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[1] Appeared in Asia, April 1938 and reproduced here by permission with little variation.

Conflict is the keynote of Egyptian politics; for it is in Cario that you find the most intransigent nationalism of the Near East, the most irreconcilable antagonism to Western domination, the most bitter fanaticism against Christian civilization. It is in Cairo, too, that you find the most abject surrender to Western rule, the most radical reforms of native life and culture, the most thoroughgoing Moslem inconoclasticism.

Unlike hinter Syria, Arabia, Iran or Afghanistan, Egypt is easily accessible to the outside world, openly exposed to the sea. Foreigners have always settled in it as a matter of course, but, since the rise of modern industrialism and its effective opening to the world by the French and English invasions, it has become a hunting-ground for predatory exploiters who are there for what they can get out of it. To those foreigners, Egypt became a lodging place, where they expected service, but had no particular sense of obligation and no hesitancy at leaving with little regret or feeling of any sort. This is not true of all, but surely of a great majority of foreigners in Egypt, in curious contrast to the state of affairs along the Syrian coast, where for many centuries foreigners have also settled.

On the other hand, the native inhabitants of Egypt, especially the *fallahin,* who are mostly Copts or of

Coptic origin, cling to their native soil with a tenacity hardly paralleled anywhere else. Very few of them ever cross the borders of their narrow, fertile valley, much less emigrate to the Americas or to other countries, as do the Syrians in such enormous numbers that today between one third and one half of Syria's population is found scattered throughout the United States, Central and South America, Australia and other parts of the world, including Egypt itself.

Between these two elements in Egypt, foreigners who are sojourners in the land and natives to whom Egypt is the whole cosmos of their earth-bound existence, there can be expected nothing but conflict, bitterness, or subservient submission. Undoubtedly conditions are changing now that Egyptians have attained a good measure of their coveted independence. Egyptian tariff is now regulated by Egyptians themselves for the protection of their own industry. This change of conditions, which indeed began when the British were still in occupation of Egypt, has brought with it a change in the attitude of the foreigners, as well as in the tone of modern Egyptian nationalists, since the rise of Zaghlul Pasha. For, unlike the nationalism of Mustafa Kamel Pasha and Mohammed Farid, that of Zaghlul Pasha and his successor, Mustafa Nashas Pasha, has certainly been more amenable to compromise, and less influenced by xenophobia. The contrast between East and West in Cairo may be said now to be subdued, but it still exists in a more marked degree than in almost any other city of the Arab lands.

Quite different is Beirut, the chief seaport of Syria, the old Phoenician city which once was a Roman colony and in which Greek culture flourished for centuries. Everything about it suggests that, for ages back, Beirut has opened its asms wide toward the Mediterranean. Like some of our modern young women it does not wait to be wooed; it does the wooing and courting itself.

European and American visitors to Syria hardly stop at Beirut, from which they hop hurriedly to Baalbek, the Cedars of Lebanon, Damascus and the Holy Land. Beirnt is quite different from Damashus, Hama or Aleppo, where monuments of Moslem architecture are plentiful: its principal mosque, al-Jami‘ al-‘Umari, is a whitewashed, modest, square edifice without a dome, which once was a church of the crusaders' period. The city's most distinguished sight and feature is the American University, on the beautiful promontory known as Ras Beirut. A trip to this supberb gem of Western contribution to the culture of the East, followed by another to the Catholic University of St. Joseph or to the cave of the Dog River, where conquerors of Syria have inscribed the records of their martial exploits, from Rameses II down to General Gouraud, exhausts the interest and curiosity of the visiting tourist.

It is a mistake, however, to think as many do, that Beirut is a cheap imitation of a Western city; that its people ape the Europeans with whom they come in contact. The attitude of impatient disgust which some Westerners openly display toward Beirut arises from a misunderstanding and lack of appreciation of its genuine cosmopolitanism, the authenticity of its claim to Westernization. It cannot be blamed if it displays undue affinity to the West; for it was of the West before Frenchmen could lay claim to any civilization whatsoever. In the days of the Roman Empire the Beirut school of law was famous throughout the world; two jurists from that school helped in the codification of the Justinian laws. And long before it was Roman, and long afterward, Beirut was a Greek city—a Greek colony with Greek culture on Semitic soil. It is not surprising if its associations and memories, like the associations and memories of all sea-faring peoples, are of distant lands and foreign climes. In the great earthquake of 551 A.D. which destroyed Beirut completely, a contemporary poet, in his moment of profound grief could evoke only Greek names and Greek associations:

> "Here am I, the unhappy city, lying in ruins, my citizens dead men . . . The fire-god destroyed me after the shock of

the earth-shaker (Poseidon) . . . Where is Aphrodite, guardian of the city, that she may look upon the shelterless haunt of the dead, once the abode of the graces? A tomb of tombless men is the city, under whose ashes we lie. Beore's many thousands . . . Sailor stop not thy vessel's course for me, nor lower thy sails. . . "[1]

Even now, after the lapse of many centuries under Arab and Turkish rule, Beirut still opens its arms wide to the West, still stands for a hospitable attitude toward things Western. A few years ago al-Rasid (Beirut) reported an audience with Pope Pius XI granted to a Syrian bishop, in the course of which the Pope said that Beirut was "the capital of Catholicism in the East." It could as well be called the capital of Protestantism in the East, at least in the Near East. For it was in Beirut that Eli Smith and Dr. Cornelius Van Dyke, American missionaries, first made a modern and complete translation of the Bible into Arabic; and in Beirut they established the first college and transplanted the first printing press from Cyprus, primarily for religious tracts and publications. In no other city of Syria are there today so many schools, churches and orphanages founded by missionaries of different nationalities—English, American, French, Italian and, until the end of the first world war, German.

It is another common mistake to conclude, because of the naturalness with which Beirutians, and others whom the city of Beirut symbolizes, take to Westernization, that they are lacking in nationalistic sympathy and loyalty. On the contrary, truly Westernized nationalists are usually more pronounced than others in their denunciation of Western domination, and often more articulate in opposing this domination. Although Damascus undoubtedly is the center today of Syrian nationalism, some of the staunchest leaders of Arab nationalism come from Beirut, which in previous decades led the Arabic world in the early literary renaissance. The fact remains, however, that even the nationalist Moslems of Beirut betray, often unconsciously, in their outward manners and conduct, that stamp of levantine cosmopolitanism which, in its subtle working on their subconscious mentality, can be traced back centuries into the past; whereas even franco-phile Christians of Damascus are more Semitic, more Arabic in their manners and mental states than many of them would care to avow.

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[1] Quoted in a little history of Beirut by Harvey Porter.

Only about sixty-five miles east-southeast of Beirut, Damascus is more than ten times that distance away in temperament, ethnic characteristics and traditions. Its attitude to the West and Westernization is not so much that of antagonism and conflict, as one of curious interest, almost facetious and supercilious. So confident is Damascus of itself, so self-possessed and rooted in their own traditions are the Damascenes, that portents and activities of Westernization which stir all around them and in their midst hardly ruffle their equanimity. The citrus-shaded, jasmine-scented homes of Damascus, with enclosed courtyards and fountains in their midst, were actually lighted by electricity a few years before the homes of Beirut; but somehow the phenomenon hardly robbed those homes of their quaint charm. Its canopied bazaars disturbed by the screeching, jarring noise of the street car before Beirut, Damascus soon learned to shrug its shoulders indifferently and resume its leisurely oriental way. In Beirut the street cars go as fast as in New York or Chicago, if not faster, but in Damascus they have not been able to go fast enough to make them practicable time-savers. They have to wait on the pleasure of the imperturbable pedestrian, accustomed as he has been for generations to the sing-song pleadings of the coachman: "Watch out for your back, O my eye; watch out for your face, O my soul." What lessons in manners could those coachmen of Damascus not give to the chauffeurs and traffic police of our American cities!

In Damascus it is no saving of time to ride in an automobile, and the cab has the advantage of being more in keeping with the atmosphere of the city. There is a perennial charm about Damascus which the flow of time has not affected, and which makes it the Peter Pan of all the cities of the world. With all its sophitication and its sapience, there is a naively genuine quality, a natural exuberance of emotions, which makes it the youngest as well as the oldest city. It must have been like that when Eleazar took leave of it to serve the patriarch Abraham; it may be like that a thousand years from now when some future Damascene biologist may be reading a paper before the world's super-academy of science on the bank of its Barada River. What is the secret of the timelessness, renewed vitality and charm of this perpetual fairy city?

One explanation is that Damascus lies on the edge of the Syrian Desert, and within short reach of the coast and other settled centers of urban population. To the east and south its gates are open to the arid wilderness, to that remarkable human biological culture laboratory of the ancient Semitic world—the Syrian Desert. New, vigorous blood is constantly pouring into its veins as Bedwins who are tired of nomadic life manage to settle in it; where ambitious sons of Ishmael, lured by the fascination of its myriad beauties and softening charms, its gurgling waters, its verdant fields and scented gardens, are first captivated and then subdued. It is the city of sweet dreams come true, the City of Delight, as the translators of the Arabian Nights tales fittingly called it. One never feels the contrast between the desert and the sown more keenly than when approaching Damascus from the parched desert, after a hot day's journey. When as a child I used to make this journey at the end of each summer vacation on my way back to the missionary boarding school, or through it to the college at Beirut, youthful imagination and petulant impatience of the long desert journey by coach heightened this feeling. But even on my recent trip, traveling by automobile, I had the same sharp sensation. The city suddenly comes to view, arousing pleasant dreams and memories, as though carried high to the approaching wayfarer on the palm of a giant *marid.*

Homs, Hama and other towns on the flank of the Syrian Desert have the same appeal for the Bedwin as Damascus, but to a lesser extent. In Beirut or Tripoli the Bedwin feels somewhat out of place, a homesick sojourner, slinking away crestfallen in its streets. In Damascus, city of the seven rivers, he feels that he is in his own town, the oasis capital of his bleak, sandy empire. His features beam with joy and contentment as he sips his coffee or smokes his *nargilah* in its cool, shaded cafes. There is an air of care-free independence and exultation about him as he proudly struts its streets, in his roomy, striped *'aba,* stopping before some confectioner's shop or leading a string of camels behind him. He feels the same freedom and unconcern as though he were under his own tent and among his own folk in the open spaces of the *shol* (desert).

Like the mountain which refused to go to Mohammed, Damascus goes not to anybody; and all have to come to it. But, once in its midst, even a *Franji* whose presence has been met with sullen indifference and secret dislike is received with soft-spoken hospitality, which disarms all antagonism and compels a smile of reconciliation.

If Lebanon is the door through which Western influences enter the East, Damascus is the citadel of Arabic, semitic culture. It is significant that the Crusaders never took possession of Damascus. A little over a hundred years ago the Western powers had no consular representation in that city. A contemporary chronicler of Damascus, a Christian, writing the memoirs of those days, said that when Damascus finally relented, through pressure on the Sublime Porte, and an English Consul moved from Beirut to Damascus, great excitment and consternation gripped the Moslem population, making necessary a military guard.

A still different type of attitude is symbolized by a city no less historic or romantic. When I went to Jerusalem I lived for a week in the home of a friend in Talibiyyah, a modern suburb outside the Western wall of the city, not far from the place where the new hotel of King David and the International Y.M.C.A. now stand. The holy city, on its four ancient hills, rose like a fortress to the east—majestic, mysterious, awe-inspiring, arousing even in the soul of a heterodox pilgrim a thousand memories and a thousand conflicting emotions. It was the first time I had seen Jerusalem in my life.

Is not this the city, I mused, that is considered by millions upon millions of our human race the most holy spot on earth, the city that was taken as the prototype of the eternal Golden City above? Is not this the city for whose hopeless defense a whole nation was decimated and dispersed throughout the world; for whose repossession a holy war was waged, and untold thousands lost their lives over a period of two hundred years? Is not this the City of Peace that has been the cause of so much bloodshed, so much strife, so much hatred, suffering and misery in the annals of our human race? Whether as *Yerushalaim, Aelia Capitalina* or *al-Quds;* whether under the Egyptians, Jebusites, Jews, Greeks, Romans or Arabs, is not this the city that has come out triumphant over the vicissitudes of time, a symbol of all that is eternal and real in this transitory, ephemeral world of ours?

A sense of taboo is upon Jerusalem. One approaches it like the burning bush of Moses, with head bowed and sandals in one's hands. One does that though at heart convinced that much for which the city stands can no more weather the scrutiny of reason than its multitudinous holy places weather the unbiased investigation of history and archeology. For it is a city that, in a deeper and wider sense, is not of Palestine or of greater Syria alone, not merely for Arabs, Jews or Christians; it is for all humanity, the spiritual capital of the hither Eastern world, and of the Western world as well.

Of all the cities of the Arab lands Jerusalem is the most international, yet not the most cosmopolitan. Its foreign colonies neither mix with the native groups nor, under ordinary circumstances, conflict. They stand aloof, isolated and insulated against one another, each guarding its rights and prerogatives with deadly jealousy. In the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, supposed to mark the very spot where the Savior's body was buried, this spirit of rivalry and isolation looms above everything else, the first to impress itself upon the visitor. For generations it was the custom, during the week which commemorates the passions of the man who died on the cross because of his gospel of universal love, for Turkish soldiers to stand guard in full arms, lest pious Christians should fall upon each other's throats. The key of that most holy of all churches was kept in the custody of the Moslem governor. And the same spirit of jealous rivalry prevails today.

About the first thing that struck my attention in Jerusalem was the fact that almost all modern developments in that truly medieval city have taken place outside its ancient walls. From Talibiyyah I could look southward and westward and see the new colonies of the Zionists. Northward lay the Jaffa road strung with Jewish and European residences and business establishments. Clear on the other side of the Valley of Kidron, on Mt. Scopus, stood the Hebrew University, disquieting symbol of a new age and a new invasion. Like the Assyrian army of old, the modern influences surround Jerusalem from every side, as within the old walls it desperately struggles to retain its identity and its individuality.

Whether we like it or not, whether it conforms to our progressive philosophy of life or flies in the face of it, Jerusalem has solved the problem of modern Westernization by drawing a cabalistic circle around itself, stubbornly resisting all the impudent intrusions from the outside. It will not surrender its fortress of faith until reason can adequately and with equal grace satisfy those spiritual values dear to the heart of man, for which it has long stood.

A liberalism that will do away with the mystery of life, rationalizing it and man's real vocation and destiny upon earth; a realistic dogmatism that will flip away, because they are not amenable to demonstration by microscope and test-tubes, all things considered sacred and eternal; an impatient radicalism that has no time for the gibberish talk of ponderous theologians, but lends an over-indulgent ear to the gibberish chatter of imponderous materialists—all these must remain outside the walls of Jerusalem. So also must remain any progressivism which seeks to divest itself completely of the past, which mocks historic tradition and looks askance upon anything that did not take root in the French Revolution and the reationalism of the eighteenth century, which experiments, with the impudence of a college sophomore, on human institutions whose roots are in the subsoil of endless experimentation, suffering and human understanding. Such Westernization will gain no admittance to ancient Jerusalem.

Thus we have before us four cities, typifying four attitudes prevalent today in the Arab lands. These attitudes are not necessarily limited to these four cities, nor do the cities each exclusively illustrate these respective attitudes. There is a Cairo, a Beirut, a Damascus, a Jerusalem in each city, town and village in the East today, and sometimes in each individual, depending on the prevailing mood. These attitudes are still in the making, and it is not altogether evident which will prevail. But what we can say is that, of these four attitudes, the first and the last are not practical for a growing East. Cairo stands for something too acrimonious, too impulsive and extreme, to serve as a *modus operandi* in the precarious relations existing at present between the East and the West, between the old and the new, while Jerusalem obviously stands for an attitude that would result in spiritual stagnation, a helpless and hopeless impasse. The one, undoubtedly, has the right of redress, the other the right of asylum. Neither, however, has the right of way in determining a general and practicable course of action in the Arab lands, an answer to the ever more complicated problems of Westernization.

Somewhere between Beirut and Damascus, figuratively speaking, lies the future destiny of the ancient lands of the East; somewhere between an open hospitality for everything good and of lasting worth in the West and a wise assimilation of these with the old and established human values and traditions of Semitic culture and Semitic racial consciousness, lies the path to a happy and balanced civilization.

CHAPTER TEN

THE FALSE DAWN

About a hundred years ago, the East was emerging from a medievalism corresponding in some respects to Europe in the fifteenth century. This was reflected as much in the intellectual stagnation of the people, as in their political despotism and economic feudalism. The village headman was the little tyrant and sycophant agent of the government, at whose pleasure the peasant might be dragged before him and bastinadoed into yielding ever more tax moneys. Nobody stopped to question the grasping exactions and harsh authority of this local caliph, and a petition for mercy or redress to his governmental superiors went unheeded.

The school master or priest held like sway, his authority undisputed and unquestioned. The little scholars in the *maktab* squatted on rush mats, their feet tucked under their haunches, bodies swaying as they repeated after their teacher the verses of the *fatihah, the Sura of the Cow,* or some other chapter of the Qoran. The child's education was considered complete when he memorized the Qoran by heart, and could recite its verses in proper sing-song, parrot-like fashion. The fact that his teacher may have understood very little of the text of the Qoran or its *tafsir* (exposition), was beside the point.

Among the Christians in the Arab countries the situation differed only in the setting. In their case also, the school was an appendage or adjunct of the church. Education, reserved mostly for aspirants to the priesthood, consisted simply of the mastery of the three R's. To have read through the Psalter was the mark of perfection to the great mass of the little Christian scholars of the village. The schoolhouses themselves were usually of the poorest and meanest, and, weather permitting, it was common to hold classes out-of-doors. Thus the popular expression, "he was schooled under the oak tree." The mosque *maktab* and the church-school are still to be seen in most villages.

Education in the East has made great strides in recent times, but in the native streets of Damascus, Aleppo or Cairo the tourist may still see the public scribes in their little booths, setting down the dictation of their illiterate customers. And as was the case in Europe of an earlier day, there are the public scribes who walk the streets of the Eastern cities today, inkstands tucked in their belts, ready to handle anyone's correspondence or most vital documents, at a moment's notice.

Only a hundred years ago, except for more specialized instruction in theology, there was little else of what may be called higher "liberal education" or "culture" in the general sense of the word. The Moslems had their Azhar Mosque, their Dar ul-Hadith or some other school of theology, where the minutiae of the four schools of orthodox jurisprudence were studied with infinite care. A smattering of grammar and rhetoric, or prosidy and logic, rounded the education of the Moslem don—who went in turn to lord it over the believers in the village mosque and *maktab*, and to strut the streets with his *jubbah* and turban as one of the *'ulama*, or learned men. The Christian theology student was sometimes more fortunate, for he was sent abroad to study: to the College of Propaganda, if a Catholic, or to the Khaliqi seminary in Constantinople, if a

Greek Orthodox.

This background must be kept in mind when attempting a true evaluation of the confused cultural status of the Arabic speaking countries today. The transition from medievalism to modernism was a sharp and sudden one. What Harnack called the acute Hellenization of the Roman world of the days of Christ, applies just as truly to this period of transition in the history of Arabic literature and cuture. We may just as aptly speak today of the acute modernization or Westernization of the East.

Unbalanced idealists, as most nationalists are likely to be, often have an abstract or distorted sense of time. This is evident in the lack of sympathy of most modern Arab nationalists with the type of literature that emerged in the Arab world at the dawn of its renaissance, between fifty and one hundred years ago. They look amusedly and with a sort of parvenu snobbishness at the earnest, if ornate and somewhat stereotyped, literature of that period. They forget that to have produced any literary traditions, that to have kept the oil lamps of the graces trimmed and polished, be their light ever so dim, was a heroic accomplishment.

A century ago the Western world was flooded with an effulgence of refreshing romanticism and enlightening rationalism. Such names as Voltaire, Rousseau, Lessing, Kant, Spencer, broke on the horizon of Europe, culminating a long period of slow intellectual fermentation. Intellectual emancipation came after generations of bloody struggles, persecutions, blood-sweating labors of the mind and soul. Not so, however, in the East, which for as many generations had been kept in a static state of stagnation. The little light it received came only in dim shafts through narrow apertures, seeking to penetrate a solid wall of darkness.

The modern East is creating its own traditions. But it is to the heroes of the first renaissance that modern literateurs and intellectuals of the Arabic speaking lands will be eternally indebted. They were the ones who blazed the way, the *muezzins* of the early dawn of a new day. Among these pioneers we find men of prophetic insight and daring, whose minds stirred with dynamic ideas. There was, for example Butrus al-Bustani who, in the 1850's, nearly a decade before the founding of the American University of Beirut, wrote:

> "And thus we see that European sciences and arts, founded on true principles, have come to us from every side. What took the Europeans long and laborious years, the Arabs may master with perfection in the shortest of time. . . . And just as the Europeans, in their days of ignorance, did not despise Arabic literature and learning merely because they were of Arab origin, so also it is not for us to belittle the sciences of the Europeans merely because they are of European origin. Rather it behooves us to welcome these sciences without consideration of their source, or who it is that gives them to us, be they from China, India, Persia or Europe. The vaunting of some that the Arabs have all that is needed of sciences and arts is the strongest proof of their abyssmal ignorance."

The modern generation of Arabs became heirs not only to the liberal ideas and trends of their earlier renaissance, but also to the revival of interest in the ancient Arabic literature and civilization of Harun al-Rashid and his successors, Janus-like, the Arab renaissance had one face turned to the past and the other to the present. It was both a revival of the ancient Arabic culture, seeking its inspiration and ideals in the past, and a rebirth of a progressive spirit with its face turned to the future, and towards the West. It is to this dual nature of the early Arabic re-awakening that much of the confusion in today's Arabic literary schools is due. This is the reason for finding, even among progressive nationalists, admirers and devotees of some school of literature that flouished a thousand years ago. This explains the strange phenomenon we observe today in the East—of modern, progressive ideas and literature thriving side by side with stagnant reactionary ideas and lifeless literary forms—sometimes on the same page of a daily newspaper.

This may be partially explained by the fact that, unlike English or French, the Arabic language has not changed materially from the days when the Qoran was put into its official, unchanged book-form by Othman, the third Caliph of Islam. It is inconceivable that an average English reader today should pick up Beowulf or the Canterbury Tales and read them as one would read an ordinary poem or book of short stories. Yet it is quite the ordinary thing for an Arab high-school boy, with little help from the dictionary, to read a *Qasidah* of Amri-ul-Qais, or a spirited ballad of Antarah Ibn-Shaddad, which has come to us from a time prior to the advent of the Prophet. And in the case of some of the poets of the Abbaside period, who had discarded the mood of the Desert and its rugged and pompous eloquence, an ordinary student could read ten or twenty couplets at a time, with hardly any mental effort. Thus if some Arab poet of a thousand years ago should somehow suddenly reappear in modern Damascus, he would not necessarily find every important manifestation of present-day life strange to him. A newspaper, for instance, might amaze him on first aquaintance, and its contents prove somewhat incomprehensible; but he would find the same words and terminologies he had known in another era—and discover quotations from poets and sages of his own ancient generation, likely from his own days. This remarkable preservation of a language has been largely due to the fact that Arabic was a sacred tongue of all Moslems. It was against orthodox tradition to read or even print the Qoran in any other. The revival of Arabic literature and the rise of Arab nationalism went hand in hand. The earliest manifestations of Arab nationalism, as we saw in a previous chapter, were a resultant of the literary revival. The Golden Age of the past was held up as a model to be copied, possibly to be improved upon. Classical Arabic literature assumed almost a reflected halo from its close association with the Islamic religion. An Arab nationalist must be an adept of Arabic literature. He must be able to recite the stirring poems of ancient Arab bards.

Ancient Arabic literature had a fascination for the Egyptian and Syrian pioneers of the 19th century—a strange attraction difficult for a stranger to understand. In many of the works of those early writers little effort was made to link this literary revival with the circumstances or needs of the age in which the pioneers lived. To illustrate, the *maqamat* (a collection of ornate essays built around an incident or a tale) of Nasif al-Yaziji were spun on the patterns of al-Hamadhani and al-Hariri. Those writers flourished in the 11th and 12th centuries, expounding the traditions and wisdom of the Arabs, back even to pre-Islamic times. The reader was saved every effort to project himself into the past. He was plunged into it from the very first page of the book. A person reading this collection of fantastic stories by al-Yaziji, if the date of publication were left out, would never suspect that they were written by a Christian writer of a little Lebanon village in the nineteenth century. There is no reference except in the preface to anything contemporary.

And while the fascination of this resuscitated literature had its undoubted influence on the writers of the early Arabic renaissance, there was another important factor in the case of the Christian writers. As Prof. Anis al-Khuri al-Maqdisi of the American University of Beirut once observed, the first intent of those Christian literary revivalists was to demonstrate to their Moslem compatriots that they could be the rivals of the best among them—that their loyalty to Arabic traditions was beyond challenge. It was a period of intense rivalry between Christians and Moslems of the East. Thus at the town of Abieh in Lebanon, I once heard a Christian centenarian remark: "They say that the sword and the horse were created for the Moslems, but that is not true. The sword of al-'Aquri (a Lebanese Christian knight) was the equal of a thousand swords!" And again, there was the Moslem contemporary of Butrus Karamah, court poet of the Emir Bashir al-Shihabi and himself one of the earliest poets of the Arabic renaissance, who gave vent both to admiration and resentment of his Christian rival in this couplet:

"A brilliant man is he, albeit a Christian;
More worthy of his excellence were Mohammed's faith."

This stage of the mastery of the classical Arabic, this recapture of the golden memories of Arabic literature, had to be won before any progress could be made along creative lines, and before any literature could spontaneously arise to mirror the age in which it was written.

However, not all of this early work was atavistic, nor limited to stultified poetry. For in addition, the modern editorial, cautious and timid in most cases, was introduced. The modern magazine opened various departments of discussion to its writers and readers. The short story, and even the drama, were essayed by some who were more gifted, or more adventurous, in that direction. Much of the material was simply translation and adaption from the French, and to a much lesser extent from the English.

Foremost among the literary pioneers in Syria was Butrus al-Bustani. In his progressive ideas, and particularly in his views on national education, this man was at least one generation ahead of his time. Al-Bustani wrote the first book of modern commercial arithmetic, the first modern dictionary and other useful books. Knowledge, in its widest sense, was his aim. His dictionary is in use to the present day. He launched the first Arabic encyclopedia, a work begun in comparatively humble circumstances at Beirut, but which was destined to become a unique as well as invaluable compendium of Arabic history and culture. Though too great a venture for any one man to carry out in the space of a single lifetime, this encyclopedia brought al-Bustani honor and fame. His work was continued by his able nephew, Suleiman al-Bucstani, but never completed.

A feat successfully essayed by Suleiman al-Bustani was the translation of Homer's Iliad from the original

Greek to Arabic verse, complete to a learned introduction of more than two hundred pages and copious scholarly notes. It is a commentary of sorts that this most accomplished scholar, who held two ministries in the cabinet of the Ottoman Empire and was a senator in the Ottoman parliament, should die in a Brooklyn hotel, penniless.

Butrus al-Bustani saw the dire need for the native secular school, which in time could become the nucleus of unified national education and culture. He succeeded in opening such a school for boys at Beirut, and had plans afoot for another for girls. But he lacked the necessary financial support. The already established sectarian and missionary schools in the East enjoyed the financial backing of organized religion, together with the liberal contributions of the pious in Europe, England and the United States. The peoples of the East had not yet become accustomed to the view that education is something for which they must pay. For generations, the salvation of their souls and of their minds had been given to them as charity, and even as a bribe to win them to this or that church or doctrine.

The great reformer and founder of the present Egyptian dynasty, Mohammed Ali Pasha, gave special impetus to the renaissance in his country. But it was the occupation of Egypt in 1882 by the British that made it an asylum for Arab liberals and nationalists, who fled there from the tyranny of the reactionary Sultan Abdul Hamid. Opportunities already opened by the Egyptian rulers, were extended by the British, making them more secure and less dependent on the caprice or largesse of a Khedive or Turkish Pasha. The patronage of Khedive Isma‘il was lavish, and Egypt became a veritable mecca for Arab writers, poets and intellectuals. The British occupancy, however, introduced a measure of free speech and free press which, while not always adhered to, was nevertheless far greater than had ever been enjoyed in the Ottoman Empire. The rule of the Red Sultan became a nominal one in Egypt, and the moral and political forces which were set in motion to weaken the power of the Caliph in the Valley of the Nile as elsewhere, themselves ultimately helped to liberate the Egyptians from the rule of the British, and to emancipate Arabic literature itself from the domination of the past.

All kinds of Western influences prevailed in Egypt and had free play, and the leavening process of the missions and of imperialism converged and was concentrated. Even Islam, represented in the decadent and antiquated al-Azhar, could not escape the assault of the new ideas from the West. Egyptian writers and poets, usually of Azharite or Turkish background and some educated abroad, were not far behind the Christian pioneers. They, too, exerted a decided and lasting influence upon Arabic literature, though modern Syrian writers are apt to forget them or to minimize their works. In his memoirs, Ahmed Shafiq Pasha mentions such leaders as Sami Pasha al-Baroudi, whom he recognizes as the founder of the Egyptian literary renaissance; Mohammed Othman Jalal, folk-poet and the translator of La Fontaine's Fables and some of Voltaire's plays; Ali Mubarak Pasha, Minister of Education, who laid the foundations of the national school system, and, among many others, Mahmoud Pasha Hamdi al-Falaki, noted cartographer who made the first scientific map of Egypt.

Two trends or traditions which influenced the future of the East are to be distinguished in the forward-looking, progressive development of the Arabic renaissance. The former of these, the literary trend, was especially fostered by the Catholic missionaries, particularly the French brothers. The other, the scientific and scholarly trend, was emphasized by the Protestant missionaries, most noticeably at the American University of Beirut.

Protestant missionary work in the East was preceded by that of various Catholic orders: Franciscans, Dominicans, Lazarites, and so on. As early as the time of St. Louis, the crusading King of France, the venerated St.

Francis of Assisi himself was moved to go to Egypt and preach to the Moslems. A statue of him and a church in his name stand today in Cairo, facing the Banque Misre, the Egyptian national institution of finance which symbolizes the country's struggle for economic independence.

The French Jesuits and friars of other orders laid excessive stress on literary proficiency and style, much more so than did the Protestant missionaries. To the present day, it is almost tradition for graduates of the local Catholic schools to be well versed in Arabic prosidy and prose, as well as in the required French language and literature. Some of the Arabic renaissance's leading men of letters studied and taught in those French schools. Louis Chekho, a Jesuit from Iraq who was for many years a professor at St. Joseph University in Beirut, and editor of *al-Mashriq,* did a yeoman's service in editing many ancient Arabic works. His "*Gleanings of Literature*" was an annotated series of Arabic readers that have remained popular to this day.

Discipline and memory work, which helped in the attainment of good diction and a knowledge of the treasures of the past, seemed to harmonize with the conception of education peculiar to the Catholic tradition. Yet with all their circumsribed regulations and their over-solicitous chaperoning of their charges' tender minds, these schools opened new vistas of life and thought through their emphasis on literature. Father Salhani, a colleague of Chekho, brought out a condensed edition of the great Arabic thesaurus of literature, *Kitab-al-Aghani.* And from the Catholic press of this same University came one of the first editions of the *Arabian Nights!*—carefully expurgated and thoroughly emasculated, to be sure. Nevertheless, the students who read these fascinating, seductive tales could hardly be prevailed upon from wandering into the orchards from which such forbidden fruits were gleaned. Similarly, in French literature, the works of Corneille, Racine, and Lamartine were studied as examples of good literary style. All of which led to an increasing mastery of language and freedom of thought. Nor did the notorious *Index* deter many a young philistine from smuggling the stimulating works of Voltaire and Renan into his dormitory, there to read by the clandestine light of a candle.

To this influence of the Latin or French missionaries there was subsequently added an element of mystical realism. The advent of Russian literature, coming in the wake of the Russian schools established by Grand Duke Sergius and the Imperial Palestinian Society, was responsible for this. These institutions flourished in Nazareth, Jerusalem, Damascus and elsewhere in Palestine and Syria, and many of the graduates thereof continued their education in the seminaries and universities of Russia. The decided influence of Russian literature is clearly evidenced in the works of such living writers as Mischa Neimy, Nasib Arida, and A. A. Haddad.

Fundamentally a Protestant missionary venture, the American University of Beirut was perhaps the greatest, most far-reaching "good-will investment" of Western philanthropy in the Near East. Originally known as the Syrian Protestant College, it was the first free, and practically non-sectarian, institution of higher learning to be established by Western philanthropy.

Facing the azure bay of St. George to the north, and the snowy peaks of Sunnin and Kanisi to the east, this modest missionary college started as a sort of glorified Y.M.C.A., but with schools of medicine and pharmacy that rapidly attained fame throughout the Near East. Most significant, the spirit of free investigation—without which no education, however elaborate and erudite, can be called complete or liberal—animated the college from the start. In time, after the world war, this same spirit liberated it from the influences of sincere but short-sighted missionaries. Consequently the little college was enabled to develop into what it is today: a full grown university, and one of the outstanding centers of scientific knowledge and research.

From its very beginning, this modern American college on ancient Phoenecian soil was blest with devoted teachers who had genuine love for the East, sympathetic understanding of its spiritual needs, and the ability to envision the country's rapid intellectual expansion. It is said that native friends of Daniel Bliss, the founder and moving spirit of the college, marveled at the size of one of its newly completed dormitories, asking him where he could get so many students to fill it. Yet it was only a few years before new buildings were necessary to accommodate the ever-increasing number of enrollees, for they came not only from Syria and the adjacent regions, but from Egypt, Greece, Iraq, Ethiopia, and the furthest reaches of Asia Minor and the Arabian peninsula.

Among its early instructors were such men as Drs. Cornelius Van Dyke, George Post, and the Americanized Armenian, John Wortabat, all of whom taught and wrote in Arabic. They gave the ancient land the first taste of modern science. They wrote invaluable textbooks of medicine, hygiene, chemistry, physics, geography, etc. This was especially true of Dr. Van Dyke, who is closely identified with the early leaders of the Arabic revival and with Arab nationalism. Today, Dr. Van Dyke's portrait hangs in the Arabic Academy of Damascus, in company with the pictures of those native pioneers who were his devoted companions in life. The setting is purely Arabic, with the old Zahiriyyah Library opposite, but the Arab nationalists see nothing incongruous in the inclusion of this American doctor's picture—for he identified himself with the people to such an extent that he is remembered as a native sage and physician, a *hakim* par excellance. When the Rockefeller oil trust recently presented the American University of Beirut with some new buildings, one of these was given Dr. Van Dyke's name.

If the contribution of the Jesuits to the Arabic renaissance is symbolized by the"*Gleanings of Literature,*" so the contribution of the Protestants in *Inscriptions on Stone* (*al-Naqsh fi-l-Hajar*) by Cornelius Van Dyke. These were small taxtbooks, written in a simplified, easy style, and mostly on scientific topics such as physics, chemistry, geology ,botany, zoology, etc. They proved popular and did incalculable good in the propagation and fostering of elementary science among large groups of people, especially among numerous intelligent self-educated men and women who lacked the opportunity to attend the new college in Ras Beirut. In an age which was practically barren of any scientific knowledge, and certainly devoid of any scientific lore in popular form, these books were precious little treasures. His book on geography became a textbook in many native schools, and was for a long time the only modern geography in Arabic.

Of all the many fine works by this beloved and greatest of Western missionaries, to the Holy Lands, the most monumental was probably his translation of the Holy Bible into lucid, beautiful Arabic. This work was begun by another missionary, Eli Smith, but the major share of the burden fell upon Dr. Van Dyke's shoulders and those of his native literary collaborators.

The scientific, liberal tradition of the American University of Beirut was avidly taken up by the enlightened Arab nationalists and leaders of the Arabic renaissance, and its influence was especially felt in Egypt and the Sudan. Among the Syrian graduates were such figures as Jurji Zaydan, the first critical historian of Islam, though he was himself a Christian; Dr. Shibly Shumayyil, the first expounder of the Darwinian theory in Arabic, and possibly the first important free-thinker of the Arabic renaissance, and Dr. Ya'qub Sarrouf, founder of al-Maqtataf, the first modern scientific magazine in Arabic. Al-Hilal, founded by Jurji Zayden, was a pioneer magazine dealing in Islamic historical topics. The two still enjoy wide circulation and influence in the Arabic-speaking world. They opened to the rising generation of reawakened Arabs vast vistas into the past and the future. Above all they brought about a new sense of critical awareness to a renaissance which was mainly and predominantly literary and inspirational.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE BIRTH OF A NEW CULTURE

It is a question whether culture, art, or even literature, could be called national. Any culture worthy of the name is the particularization in terms of local traditions and historic heritage of the universal "world spirit."

There can be no such thing as Chinese, Arabic, or English culture as such, but culture as expressed by the Chinese, the Arabs, or English. The revival of Arabic literature becomes, in this respect, only a means to an end. It is to help the literary creator to orient himself properly against the background of his own past, the better to coordinate himself with the *vital elan* of world or universal culture.

We shall have occasion in a later chapter to discuss a peculiarity of the Semitic race, which has been noted by more than one thinker—namely the monotonic nature of its culture, consisting as it does mostly of the art of words—literature, and even then to certain aspects and expressions of literature. For this reason, this chapter, which we have called "The Birth of a New Culture" will deal mostly with the contemporary *literary* development in the Arabic speaking lands.

For the first time the Arab genius is awakening to the significant distinction between life as art, and art as an expression and *representation* of life. Life as art, expression of the emotions directly in speech, gestures, bodily movements, conventional mores and moral conduct was always familiar to the Arabs, as it was to the Hebrews and to the Greeks. But the Arabs who developed neither drama nor the theatre would have mocked the Greeks who used masks in the presentation of their dramas. Only now are the Arabs beginning to appreciate masks in the scheme of art, and even in the scheme of life itself. But technique, through which such "masks" are created, and without which representative art is inconceivable, cannot come by diligent imitation alone. People who come under the influence of a different and more highly developed, hence artificial, culture often are tempted to acquire this culture through the easy way of imitation. The result is a kind of mechanical and lifeless reproduction that misses the genuine spirit and fails to harmonize with the environment of its new setting. The surer way is that of apprenticeship—a long and arduous work in which the acquired culture is thoroughly understood and assimilated by a growing kinship with its spirit and genius. Through this stage the Arab writers and artists of today are passing, in their effort to create a new national "Arabic" cuture and literature.

The new Arabic literature is new not only in the sense that it differs from the old, but just as truly in the sense that it is unlike anything in the history of Arabic literature, as far as its form of expression is concerned. It is building on new foundations, without the help and guidance of traditional background or historic continuity. When Henrik Ibsen, George Bernard Shaw or Eugene O'Neil started new schools of drama, they had dramatic literature and stage traditions from which they could deviate and upon which they could enlarge and improve. But when modern Arab writers try their hands at writing plays in Arabic—plays that are not mere translations or adaptions from the European languages, but that reflect the life and genius of a people who have no dramatic literature—the task becomes almost superhuman. It is little wonder that such plays have usually been mediocre. The wonder is that occasionally we do discover a play that has more than passing merit.

The modern Arabic renaissance, which is still in progress and about which no definite prediction can be made at present, differs from the renaissance we studied in the previous chapter in that it is consciously creative. For this reason it also recognizes more keenly the limitations and obstacles that confront the modern Arab writer or artist. The present renaissance is really a *birth* of a new culture. With this recognition comes a more critical appraisal of Western art and literature, a firmer national consciousness and confidence of approach to Western civilization. Illustrations of this among Arab writers are not hard to find.

Abbas Mahmoud al-ʻAqqad of Egypt does not hesitate to say that the Arabs, until the present period, never excelled in prose literature and never produced a prose style of their own. Their language, he points out, was a forensic one, suitable for the ornate and short speech, of which its prose mostly consisted, except for the chronicler's narration which usually had no literary merit. When the Arabs wrote at length, says al-ʻAqqad, or on some philosophic theme, their style was loose, sprawling and lacking in the eloquence and compactness of literary Arabic.

This Egyptian writer and nationalist is a splendid representative of the modern Arabic renaissance. He is at home both in French and English literatures, and excels in the command of Arabic, and knowledge of Arabic literature. He is a happy illustration of the successful modern Arab writer who can utilize the classical Arabic for the expression of modern thought with felicity and ease. Al-ʻAqqad makes no special distinction between the old and new in literature; but rather between "literature of originality" and "literature of imitation." All the great Arab writers of the past he calls modern, in respect to their age. They did not echo or reproduce the works of those who had come before them; but expresed the out-pourings of their own feelings and ideas in their own way, reflecting the conditions and peculiarities of their own times.

The trouble with the modern exponents of the old, al-'Aqqad argues, is a mistaken loyalty to the letter which does violence to the spirit. As in religion and politics, the true legatees of the old are not the reactionaries, but the liberals who understand and appreciate the past in terms of the present. And al-'Aqqad who writes understandingly of Max Nordau and Anatole France, writes even more sympathetically and understandingly of al-Mutanabbi and Abu-l-'Ala al-Ma 'arri. He writes of these latter objectively, as of the former.

Not less interesting, and better known both in Western countries and in the Arab lands, is Dr. Taha Husein, dubbed by his critics as the "Shaykh of the Infidels." By the same token he is the Shaykh of the Arab modernists, and perhaps the most colorful personality today in the Arabic-speaking world. To me he typifies more than any other the New Spirit in the Arab Lands. His readers and admirers are to be found in ever increasing numbers in Syria, Iraq, North Africa, the United States and South America, and even in Saudia Arabia itself, as well as in Egypt, his homeland.

The rise of this genteel blind scholar and literary critic from an obscure little village in Upper Egypt to become one of the recognized spiritual forces of our day, the standard-bearer of a movement that is destined to change the course of thought in a large section of the East, reads like an Alger story of the spirit. Dr. Taha Husein has told us his story in an impressionistic little biography that is one of the landmarks of modern Arabic prose, and that has now become accessible in English.[1]

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[1] *An Egyptian Childhood,* Tr. by E. H. Paxton.

Born of an Egyptian father and mother of fellah stock, Taha Tusein sprang from native Egyptian soil. Like Sa'ad Zaghoul Pasha, Hafiz Ibrahim, "the poet of the Nile," and Mohammed 'Abdou, the great Moslem reformer, Taha Husein represents the rise of the native Arab and Coptic stock as distinct from the ruling classes who were mostly of Turkish or Mamluke origin. Nor could it be said that Dr. Taha Husein is the child of his environment, or that his phenomenal rise was due to foreign influences over which he exercised little choice. If there is one man who could be said to be the child of his own choice and destiny, in spite of all handicaps and hardships, that man is Taha Tusein. "Infidelism" did not seek out Taha Husein to make him a son of its kingdom. He went out of his way to examine it curiously, study it and embrace it whole-heartedly.

In one of my press articles, I called Dr. Taha Husein "a blind man leading Egypt to the light." There are those, I am aware, who think he is leading it and the whole institution of Islam to the abyss of confusion and oblivion. I cannot appreciate their fear, much as I appreciate the things that are beautiful and of enduring worth in old traditions.

Taha Husein's passion for literature came to him naturally. He tells, in his autobiography, of listening to the village bard recite the exploits of *Abu-Zaid* and *Zainati Khalifah,* of *'Antar* and of *King Zahir Beibars,* who defeated the Franks and drove them out of Egypt. He crouched silently in a corner of the house to drink in the tales recited by the village story-tellers; he memorized the folk songs and dirges which the women folks repeated at the village festivities or at funerals. This homely folk culture was undoubtedly the most valuable preparation for the future career of the paragon of Arabic literary criticism and scholarship. It put him in touch, in the impressionable years of his life, with the very fountainhead of vital literature that springs from the unbeguiled hearts of simple folk. What better training could a future literary critic need?

The point of departure in Dr. Husein's critical approach is the free and unbiased exercise of judgment which the seeker of truth should bring to the subject of his study and investigation. This departure from the traditional school of learning in the East, in which authority for long reigned supreme and fidelity to text was the guiding principle, is not new to the Arab world. Prominent examples of that were men like Ibn Khaldun whose *Prolegomena* is said to be a forerunner of our modern science of sociology, and al Beiruni whose *Indica* is considered one of the most objective and scholarly works on India that has come down to us from those ancient days. The whole school of the Mu'tazilites was a shining example of religious liberalism. Its followers prided themselves on being "the people of intelligence," as contrasted with the people of traditions. Free investigation in the Arab world is not surprising, although it had been discarded and neglected for so long that its rebirth has about it the elements of a discovery.

Dr. Taha Husein believes in no *a priori* system of truth which may be called infallible, or which should be warded off as too sacred to be examined and discussed rationally and objectively. He criticizes in a cautious and veiled manner what some of his reactionary critics do not hesitate to express openly—namely, that literature cannot be nicely segregated from religion, expecially in Islamic history and culture. But whereas from that Dr. Taha Husein would further deduce that religious tradition, too, must be submitted to the same rational process, his opponents argue that Arabic literature must also be defended against the raids of infidelism.

Both 'Aqqad and Taha Husein, different and sometimes antagonistic as they are, have achieved great success as writers and critics. They have shown aptitude and felicity of expression where rising Arab writers might follow in the field of the essay and of literary scholarship.

But modern Arabic literature would be sorely deficient, and sadly unbalanced, if it were to consist only of the editorial, the essay and of works of scholarship. To the Western mind this is literature only in a minor or secondary sense. It is the novel, the short story, the drama and the whole range of fantasy and imagination that first suggest themselves when we speak of literature. Has modern Arabic literature shown gain, however little, in these forms of expression ?

There is a tendency among some students of the modern East to pat Arab modernists on the back, as if to say, "Of course what you have produced does not begin to compare with the best literature in the more advanced countries of the West, but it is a good showing. Keep it up!" On the other hand, there are those who go to the other extreme and declare that outside of the essay and the editorial of a semi-philosophical turn the Arab modernist has produced nothing of lasting value.

True men of letters, true artists, resent paternalism as they resent off-hand criticism. But they are also quite aware of falling short of their literary ideals and aspirations. Modern Arab writers fully realize that they are laying the foundations for a golden age of Arabic literature which has not yet seen the light of day. Khalil Mutran, a poet and artist who represents the best traditions of the classical and of modern Arabic literature, and who is thoroughly acquainted with French literature and the literary traditions of the West, writes in reply to an editorial questionnaire:

> "In fifty years we shall attain that to which we aspire now—world-recognized authors, literary men whose fame will spread in every clime, whose brilliant creations will be translated into every tongue. I am not speaking in way of wishing, but from deliberate deductions, viewing the end from the prelude before me. I have no doubt that material circumstances will change our spiritual conditions. And there is no doubt then that literature will come nearer to the desired perfection. For I hold that leisure and affluence are neces-

sary for the progress of the fine arts."[1]

Murtan believes that the elements of the short story, drama and the novel are all found in the Arabic classical tale, as portrayed in the Arabian Nights, which he calls "the most precious of jewels that Arabic literature has given to world literature." Unlike the old Arabic tale, the new fiction will be imbued with spiritual insight and social significance.

Disregarding, for the present, the ideas or contents of certain outstanding works of modern Arabic literature and limiting ourselves to a consideration of their literary merit, one may say, without equivocation, that they have attained a fair measure of excellence. Among these one may name such works as *Muluk ul-'Arab* (Arab Kings) of Ameen Rihani, an enchanting travel book of modern Arabia and Iraq from which that author drew freely for his recent English books—*Maker of Modern Arabia, Around the Coast of Arabia,* and *Arabian Peak and Desert.* In the field of fiction one may single out *Sayyid Qureish* (Lord of Qureish) by Ma'ruf al-Arnaouti of Damascus, an historic novel centering around the Prophet Mohammed and his days, and containing some beautiful descriptive passages. The novel is somewhat spoiled by an affectation for obsolete words and an uncritical acceptance of tradition. But from the technical side the novel is a contribution to modern Arabic fiction. To a lesser extent this is also true of *Zainab* by Mohammed Husein Haykal of Cairo and some of the serial novels of the late Jurji Zaydan and of Nicola Haddad. The biography of Jibran Khalil Jibran by Meisha Neimy deserves mention, in spite of the fact that it has aroused a storm of protest and criticism for its ungallant betrayal of confidences pertaining to the private life of the great Syrian-American mystic and poet. In his effort to give his Arabic readers a realistic picture of a man who, as the author said, "Has already become a myth," Neimy leaned a little too far towards the realistic. Again, we are not concerned here with the contents of those works, but only with the literary forms. As such, Neimy's biography of Jibran certainly represents a milestone in the progress of modern Arabic biography. Neimy belongs to a school of Arabic literature which flourished abroad, particularly in the United States and Brazil, and has come to be known as the school of the *New Andalusia*. The lyrical poems of Rashid al-Khoury of San Paulo, Rashid Ayyub, Elia D. Madey, Nasib Arida, Nadra Haddad, all of New York, and the whimsical short stories of A. A. Haddad, portraying the life of the immigrant Syrian, are among the best productions of this school that will live on their intrinsic merit for a long time to come.[1]

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[1] Al-Hilal, Nov., 1932.

The short stories of Mahmoud Taymour, son of the late orientalist and bibliophile Ahmed Taymour Pasha, are a refreshing relief from both the trite, unpolished narrations which emulate the Arabian Nights tales and from the slavish imitations of the Western short stories. Taymour's short stories are genuinely Egyptian in their local color and atmosphere and yet quite modern in their technical construction. This brief review, however, by no mean exhausts all the good examples of modern Arabic literature.

In recent years there has been a genuine renaissance of folk poetry, some of which has attained matchless beauty and lyrical quality. The best examples of this literature have appeared in Lebanon. Foremost among its exponents are: Rashid Nakhlah, Abdullah Ghanim, As'ad al-Sab'ali, and As'ad al-Khouri al-Faghghali. Little notice has been taken of this most refreshing and unaffected poetry in the vernacular Arabic. It is a poetic mirror of the simple, unaffected life of the common peasantry.

Arab classicists as well as Western students and admirers of the old Arabic literature may well wonder whether something is not lost in the process of Westernization, something of the simple charm of the old, something of the grandeur and genuine thrill in the skillful gymnastics of literary construction which characterized the classical authors and their faithful followers of the former renaissance. With all my admiration of the classical, I cannot bring myself to the view of the late Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i who would discard all modernization of Arabic literature and return to the literary standard of the Qoran. At the same time I believe the old has not been utilized as sufficiently as it should have been, and that its legacy has been somewhat ignored and undervalued. There is a gap in the evolution of Arabic literature that must be filled. Al-'Aqqad is right when he speaks of the old Arabic literature as "food material" that is still in need of cooking. Perhaps the next stage would be one in which Arab authors would draw liberally from this huge reservoir of food material to feed modern Arabic fiction, the short story and drama.

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[1] See chapter by the author on Syrian Americans in *"Our Racial and National Minorities."* 1937, Ed. by Prof. J. Brown and Mr. Joseph Slabey Roucek of New York University.

Prof. Hocking refers to the dangers of Westernization on the wider aspects of Arabic culture when he says that "Arabic culture is being driven to the wall by processes not more intentional than automatic."[1]

He cites this development as an example of what may come from the imposition of Western civilization on the Eastern one. From a different angle Prof. Hocking alludes to the same danger in an article in *Asia* for March, 1936 entitled *"Hard facts in the East."* There the philosopher discusses the change in mental processes among Easterns who adopt Western technology and Western material benefits and innovations.

Another danger, however, which seems more imminent and more likely to retard the progress of modern Arabic literature and distort the course of Arabic culture comes from within. It springs from the direction of timid conservatives or fanatic reactionaries who are suspicious of every move of the modernists, and are distrustful of their intentions. In their crusade against modernism those misguided and short-sighted defenders of the old go the length of suppressing freedom of expression and of capitalizing mob emotions against the "infidels." With the creation of a poisoned atmosphere of intense and blinding hatred for everything new or Western, free thought and genuine art are forced to temporize with their best ideals. In tortuous and often unconscious ways writers and artists are forced to circumspect manners of self-expression, an unhealthy atmosphere for the growth of genius. It is the recrudecense of such a crude spirit of national reactionism which prompted some deluded nationalist youths of Damascus, a few years ago, to burn publicly the works of Dr. Taha Husein, because the Egyptian scholar and modernist had written an article in one of the Egyptian papers in which he declared that Egypt suffered oppression and injustice in the past at the hands of the Persians, Greeks "and also the Arabs."

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[1] *The Spirit of World Politics,* pp. 10-11.

Whatever the future will bring with it, the Arabs, it may be safely said, will always have their national literature. Unlike painting, sculpture or music, the medium of literature is perforce particularistic. Language cannot be separated from the present and the past of the people who speak it. It is the expression of their history, common traditions, as well as of their social destination. Whether literature be stagnant or progressive, reactionary or liberal, it will still be intimately and securely linked with the past and its traditions.

To speak, however, of Egyptian literature, as distinguished from Arabic literature, as some Egyptian writers do today, we believe is sheer nonsense. For better or for worse, the language and historic traditions of all the Arabic speaking peoples have become much the same. We can no more speak of the Pharonic culture for Egypt now than an Englishman would speak of the Saxonic, Norman or Pictish cultures. Even without the political necessity which is forcing the Arab peoples to form a Pan-Arab block, the great facilitation of communications is accelerating the unity and homogeniety of Arabic literature everywhere in the world. A newspaper published in Cairo sells next morning in the streets of Damascus, Jerusalem and Bagdad simultaneously.

The meagre production in the other recognized arts which usually determine a people's culture, make it difficult to give a rational estimate or prediction. If there is such a thing as Arabic painting or Arabic sculpture today, I confess I have not been able to discover it. There are Arab sculptors and Arab painters who studied abroad and followed various contemporary schools of art and applied their acquired gifts to local subjects. But, I daresay, a French or American painter or sculptor executing on an Egyptian or Syrian location would create a piece as "Arabic" as that of any Arab painter or sculptor, because painting and sculpturing are not traditional Arabic arts.

Not so with music, whose traditions go to the first century of the Arab invasion. With some of its elements taken from the Byzantine, some from the Persian, and later, some from the Turkish, there has been Arabic music since the early days of the Umayyad dynasty. Undoubtedly, modern Arabic music retains some of the basic characteristics of the ancient art. Until very recently this Arabic music had clung tenaciously to the old norms (*'usul*). First *Hamuli,* then *Darwish,* and now *Abdul-Wahhab*—all of Egypt, where the revival of Arabic music has met with the best success—have introduced innovations which have successively won popular approval and applause. Speaking as a layman I must admit that much of this so-called modern Arabic music of the classical school leaves me cold. There is an affectation at popularity in much of this music that sometimes touches on the jazz, the while it seems to lack an intimate feeling for the old.

On the other hand, there is not enough mastery of the technique of the traditional classical music of the West to bring it within the appreciative sphere of the Western listener. Nevertheless there is a groping in the right direction, and a genuine effort at creativeness. Arabic music still awaits its Schubert, its Bach and its Beethoven, who would dip into the sub-conscious mass of simple and beautiful folk music and come out with great gems of musical creations. However, as I said before, I speak as a layman.

In the more modest fields of handicraft, woodwork, silver-work, ceramics, the Arab artisan is still far behind in imagination and in finish. An exception may be made of the beautiful antimony silver work of the Sabbaeans (Subbas) of Iraq, and some to the finer inlay wodo-work of Damascus.

The birth of any new culture—whether it is in the form of literature, music, painitng or handicraft—like the birth of anything spiritual is always accompanied by the travails and pangs of a delivery from the parent past. It is new, yet it is begotten of the old. It is the concrete and articulate materialization from a great nebulous mass of latent forces. Of culture also the profound truth applies—"The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth." Hocking is well aware of this when he writes:

> "Over all the Orient, there broods this sense of latency, of an immense and unfathomed capacity for new life, the potency of something radically different from our type, if it can be given its own time and mode of growth."[1]

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1. *The Spirit of World Politics,* p. 34.

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE TREND TO LIBERALISM IN ISLAM

A key to the understanding of Islam, still a potent and virile factor in the modern development of the Near East and particularly of Arab nationalism, is to recall what we have said on other occasions, that Islam is not merely a religion, a system of strange dogmas not always compatible with our Western views of life. It is, besides a social code, a political system and an all-pervading spiritual force. It is not possible, even today, to understand the larger aspects of Arab renaissance and Arab nationalism without a fair understanding of Islam. There has been no cleavage, as for many centuries there was in Christianity, between the secular and the religious life, the temporal and the spiritual. What is Caesar's in Islam is God's, and what is God's is also Caesar's. The religious canon, *shari'ah,* was until comparatively recently the only law of the land, and is still so to a great extent in some Arab countries. Arabic literature, and Arabic culture in general, often have been a euphemy for Islamic literature and Islamic culture. The classical literature of the Arabs, and even the literature produced by the pioneers of the early renaissance which we studied in a previous chapter, is impregnated with references to the Qoran and to the Islamic religion.

Whether Islam from its inception was consciously conceived by its founder as a national movement as well as a religion is questionable. But at least since the Prophet's flight, *hijrah,* from Mecca to Medina, Islam began to evolve consciously and increasingly into a national religion or religious nationalism. The worldly Arab followers of the Prophet, represented in the chieftains of Qureish, thoroughly understood the secular and national implications of Islam, and did not emphasize its theological, spiritual aspects. The Umayyads of Damascus observed religion as far as it was compatible with the security of their far-flung empire, won by the sword of spiritual zealots as by the sword of booty seekers. It was the Persian converts and Arab malcontents who refused to regard Islam as a predominantly worldly, political, movement, and who finally caused the downfall of the Umayyad Dynasty and brought about the rise of the Abbaside one in Baghdad.

For this reason Islamic political life, through the caliphate, was inseparably linked with the spiritual one. And for this reason, too, the social and cultural developments assumed a religious color. And in this sense we speak of Islamic culture and Islamic civilization more correctly than of Arabic culture and Arabic civilization.

Because of this dual nature of Islam the spiritual side was more humanized than in Christianity or Buddhism. "There is no monasticism in Islam," was not only a prophetic injunction against celibacy and self-mortification. It was as truly a characterization of the practical and humane nature of Islam as religion and as a way of life. For when there is only one standard of conduct, one code of morality for priest and layman, for the initiate and the catechumen, that standard of necessity becomes more human and reasonably attainable. Religion cannot be in practice divorced from the ordinary pursuits of life. But whereas in the Middle Ages the ordinary life of the Christian was dominated and hampered by the spiritual, in Islam the process was reciprocal. The remark of Lothrop Stoddard is preeminantly true of Islam, namely that "no human society once fairly on the march was ever turned back by a creed. Halted it may be, but if the progressive urge persists, the doctrinal barrier is either surmounted, modernized, flanked or swept aside."[1]

It was comparatively easy throughout the history of Islam to introduce social reform and even social innovations, and thus pave the way for the free play of science and the inspiring influence of new ideas and new cultural values. For was it not the Prophet himself who said: "Seek ye knowledge even if it were in Cathay?" The most orthodox theology of Islam could not stand aloof very long amidst the swirling currents of the secular life that swept it along.

Add to this the fact that Islam historically came after Judaism and Christianity, and that it was consciously indebted to them, and you have a historical explanation of an inherent tolerance in Islam that has been noted by all critical students of that religion. Of importance also in understanding the tolerant nature of Islam is the consideration that this religion, while it has its fundamental dogmas, has no fixed and final authority. There is no sacerdotal hierarchy in Islam, and there is great latitude and freedom in the interpretation of its beliefs. A living proof of Islamic tolerance is the persistence to our own day of Moslem heretical sects, some of which are inimical to the very existence of Islamic orthodoxy. Similarly Christian heresies, which would have been wiped out under Byzantine dominance, as they were wiped out by the papacy, were left unmolested under the protection of Islam.

The popular impression, often distorted and exaggerated by some missionaries and imperial apologists, that Islam is a religion of intolerance and fanaticism, overlooks certain historic explanations that have nothing to do with Islam as religion. It leaves out of account that the Moslem-Christian clashes, and the hatred of Christians engendered in the hearts of Moslems of the Near East, are very closely associated with the intrigues of European Christian powers which sought to dismember the Ottoman Empire and which used the native Christians as their unsuspecting pawns, their protection as an excuse for penetration into Moslem lands. Today new forces are at play which are bound to react on Islam, and which bring with them their own peculiar problems.

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[1] *The New World of Islam,* p. 35.

The rise of nationalism, the renaissance of Arabic letters, the invasion of scientific ideas and the rise of industrialism in the Arabic-speaking world, have had a dual effect on Islam as religion.

On the one hand they have accelerated the progressive trend in the East at the expense of religion. In many cases the Arab nationalists of a radical stamp of mind took the attitude of the Kemalists in blaming the Moslem religion of the past for much of the retrogression and stagnation of Arab civilization and culture. Those Nationalists have shown impatience with the schoolman methods of the conservative religionists who essayed to conform every reform or progressive idea with the Qoran. The result has been an undue emphasis on the secular aspect of Islam at the expense of its religious side.

On the other hand timid and reactionary Moslem religionists have stiffened against any progress or any further secularization of Islam as a threat to the whole institution of Islam itself. It is among these that we find today the majority of Pan-Islamists who look upon the spread of secular nationalism in the Moslem world with as much suspicion and fear as upon Western imperialism itself.

At any rate, it may be fairly said that while we may speak of a trend to liberalism in Islam, especially in the Arabic-speaking countries, this trend has not yet gathered sufficient momentum to justify the name of a movement. Arab nationalism is moving away from Islam as religion, having secularized and incorporated into itself the national traditions and progress which Islam has contributed to the world, leaving the religionists and theologians to shift for themselves.

There is danger that an estrangement may come about, a dichotomy, for the first time, between Islam as religion and Islam as a national, spiritual movement. In this estrangement the religionists are as much to blame as the nationalists. For it seems to me that those religionists are dallying too long with antiquated methods of interpretation and tradition which are no longer in keeping with the mental attitude of our modern times. A fresh start is needed in which the permanent values of the Moslem religion would be taken up, so to speak, on a higher plane and interpreted in the light of true science and critical thinking. We shall have occasion in the next chapter to see for ourselves how earnest theologians of a great Moslem institution are bravely struggling to face this problem. In the present chapter we will limit ourselves to the general aspects of the liberal trend in Islam.

On my last visit to the East I was in a fortunate position to observe and study some aspects of the modern religious trends in Islam. At the request of the late Dr. Charles Wendte, a veteran religious liberal, Dr. Louis C. Cornish former president of the American Unitarian Association and president of the International Association of Religious Liberals, asked me to make a preliminary investigation of the liberal trends and movements in the countries I was visiting. It was Dr. Wendte's cherished hope to hold a liberal congress in some Moslem country, similar to several held in previous years in Europe and America.

After several months of interviews, investigation and study, I found there were groups of indifferent radicals whose interests in religion is negative and often destructive. I also found semi-liberal religionists whose acquaintance with liberal literature is meagre or superficial and whose attitude towards religious liberalism is more cautious than consistent. These latter are timid reconciliationists who were more anxious to explain away the inconsistencies of faith with reason, the Qoran with science, than to give a historic, critical appraisal of the spiritual forces and elements in Islam.

Sometimes students of the contemporary East fail to keep the distinction clear between liberalism and modernism. In our modern, highly developed civilization a great number of reactionaries and conservatives make good use of our modern inventions while they preach ideas that fit logically in the Middle Ages. Had these reactionary ideas prevailed they would have made modern progress impossible. These people are modern but not liberal. And in the Arab East today, there is a large and growing body of religious people who may be aptly called modern and reactionary at the same time.

To this class belong the Moslem reconciliationists with their usual variation from middle right to middle left. They form a bridge between orthodox Moslems, who are blindly attached to the letter of the Qoran and traditions (*sunna*), and the liberals, who are attempting a modern reinterpretation of Islam in the spirit of modern philosophy and science in the light of critical history. The underlying thesis of this school may be surmised from the following quotation from the late Shaykh Rashid Rida, one of its foremost exponents:

> "It is God's dispensation for human individuals to endow them with the powers of sense and reason gradually, until man reaches his strongest at adolescence, when he begins to depend on himself for knowledge, action and experience. In the same manner God bestowed on each nation and people the guidance of inspiration, at every stage of their social life, according to their various capabilities and the needs of their times, until humanity in its totality was ready to comprehend the highest divine guidance (Islam). After that it is only necessary for the mind to be employed in accordance with this guidance, at all times and all places. Thus did God bestow the guidance of the Qoran, sealing prophecy with

the message of Mohammed, on him be prayer and peace."[1]

Moslem reconciliationists are anxious to be as modern as possible, as long as they manage not to go outside the circle or Islamic orthdoxy. And while the paradox implied in this stand may not be quite apparent to the reconciliationists, it is surprising how far one may actually go and yet remain within this charmed circle.

The position of the reconciliationist, whether in religion, politics or economics, is not a happy or comfortable one, nor is it conducive to sincerity and clarity of thought. His arduous labors are apt to go thankless both from the liberal and from the orthodox. Among the many Moslem divines I interviewed there was an obscure imam whose orthodoxy was pointed to as exemplary and unsullied. He lived in a little town in the interior of Syria. I made a trip especially to interview him. I found that he had little time to read the secular press or to acquaint himself with what was going on in the world, or even in his own country. Among other things, I asked him what he thought of Shaykh Rashid Rida. He replied:

"He has put himself outside the pale of Islam!"

Yet the same Shaykh Rida was considered a reactionary by radical Moslems I had met in Cairo.

Today in Islam, as in Christianity, liberalism is leaving the mosque to join the literary circles and university classrooms. Men like Taha Husein, Shaykh Ahmed Amin, Shaykh Ali Abdul-Razik and his brother Shaykh Mustafa, were all formerly graduates of al-Azhar Mosque University, of which we shall treat extensively in the next chapter. They could no longer be true to their convictions and still avow loyalty to the old theological institution. Instead they transferred that loyalty to the Egyptian National University. And there is many a liberal among former graduates of al-Azhar who has doffed his turban and joined some other profession.

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1. Al-Manar, October, 1931.

The reaction from religious reconciliationism is towards religious radicalism.

There is today a rapidly growing body of radicals in Islam. I met members of this group both in the East and among students in our American universities. I was especially struck by the impatience of some of them to rid Islam of what they called its superstitions, among which they would include valuable traditions and serviceable institutions that need only slight reform to make them admirably suited to the temperament of modern Moslems.

A literary modernist of Damascus, a former student of Oxford University, with whom I was discussing the religious liberal movement, confided to me that Moslems in the Arabic-speaking countries were not ready for any critical, liberal interpretation of religion; that Islam must first pass through a period of doubt and negation to infidelism before such a spiritual, historical appraisal could be appreciated by any sizeable number of thinking Moslems. And it was with such critics in mind that Shaykh Abdul-Hamid al-Kayyali, Grand Mufti of Aleppo, said to me:

> "It is no more a question of Mohammedansim or Christianity, of orthodox or liberals: it is a question of those who believe in any religion, and those who believe in no religion at all!"

The Moslem radicals of today are acting as gadflies to all sincere and earnest Moslem thinkers and forcing them to reconsider the rational grounds of that great religion in terms of modern life. More and more they are committing Islam to rationalism. The result cannot be but a salutary one, a sounder and more workable appraisal of Islam as a great spiritual movement in its proper historic perspective. Only when religion ignores reason altogether is it to be safe from reason! No true friend of Islam wishes it to be in that position.

One of the leading radical Moslems I met in Cairo was Isma'il Mazhar Bey, whom I have called the Robert Ingersoll of Egypt. He, too, is an Oxford man, and the author of several works on science in Arabic. One day in February of 1930 a Christian Coptic physician, Dr. Fakhri Faraj by name, gave a lecture at the American University of Cairo in which he attacked a tenet of Islamic jurisprudence pertaining to inheritance and its discrimination against the fair sex. A great hue and cry of indignation broke out against the hapless Copt. But the storm had hardly spent itself when Isma'il Bey took up the cudgel in defense of the feminist doctor: The Moslem radical wrote an article defending Dr. Faraj in which he said:

> "We do not wish to discuss Dr. Fakhri's case as such, but merely to request our reverenced Shaykhs to give us their opinions on the following:
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> "It is written in the Qoran, 'We have adorned the heavens with lamps', and it has been established by science that the heavens are not adorned with lamps, but are stippled with huge orbs, separated by tremendous distances. . . . Is this belief that the heavens are not adorned with lamps a contradiction of religion? Is the view that what we behold are huge orbs, an elementary truth taught our children in schools, of such a nature as would call for the interference of the law for the protection of religion,
>
> "And it is written in the Qoran, 'We have opened the gates of heaven with torrential rain', while it has been established by science that rain falls on earth after it had ascended as vapor and is then condensed as rain. Is this belief, then, a blasphemy? Must we believe that the heavens have gates, behind which are seas, and that when those gates are opened rain pours down and when closed rain stops pouring?
>
> "It is written in the Qoran, that, 'The sun and the moon do kneel', and it has been established by science, etc., etc."

Isma'il Mazhar Bey submitted these embarrassing questions to "our lords the distinguished *'ulema* who will perchance favor us with some answer to dispel thereby these ambiguities." It may be noted that the conflict between Moslem radicalism and Moslem orthodoxy is not primarily between science as such and religious dogma as such. Even orthodox Islam would raise little objection to the findings of pure sciences that deal with the shape of the earth, the manner of creation, the nature of the heavens, the stars, and even with the fundamental concepts of evolution. In assenting to the findings of pure science Islamic theology need not compromise its fundamental tenets—the belief in Allah as the one God and in the Prophet as his messenger. Allegorically many theological difficulties concerning the soul, resurrection of the body, hell-fire, etc., could be explained away. These are, at best, theoretical metaphysical problems. The real conflict comes when Islam as a social system, dealing with our daily life and conduct, is suddenly jarred by modern concepts of economics, socialogy and psychology, which cannot claim any scientific finality. Nevertheless these modern ideas, as it has been demonstrated on a large scale, point the way to a more equitable and happier state of social existence.

What about social practices and institutions which have fallen down utterly and have proven to be only antiquated local *mores*, inadequate for our modern conception of life? What about polygamy, the harem institution, capricious one-sided divorce, prohibition of interest, and the retaliatory theory of punishment? What about the nationalistic, not to say theocratic, character of Islam; the recognition of slavery as a social institution and the conception of Allah as the Lord of Hosts, who uses war to judge among nations, and "giveth victory to whomever he desireth?"

Social reforms are being introduced when needed, perhaps with greater alacrity than at a corresponding stage in Christian countries. In Turkey the cob-webs of antiquated social usages have been swept away with little ado. Many social reforms effected in Turkey are being adopted in Egypt, Syria and other Arabic countries with little opposition from religious sources, and often under the leadership of enlightened Moslem *imams*. The international convention for the abolishment of slavery is recognized today by all Moslem states and no sane Moslem takes the theocratic doctrine of extreme Shi'itism very seriously. There are today divorce courts in Egypt before which the Moslem husband and wife may argue their relative sides whereas until recently Islamic divorce had been almost solely the male's privilege. The rigors of the harem life are fast disappearing; and one will have to search diligently to find a Moslem who would not trust his money to an interest-giving bank. One of the most sensational and vital social reforms was recently launced in Egypt, with the benefit and blessing of the Moslem clergy. Shaykh Abdul-Majid Salim, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, according to press reports, gave a *fatwa,* or canonical opinion, in which he declared that there is nothing in Islamic law to prohibit birth control!

"If we let the 'ulema run things their own way," King Ibn Saud once said to Ameen Rihani, "they will spoil everything!" But the modern 'ulema of Egypt are doing fairly well by progress and modernization of the social pattern.

I do not believe that the stamp with which Moslem radicals seek to impress Islamic culture need be final. The particular formula combining the grace of a spiritual culture with the emancipation of the spirit which comes from the knowledge of the physical sciences has not yet been articulately formulated in the Arabic East. The gap will be somewhat narrowed when religionists are made to study physical sciences and the physical scientists made to study poetry and theology Radicalism in the East is a challenge of science which can no longer be ignored. The temper which will allow the free discussion of the conflict of positive religion with science is beginning now to be not only tolerated, but accepted and respected among the higher cultural circles. This is a great gain, a gain which must be credited not only to tolerance but to growth of liberalism as such among the religionists.

One trend to liberalism in Islam, which has its counterpart in modern Christianity, has found shelter from the raging storm of reason versus inspiration in avoiding the contest altogether and in centering its interest in the practical phase of religion. This trend which expressed itself in Christendom in such institutions as the Y.M.C.A., the settlement houses and the varied forms of social reform championed by field workers and backed by ethically-minded ministers from the pulpit, finds its advocates and its zealous workers in modern Islam as well. The Christian pattern is often taken and adapted with little variation. Father Lammens must have had this trend in mind when he said that Moslem modernists make of Islam a code of discipline.[1] Islam today has its Red Crescent, corresponding to the Red Cross, its Y.M.M.A., its social workers and its internationalist humanitarians, working for world peace and world brotherhood.

An admirable example of this class is Shaykh al-Tantawi al-Jawhari of Cairo, an enlightened reconciliationist who quotes in his writings from Spencer, Lubbock, Flammarion, Plato, Emerson and Kant. Over three decades ago he had written a book which attracted the attention of many Western thinkers. One orientalist spoke of it as one of the great documents which indicate the extent of modern thought and feeling among the cultured Moslem circles. It was one of those fantastic Utopias which have dotted the history of distracted and frustrated humanity since Plato wrote his immortal *Republic*.

In this book, *Where Is Man?* (*Ayna-l-Insan?*), al-Jawhari pictured man as having advanced in science, but retrogressed in character, debasing himself through his own deeds. He deprecated the pettiness of public expenditure devoted to the improvement of humanity, as compared with huge sums expanded in the cause of national rivalries and wars. He rejected what he calls the Epicurian or Darwinian view that the strong must always dominate the weak. Instead he substituted as a working rule: mind is superior to force. The contrast between our imperfect world and a happy Utopia is presented by the author through the imaginary visit of a guide from a distant planet. The book reminds one of the more modern Utopia of H. G. Wells, *Men Like Gods,* but is somewhat disconnected with direct discourse and written in a fervid strain.

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[1] *Islam, Beliefs and Institutions,* pp. 207.

Liberalism often lacks the challenge and aggressiveness of radicalism, and the blissful self-confidence and finality of orthodoxy; it lacks the appeal to the average man in the street. The more unfortunate therefore, that modern Moslem liberals and semi-liberals are not as well known to their Christian liberal brethern as they should be. Here and there one comes across scant references to them but on the whole they are little understood. Missionary literature avoids them as much as possible, naturally stressing the blessings and beneficences of orthodox Christianity in Moslem lands, while unduly emphasizing the destructive work of Moslem radicalism.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

REFORM OF AL-AZHAR

The light of Islam which in the distant past shone forth from Damascus, Baghdad, Nisabur and Cordoba, shedding its rays of wisdom and learning on a world enshrouded in darkness, now flickers feebly from Al-Azhar, "the Resplendent," the most famous mosque university in the Moslem world today.

At the recent tercentenary of Harvard University, the procession of distinguished university delegates from all parts of the world was headed by a turbaned shaykh of this same mosque university, a recognition of its being the oldest institution of higher learning in the world still in existence. It was founded by the freed slave general, Jawhar, under the Fatimide caliph, al-Mu'izz, in the year 930 A.D. It owed its ascendency, we are told, to destruction of the splendid Moslem schools (*Madrasahs*) in the wake of the Mongolian invasion in the Eastern empire and to the downfall of the Arab dynasty in Spain. To it flocked thousands of aspirants from the banks of the Nile, from the Arabic-speaking countries of Syria, Arabia and Iraq; from the Steppes of Russia and Kurdistan, from the plains of the Indus and Ganges, from the confines of Cathay, and from every land where the name of the Prophet is coupled in prayer with the name of Allah. There, in that democracy of education rarely equalled even today in any Christian institution of learning and reminding one of the medieval universities of Europe when students gathered informally around a gifted Abelard or an erudite Scotus, Mohammedan initiates to the intricacies of Moslem scholasticism and tradition quietly pursued their studies. They were grouped in the shade of al-Azhar's pillared porticoes according to nationalities and sects, attaching themselves freely to this or that lecturer (*muddaris*) or shaykh, as the spirit moved them.

For centuries al-Azhar has been recognized as the most eminent institution from which learned doctors of Moslem theology and jurisprudence determined the beliefs and fashioned the opinions of countless thousands of orthodox Moslems all over the world. As simple, obscure *imams* and *cadis* in small towns, or as high spiritual officials in the courts of kings and emirs, those graduates of the Fatimide mosque in Cairo exercised tremendous influence in the Moslem world. Western political writers before the first world war pointed with apprehension to this mosque university as the hotbed of Pan-Islamic propaganda, the center from which ebullitions of Moslem zeal and fanticism were disseminated to every corner of the world. And while this anxiety owed much of its prevalence to imperial European propaganda there can be no doubt that al-Azhar for a time played a prominent role in the nationalist uprising in Egypt and elsewhere. In the 1919 revolution and on many other occasions it was Azharite students who led the infuriated mobs, and were the first to breast the rifles and bayonets of British soldiers. Both as a seat of learning and as a point of convergence for the crystallization of nationalistic feeling, Al-Azhar has now been superceded by the secular Egyptian National University, now known as Fuad University, organized and revitalized after the war.

Indeed in its more than one thousand years of existence, al-Azhar Mosque University has made little notice-able progress, in our modern sense of the word. The march of time has left Islam far behind; and now, far from being a source of enlightenment to a semi-barbaric world, al-Azhar gropes about for guidance and light. Until about forty years ago, al-Azhar had changed very little, and if any—for the worse. We read about a blind shaykh, who, having been appointed head of the Blindmen's Corner (*Zawiyat-ul 'Umyan*) in the university, caused every one of the blind students to be flogged. But those blind men knew their rights as Moslem citizens and free seekers of knowledge, and as Lane tells us, "they rose against him and inflicted upon him a flogging more severe than that which they had themselves endured."

Today tourists who visit al-Azhar Mosque are still shown here and there a circle of students around a shaykh, leaning his back against a pillar, all squatting on rush mats, as they have done these countless generations. Outside in the open court (*sahn*), students are either reading in the sun or walking to and fro with their books in their hands, the mumbling motion of their lips eloquently indicating that memorizing still prevails as a method of instruction in this venerable institution. At the same circle one may find students of all ages, from mere saplings to elderly men with grey beards. Occasionally one may distinguish a Hindu, a Mongolian or a Slavic face in the audience.

One is tempted to conclude that such sights tally remarkably with descriptions of Al-Azhar by Lane and other tourists of the 19th century, and that conditions have not perceptibly changed from those of a hundred or fifty years ago. But here, as in many instances in the East today, appearances are deceiving. Great changes have come upon al-Azhar in the last two decades, and indications seem to point to still greater changes in the future.

Unlike the ancient European universities of Italy, France and Germany, al-Azhar, until quite recently, had made no compromise with the fast-growing, all prevading modern sciences. At one time in its long history it was more progressive than it had become in the last few centuries. Following the general decay of the Arabic-speaking states and the subsequent deterioration of Arabic literature and Islamic culture, the curriculum of al-Azhar fell into a deep rut. Terse, dry compendiums of works which themselves were compendiums of former works by great Moslem theologians, were prepared by mediocre pundits for the mystification of helpless seekers of knowledge. Memorizing of the principal compended text (*matn*), with a show of sophistry in discovering all the possible meanings therein; a seemingly endless exhaustion of the possibilities of exegesis which the same text might bear, became characteristic qualities of Azharite erudition. So much so that an expression was current among the Egyptian intelligentsia when they wished to describe a person who was fond of futile and involved discussions. They said: "He has an Azharite mind."

A time came when this Azharite mind had either to keep pace with the progressive secular minds around it, or be left behind in the mazes of its impenetrable jungle of marginal texts and cycles within cycles of obstruse and self-contradictory explanations. Fortunately for the world at large, and for the Moslem world in particular, it has chosen the former course. More fortunately, and more significantly, the reform of al-Azhar, while accelerated and prodded on by extraneous influences that seemed to bombard it on all sides, was urged and sponsored by its own people.

The Mosque of al-Azhar itself, where the circles of study are still held, is but a small unit of al-Azhar Mosque University, which taken with its affiliated branches at Alexandria, Tanta, Zaqaziq, Asyout, Disuq and Damietta, has a total enrollment of approximately ten thousnd students—all forming the Institutions of Religious Learning under the headship of the Rector or Shaykh of al-Azhar.

In Cairo itself, al-Azhar Mosque quarters only a section of the students. The lower or preparatory branches have separate buildings of their own, with recitation rooms, desks, maps and all the paraphernalia of a modern school. There students are taught mathematics, geography and elementary physics and chemistry —once forbidden. The program of the Preparatory Section in al-Azhar and its affiliated schools has been unified, following in the secular subjects the carricula of the government elementary and secondary schools. Even physical training is required, though laxly enforced. The Zaqaziq and Tanta Institutes have up-to-date buildings and grounds.

Similarly the higher departments of al-Azhar, known collectively as the "Section of Specialization," have quarters of their own near the Abideen Palace. These departments correspond to graduate schools in our modern universities. The classes one encounters in Al-Azhar Mosque today constitute the undergraduate body. There is a movement afoot to rid al-Azhar Mosque of students completely and leave it for worship only, a kind of chapel for the theological students of Al-Azhar University, open to the public.

This last reform was part of an extensive program submitted by Shaykh Mustafa al-Maraghi, present head of al-Azhar. It was widely discussed in the Arabic press when it first was made public in the summer of 1929 and has been since, with minor modifications, put into force by a *decrit de loi* by the late King Fuad I.

Among the distinctive features of al-Maraghi's program is the constitution of al-Azhar into three colleges, a College of the Arabic Language and Literature, a College of Moslem Jurisprudence and a College of Theology. A student graduating from al-Azhar secondary school, or one of its affiliates, could enter any one of these colleges and take selective courses in the other two. Each of these colleges in turn would have a Section of Specialization, both in the matter and in the application of the subject pursued. A magazine for the thorough treatment of Islamic lore and student missions for study in European universities are other innovations in al-Maraghi program.

As one would naturally expect, the program met with opposition from Moslem fundamentalists in different sections of the Moslem world. But a surprisingly large number of Azharite professors and almost the whole student body of al-Azhar were said to have been for its adoption.

Few writers on Eastern subjects have realized the full significance of the Maraghi reforms, and the whole movement of the conservative liberalization of Islam set in motion by Mohammed Abdou, undoubtedly the greatest Moslem reformer since al-Ghazali. Dr. C. H. Barlow, an American scientist and head of the Rockefeller Foundation mission in Egypt, was eminently right when he said in a personal interview that "the reform of al-Azhar, as embodied in al-Maraghi program is the most stupendous event in the modern history of Islam—more significant than the Kemalist religious reforms, and equal in importance only to the Protestant Reformation."

The Kemalist reforms have often been cited as the most revolutionary made by Islam in the last few centuries. Following the successful campaign of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, Ataturk, and the victory of the nationalist Turks over the invading Greeks, the great Ghazi first abolished the Sultanate, then the Caliphate. Through parliament or by decree he abolished the veil, polygamy, the canonical law, and caused the Qoran to be translated into Turkish and read in that language in the synagogues. Overnight he changed even the Arabic alphabet which was the only one the Turks ever had, and in its place substituted the Latin one. These reforms, however, cannot all be called religious reforms in the strict sense of the word. With the exception of the abolishment of the Canon Law they may be called reforms affecting the form of religion or social usage. Even the abolishment of the caliphate, as we shall see, is not necessarily related to the religion of Islam as such. Furthermore these reforms, because of their suddenness and their negative nature, have helped only to stiffen the opposition to religious reform generally in the circles of conservative Islam, even within Turkey itself. The alien source of these reforms and their close connection with a nationalist movement that has since come into sharp opposition with Arab nationalism in Syria has discredited them even among the secular Arab natonalists. The cause of Moslem reform in the Arab world, from the standpoint of religion, has not been helped materially by the Kemalist regime.

Of the Indian liberal movement, represented in the Algirah University movement, it may be said that it lacks that sentimental appeal to Islam which al-Azhar has always enjoyed. As long as Arabic is regarded as the sacred language of the Qoran, no reform movement, we believe, will have the necessary centrifugal potency and universal scope that a similar movement in an Arabic-speaking land would have. For this reason, if for no other, the reform of al-Azhar transcends all other reforms in Moslem countries. It is a reform at the very center of Moslem orthodoxy.

Because of the importance of al-Maraghi's program both in the understanding of Islam in the Arab world today and in its influence on the whole economic, social, spiritual movement which we generally characterize as Arab nationalism, I have given a rather detailed description of its precendents and the events that led to it. I had the distinguished privilege of getting the facts relating to the reform of Al-Azhar from the lips of living persons who played pivotal parts in it. Shaykh al-Maraghi himself, was gracious enough to give me, in his own words, his explanation of the forces and reasons which led to this reform. His discourse and the description of the reforms which preceded it are taken from Arabic notes which I took on the spot, and which have had the benefit of the Shaykh's revision and final approval.

"If we go back in history," said Shaykh al-Maraghi, "we find that the first thing which occupied the minds of Moslems was the true understanding of the Qoran, extracting therefrom the ordinances and rules of life applicable to their conditions and happenings round about them. After that they busied themselves with the science of language and exegesis of the Qoran.

"It was only afterwards that they found themselves obliged to study theology proper and what is known as the science of *kalam* or scholastic dialectics. From this they were led to the multiplication of sects and the study of philosophy to dispute therewith the followers of other sects, notably Christian and Jewish, as well as Greek schools of thought. We need hardly add that they also used the science of *kalam* to dispute among themselves. It was then that Greek philosophy became part of Islamic scholasticism.

"The Qoran makes it incumbent upon all true and conscientious believers to know a number of things dealing with history, astronomy, physics and other cosmographical sciences. For while the Qoran itself is not a book of science, it alludes to many things the proper understanding of which is not quite possible without the cognizance of several cosmographical sciences."

The Shaykh was referring to such matters as the determination of the *qiblah* or prayer direction towards Mecca, the lunar month of Ramadan, laws of marriage and inheritance, etc.

"Similarly in *fiqh* (jurisprudence)," he continued, "there are many questions dealing with medicine and anatomy. Ancient Moslem books, therefore, whether in exegesis, jurisprudence, *hadith* or theology, touched on many questions of science which took particular form according to the state of knowledge prevailing when those books were written. Most of those questions have proven now to be false. Neither the historical allusions are truly historical, the philosophic questions truly relevant, nor the medical ones scientific in any sense of the word.

"When we, therefore, study today the books of Moslem exegesis, *hadith* or *fiqh*, we pursue many discussions which, because of their affiliation with religious matters, are considered part of Islamic theology, but which are, nevertheless, absolutely out-of-date and unscientific.

"Furthermore, the sectarians of *kalam* have passed away, and we are face to face with followers of new, living sects and schools of thought amidst us and in countries bordering on the Moslem world. Yet we turn our faces from them to dispute with the dead!

"What I proposed to do was simply to turn the attention of al-Azhar people to the discussion of modern sciences and scholarship, that they may the more arequately understand the medium in which they are living. Our good Moslem ancestors did not recoil from the study and comprehension of mundane sciences of their days and generations, according to their light. True religion cannot possibly be in conflict with true science; and when we are positive of the truth of some scientific proposition which seems to be in conflict with Islam, it is because we do not properly understand the Qoran and traditions. We have a universal doctrine in our religion which states that when an apodictic proof is in conflict with a revealed text we must interpret the text *allegorically*. Besides, the Qoran was revealed in the Arabic tongue, which, as you know, is quite elastic!"

It is true that the allegorical method of exegesis is an antiquated and misleading approach to the critical study of religion, and also true that Shaykh al-Maraghi in his argument leaves much to be desired from the standpoint of critical liberalism. But considered in the light of the recent awakening of orthodox Moslems to the necessity of adapting their religion to modern thought, and keeping in mind the fact that less than forty years ago even the introduction of elementary "scientific education" into al-Azhar caused a great commotion in Islam and was opposed very strenuously, the discourse of the rector of al-Azhar was nothing short of revolutionary. More than once I had the illusion, that I was not in Cairo listening to one of the pillars of Islamic orthodoxy, but back in Cambridge, Mass., attending a lecture by some liberal professor of the Harvard Divinity School.

The Maraghi reform, however, like many similar movements, did not arise from vacuity. It had its history—its, struggles, its triumphs, its setbacks and its reversions to old reactionism. Undoubtedly the most outstanding personality in the reforms leading to al-Maraghi program is that of Mohammed Abdou, who joined the circle of the *'ulema* in the year 1893. One

Moslem biographer, writing of the influence of Mohammed Abdou on the present life of Egypt says:

> "If we mention the modern literary renaissance which followed the decadence of Arabic letters, then the Shaykh was one of its fluttering banners, one of its conquering pens; and if we sense today a reform movement in the religious institutions, the religious courts and the secular schools, where the religious life touches the mundane and civil one, then this Imam was the one who laid its foundation, following in the footsteps of his teacher, Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani."

Two influences—two other magnetic personalities, which came early into the life of the future reformer of Islam—determined his career and directed his steps in the path of the gigantic and hazardous task which he took up as his lifework. The one was an obscure Moslem mystic in a little village of upper Egypt, the other a man great in his own right, a dreamer of dreams, a denouncer of kings, the forerunner of modern reforms in all Moslem lands—Sayvid Jamal-ud-Din al-Afghani. From the former Mohammed Abdou received an insight into the spiritual message of religion, a mystical trend of mind which helped him to discern the futility and utter inadequacy of the traditional method of religious instruction prevailing at his time; from the latter, he received a burning zeal for the political, social reform of Islam which would purge it of its archaic institutions, and its traditional obscurantism.

Like the modern Egyptian scholar and critic, Dr. Taha Husein, Mohammed Abdou sprang from the soil of Egypt, of fellah Egyptian stock, having been born in the village of Shenera in the Gharbiyyah District. He was thirteen years of age when in 1861 his father, anxious to have his son follow up a religious career, sent him to the Ahmadi Mosque of Tanta to study. There the young pupil remained a whole year without understanding anything of what he was being taught. His was the precocious mind which instinctively insisted on discovering the why of things, and the *'ulema* of those days wished their pupils to receive their authoritive dictums without questioning or curiosity, "without how." Despairing and discouraged by his failure, the young pupil took leave of his elder brother who was studying with him in the same institution, and returned to his home town, prepared to settle down to the drab life of an Egyptian fellah, as his father and grandfather before him had done, marrying soon after at the tender age of seventeen. But his father, who was determined to see his son finish his education, compelled him to leave the village and return to Tanta.

On the way, suffering from the heat and dust of the road, he turned his steps into the village of Kanisat Ourin, an old Coptic town, where Shaykh Darwish Othman, an ascetic uncle lived and with whom he stayed a fortnight. That short visit with the mystical Shaykh proved the turning point in the life of the future reformer of Islam. Shaykh Darwish, who followed the Shazili school of Sufism, had him read some of the works of the founder of that school as well as portions of the Qoran, which the Sufi uncle explained in a novel way, so unfamiliar to the young aspirant. Shaykh Darwish opened the youth's eyes to a new approach to religion, a way that emphasized the moral tenor rather than the legalistic one, that employed spiritual intuition in discovering the deeper meaning behind the apparent, literal one. Thus equipped Mohammed 'Abdou returned to the Tanta Mosque, where as Shaykh Suleiman al-Hanafi says in his history of al-Azhar, "It was opened for him," i.e., where his heart and understanding were opened for the new truth. From that time Mohammed 'Abdou became an earnest and restless seeker of the truth.

In the year 1864, Mohammed 'Abdou moved to al-Azhar to complete his education. For six years he groped about for more light. He found about him nothing but the abyssmal darkness of dry exegesis and slavish adherence to text. However, he heard that one of the '*ulema* of al-Azhar, Shaykh Hasan al-Tawil, had singled himself out from the rest by teaching logic and philosophy in his classes; but after attaching himself to Shaykh Hasan's circle Mohammed ‘Abdou felt that there was still something wanting. His disappointment and disillusionment became complete.

Then one day there came to Cairo a strange person, a political agitator with whom it was considered dangerous to consort. One who taught that "prophetship" was a necessary social function, a kind a mundane message stripped of its unique and divine nature. This man was Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani, then the moving spirit in Pan-Islamism. Opinions have differed widely on this enigmatic man who created trouble wherever he went. But one thing seems to stand out clearly from the conflicting sources of information—he was a man of tremendous magnetic personality who inspired and moved men. His ideas on religious reform were neither critical nor stratling, but they supplied that intellectual and spiritual dynamite which was necessary to blast the jam of interlocking logs before the stream of the spirit could resume its course. Even today, men who should have outgrown his incongruous dream of a united Islam under one caliphate and the revival of Islamic jurisprudence, are still spell-bound by that remarkable personality and faithfully preach his Pan-Islamic gospel in a world which has become definitely committed to laicism and nationalism.

Al-Afghani attracted to himself men of different types and different cultural antecedents. There were liberals and conservatives in his circle of listeners, men who were interested in religion and men who were interested in politics and social reforms; there were Moslems and Christians among his adepts, and he talked on a wide range of topics. He was attached to no school or institution, and would have been considered impossible within the placid precincts of al-Azhar. His lecture room was his own lodging place, a cafe or a friend's shop in the native bazaar of Khan al-Khalil. Among the younger adepts who sat at the feet of al-Afghani was young Mohammed ‘Abdou.

The outside influences that worked on the impressionable mind of Mohammed ‘Abdou while still a student in al-Azhar outweighed those of al-Azhar itself. All around him Mohammed ‘Abdou was aware of a changing world of ideas, which even the hermetically secluded al-Azhar could not escape. He grew in an atmosphere of literary renaissance whose influence on Islam, both as religion and as an institution, was inescapable.

Mohammed ‘Abdou’s star was in the ascendancy in the days of Khedive Hilmi Abbas who restored him to power and influence after the ‘Arabi revolt, in which the reformer was accused of participating. He was friendly to the British and Lord Cromer spoke of him as the hope of Islam. He was appointed to the newly organized Board of Directors of al-Azhar, and later as chief Mufti of all Egypt, while retaining his position in al-Azhar.

Until the time of Mohammed ‘Abdou no modern secular subject, excepting those dealing with the mastery of the Arabic language, was taught in al-Azhar. Its curriculum consisted of eleven courses which, for curiosity, we may name here as follows: Qoranic Exegesis, Tradition, Grammar, Etymology, Rhetoric, Prosody, Logic, Jurisprudence, the Principles of Jurisprudic Criticism, Theology and Scholastic Dialectics (‘Ilm-al-Kalam.)

Mohammed ‘Abdou succeeded in breaching this solid wall of classical Moslem erudition to the extent of making the study of “modern sciences” optional, and in bringing some organization to al-Azhar administration. However, severe criticism of his colleagues and his smarting castigation of their reactionary methods aroused them to bitter opposition.

Mohammed ‘Abdou’s reforms fell into disuse even before his death, but not before their seeds were sown deep in the hearts of earnest and loyal followers among the younger generation of al-Azhar itself. Conditions in al-Azhar reverted to what they had been in the long past of decadence and reaction. The inertia of tradition and of venerable orthodoxy proved too strong for the time being. The task was too big for any one man, even of the calibre and force of personality of Mohammed ‘Abdou. The way had to be cleared, and the minds of the mass of students and instructors had to be prepared for the reception of more drastic reform. Even the student body had to be weeded of undesirables and parasitic elements which had no place in any institution of learning.

A vivid picture of those doys following Mohammed Abdou’s abortive reforms may be gained from the following brief description supplied by a distinguished authority who played a leading part in the subsequent events of al-Azhar.

In those days many young men went to al-Azhar imbued with the passion for religious learning, preparing themselves for careers of responsibility and leadership in their respective fields. But there were many others who flocked to it mainly for two reasons—to escape compulsory military service and to receive the daily bread grant. A great part of the endowed properties of al-Azhar, following a policy set by Mohammed Ali Pasha, was sequestered by the state and managed under a board of *awqaf*, since then organized as a ministry. But there was another sort of *awqaf*, special appropriations, set aside for special groups of students or for especially designated purposes. Lecturers and professors also had their own endowments. For the sake of standardization over long periods of time these grants were computed in loaves of bread a day, and certain agents in Cairo plied a thriving trade with Azharite students and professors by buying those loaves of bread from them and selling them in the bazaars. Besides the special grants, Azhar teachers received meagre salaries from th estate funds. The pay of an Azharite instructor or professor varied considerably and depended completely on the whim of the Shaykh of al-

Azhar.

Such was the state of affairs, when in 1907, two years after the death of Mohammed ‘Abdou, Shaykh al-Sharbini, head of al-Azhar, accompanied by a colleague, Shaykh Suleiman al-‘Abd, sought the audience of Khedive Hilmi ‘Abbas to petition him for an increase in the annual share of al-Azhar from the public endowments fund. That share was then approximately $25,000 annually. The Khedive referred the two Shaykhs to Ahmed Shafiq Pasha, head of the Royal Diwan and member of the Awqaf Board. To him the Azharites repeated their petition, setting their request for increase at E.£ 1,000 or $5,000.

When Ahmed Shafiq Pasha heard their request he was greatly surprised:

"How is it possible for the Shaykh of Islam," he gently rebuked, "to ask for such an increase?"

Mistaking the intent of the vizier, Shaykh al-Sharbini meekly replied:

"Well be it, my son, if you think the sum too high manage the matter with your own wisdom."

"On the contrary," the vizier quickly retorted, "when the Shaykh of al-Azhar seeks for an increase, he should ask in the tens of thousands, if for no other reason than to uphold the dignity of his position and the honor of the *‘ulema!*"

On hearing these words from the head of the Royal Diwan, the features of the old Shaykh brightened up, and, with a smile all over his face, he said:

"My son, I will leave the matter to you; for the common object is the improvement of the *ulema's* condition."

But Ahmed Shafiq Pasha who, in agreement with the Khedive, was waiting for just such an opportunity, had something up his sleeve. He was not content with such a blanket authorization, and was not going to let such a splendid opportunity to bargain with the head of al-Azhar slip from his hands.

"Well," he said with a quizzical smile, "if we give you what you desire what will you give us in return?"

Divining what the head of the Diwan had back of his mind, Shaykh al-Sharbini replied:

"My son, we but do as our forefathers have done before us. We distribute the books to the lectures (i.e. designate to each lecturer the kind of text-book he should use) and assign to each his pillar."

Ahmed Shafiq Pasha was not to be so easily dissuaded. He insisted:

"But we want to know who the student is and who attaches himself to al-Azhar merely to fill his belly. We wish, further, to see the system of al-Azhar better organized, so that it may be determined who comes regularly to the lectures and who only shows up at the distribution of the bread grants. This can be done by keeping a regular registry and by a system of annual examinations."

For it was found out on investigation that there were many so-called Azhar students who were occupied in profitable trades in the city while enjoying the privileges and immunities of theological students. Some of these chronic seekers of knowledge were actually grey-bearded gentlemen who had been attending al-Azhar for periods varying from twenty to fifty years!

The Shaykh of al-Azhar murmured something about the impossibility of accomplishing this superhuman task.

"By organization everything is possible," retorted the practical vizier who had studied abroad and had seen much of the world and observed how institutions just as large and unwieldly as al-Azhar itself were efficiently managed in European countries.

Shaykh al-Sharbini departed without committing himself and not long after passed away. In his place Shaykh Hassuni al-Nawawi, a progressive, fearless and energetic man, was chosen head of al-Azhar. He had had experience as lecturer in the Nazamiyyah or Government schools, and knew the value of order and organization.

It is no wonder, therefore, that Ahmed Shafiq Pasha had more success with Shaykh Hassuni and found him more amenable to reform suggestions when the latter, accompanied by the same Shaykh who had accompanied al-Sharbini, appeared before the vizier to repeat the same request his predecessor had made.

A committee was soon organized, consisting of the head of al-Azhar, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, the Shaykhs of the four different sects and Shaykh Mohammed Shakir, head of the Alexandria Institute. Ahmed Shafiq Pasha, as Head of the Khedival Diwan, was a member ex-officio, representing the Khedive, while the minister of education presided at the meetings. A sub-commission of three, Ahmed Shafiq Pasha, Mohammed Shakir and Hasanein al-‘Adawi, the latter of the celebrated *‘ulema* of al-Azhar, set about to formulate a modern constitution for the mosque university. This done, they submitted it to the general committee which approved it, after the necessary amendments, and appended to it a declaration signed by all members, stating that the contents of said constitution do not, in any shape or manner, contravene the spirit of Islam. And thus the first modern constitution of al-Azhar made its appearance in the same year, 1907.

As a consequence of this bold step of reform, the budget of al-Azhar was increased considerably, reaching in a few years to $100,000. This increase has kept pace with the increase in the values of property and standards of living until now it is past the million dollar mark.

A thorough shake-up of al-Azhar enrollment followed. A general administrative council was appointed to suppervise al-Azhar and its various affiliated institutions, retaining for each its local council. The hours for students and lecturers alike were assigned, and matriculation was put on a modern basis. It was in the days previous to these reforms that the enrollment of al-Azhar proper reached as high as 14,000 “seekers of knowledge.”

Up to the time of al-Maraghi's program the constitution of 1907 with some modifications, notably those of 1911, was the governing one for al-Azhar Mosque University.

One event between the constitution of 1907 and the Maraghi program deserves our special attention. It is the appearance in 1925 within al-Azhar of the critical book of Shaykh ʻAli ʻAbdul-Raziq on the Caliphate. At the time of its appearance Shaykh Ali was one of the ʻulema of al-Azhar.

Islam and the Principles of Government marks an epoch in the history of al-Azhar. The author does not attack the Islamic religion as such, nor does he resort to the dubious method of allegorization to establish his point, namely, that the Caliphate was a spurious institution foisted upon Islam by the contingencies of time and circumstance, and by the authority of those who ruled the Moslems in the distant past.

The caliphate, he claims, is not relevant to the discussion of religion proper, and hence is a purely historical subject, amenable to scientfic and critical study. With this bowing deference to religious sentiments, and having properly guarded himself against the charge of attacking inspired religion, he proceeds to study the subject in the same spirit and with the same methodology that any modern scholar would study a similar topic. He finds no justification for the caliphate either in the Qoran or the traditions of the Prophet, which fact weakens the argument from concensus (*ijma*ʻ), on which defenders of the caliphate have always fallen.

Nor does the modern Shaykh consider the caliphate necessary for the regulation either of the religious or the mundane affairs of the believers. On the contrary, he does not hesitate to assert that the caliphate "has been and still is a calamity to Islam and the Moslems; a fountain of evil and corruption." The historic *raison d'etre* which seemed to have given the caliphate its justification, Shaykh ʻAli ʻAbdul-Raziq traces back to the dual role of the Prophet. He was the founder of a universal religion, a Messenger of Allah. But his message made some sort of worldly leadership incumbent on him. It was not the leadership we associate with kingship, but still one implying a wide range of authority. Shaykh 'Ali quotes several verses from the Qoran to prove that Mohammed came only to guide and preach, not to impose his guidance and preaching by force.

It is quite logical, the ex-Azharite professor claims, to conceive of the whole world embracing one religion, of humanity coming under one religious unity. In that respect Islam has its universal appeal. But for the whole world to adopt one government, to come under one political unity, is almost beyond human nature and has no relation to divine will.

Separating effectively the religious and the national aspects of Islam, a duality which had always been tacitly acknowledged and approved by orthodox Islam, Shaykh Ali Abdul-Raziq finds no legitimate reasons why Moslems should not apply themselves to the emulation of the rest of progressive humanity. This they could do by the free study of social and political sciences; by laying the foundations of their national sovereignty and the order of their governments upon the best principles of government as indicated by the most modern views and by sound experience.

There is a long way for al-Azhar to travel before it can be called a liberal theological school, in the more critical sense of the word. But the distance it has already covered in a few decades is tremendous. Generally speaking the reforms instituted by Mohammed 'Abdou and the committee called by Ahmed Shafiq Pasha may be said to have affected only the form of teaching, introducing a few extra-curricular subjects. They were reforms along the lines of modernization, whereas al-Maraghi's reforms have touched the contents of religion and prepared the way for a genuine liberalization of the ancient Mosque University.

The real issue facing any theological school or system that makes its appeal both to faith and to reason has not yet been met squarely by al-Azhar, and unless it is, the exodus of such men as Shaykh ‘Ali ‘Abdul-Raziq and other intellectuals will continue. Already voices of intelligent, if not liberal, Moslem theologians and others are raised in warning.

The issue that faces al-Azhar is the same that faced Protestant Christianity in various countries at various periods since the Reformation. Summed up in a few words it is the determination of the true relation of faith to reason, and the restriction of each within its proper domain. A Moslem intellectual who may be characterized as a modernist in full sympathy with the traditions of al-Azhar and orthodox Islam senses this issue and the conflict it will necessarily bring with it when he makes a vital distinction between the "permanent" and the "transient" elements in positive religion. The former, he points out, need not conflict with science; the latter, comprising definite dogmas and traditions which took their colorings from the particular time, people and circumstances which gave them birth, must be removed or modified to suit the growing needs of man and his changing environments.[1] This statement of the case could hardly be improved upon.

In the challenge between faith and reason it hardly avails Azharites or other defenders of orthodox Islam to resort to the old distinction, repeatedly and unsuccessfully made, between certain fields of knowledge where reason functions but not faith, and others where faith functions without reason. For even the *dichotomy* of the human mind which this distinction presupposes, is itself being challenged and subjected to serious questioning. Men in the East are beginning to insist that either faith has to show why it should be taken for granted, without questioning, or else capitulate to reason. Doubtless there are still many things, many mysteries of life and the universe we live in, which have not yielded up their secrets, and may never do so. But the normal, practical mind of the average seeker of knowledge refuses to accept on the authority of religion or divine inspiration statements of alleged facts which fly in the face of reason and established truths, and which have no inherent relation to the essential message of religion. There must be something like reverent faith in science; but there must also be something like decent fidelity to truth in religion. For properly speaking faith is nothing more than a postulate, based either on spiritual insight and experience or on the premises of reason itself. It is often a bold and sweeping postulate; but it must also be a contingent one, indicating the direction wherein reality lies. Faith thus construed must always begin where reason ends. It is not a substitute for reason, and the two do not run parallel, nor should they ever conflict. They lie on the same plane, and lead in the same direction. It is therefore absurd to limit the scope of reason in the pursuit of religious truth, as some religionists still fondly believe they can do, as it is absurd to exclude faith from the domain of science, as some short-sighted scientists have done.

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[1] Farid Wajdi in al-Hilal, June, 1931.

These remarks may sound trite and obvious to many. But one acquainted with the type of literature produced by the reconcilationist school will admit that these truths are not as self-evident to the reconciliationists, whether Moslem or Christian, as it appears. These reconciliationists, speak and write as though by some magic or metaphysical subtlety and sophitication it is possible to wring out truth from scientific and historic propositions whose falsity has been proved beyond the shadow of a doubt, or perpetuate social institutions which tested experience has proved to be utterly inadequate and unsatisfying to our modern needs and demands.

It is obvious that Islam, like Arab nationalism and Arabic culture, is also in the dawn of a renaissance. And here, too, we find that forces and factors which are bound to carry this great religion forward in the march of time partake both of the past and of the future. Both al-Maraghi and Mohammed ‘Abdou found in the history of Islam, as well as in its doctrinal structure, sufficient precedent to justify many innovations and reforms. Replying to criticisms of a French orientalist, Hottenoux, Mohammed ‘Abdou pointed out that the mundane nature of Islam makes it more amendable to adoption of modern social reform. Modern Moslem liberals and semi-liberals almost naturally turn to such movements within Islam as Mu ‘tazilism and Sufism for comfort and inspiration.

The former of these, founded by Wasil Ibn ‘Ata in the middle of the eighth century A.D., became in time a dominent movement with divergent schools of thought. Al-Mamoun, the famous liberal caliph and father of Harun al-Rashid, was a Mu‘tazilite and went in his zeal so far as to persecute literalist Moslems who taught that the Qoran was "‘unceated." Mu‘tazilism represented rationalism within the bounds of Islamic religion. Its followers prided themselves on being "the people of intelligence and of justice." To them faith must show its credentials to reason. They believed in free will and conformed their theological concepts of retribution to this belief. They were reformers not merely of the outward expressions and institutions of Islam, but of its very doctrines.

In a completely different direction Sufism, Moslem mysticism, contributed to the liberalization of Islam through its universalistic sympathy and understanding of the spiritual message underlying all religions, and by bringing a prophetic message to Islam itself. Of the influence of Sufism on Islamic religion we shall have more to say in a coming chapter—*On the Spirituality of The East.*

Even the forward-looking outlook of science and its correlation with religion finds its historic counterpart in the great scientific revival which began in the golden age of the Abbaside dynasty and was carried forward to new heights by Moslem scientists and philosophers who flourished in Andalusia.

Considering, therefore, the progress which Islam made in its history, there is every reason for hope that its process of liberalization has not ceased. On the contrary, as we may surmise from Al-Maraghi's discourse earlier in the chapter, Islam today is making a new orientation on the plane of the present, and bravely facing the problems that confront it daily, even problems of a purely intellectual, theological nature.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE PASSING OF THE VEIL

In the popular mind of the West there is almost an inseparable association between the status of the Moslem woman and the Islamic religion. The Qoran invariably and immediately recalls the harem and the veil; the harem invariably and immediately suggests the Qoran. Nowhere has Islam been so harshly and uncritically condemned among Christians of the West as on the question of the status of the Moslem woman at home and in society. Some missionaries, despite long years of their lives in Moslem lands, have evinced a surprising amount of prejudice and venom when treating this subject. Samuel Zwemer quotes another missionary who lived among Egyptian women for four decades as saying of the Moslem woman:

> "As a babe she is unwelcome; as a child untaught; as a wife unloved; as a mother unhonored; in ald age uncared for; and when her miserable, dark and dreary life is ended unmourned by those she has served."[1]

Aside from the consideration that this "thumb-sketch," as Zwemer calls it, is so sweeping that it may be safely discounted, the inference which the erstwhile militant missionary draws from it, namely that such conditions are due to the influence of Islam as religion, is altogether erroneous. One may draw just as dark a picture of the debased slums of London or of the peasant women in Russia in the days of Czars or of our "Tobacco Roads" and our Cumberlands and attribute such conditions to the influence of Christianity. Much of the material adduced by Zwemer in his book, illustrating the backward and degrading position of the Moslem women in different countries of the East, belongs more properly to Frazer's *Golden Bough*. They are mostly remnants of animistic supirstitions and notions pertaining to a lower stage of human society and of which Christian countries are not altogether free. Zwemer himself believes in demons and angels and would substitute exorcism by prayer for the *zar* practised by foolish, superstitious Egyptian women! The important point, however, is that Coptic women of the fellahin population of Egypt, their Christianity notwithstanding, differ little from their Moslem sisters. That could be just as safely said of many Christian women of Syria and Iraq to the present day.

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[1] *Across the World of Islam,* p. 135.

Generally speaking, the Arab woman from time immemorial enjoyed a range of actual freedom incommensurate with her legal status, which under Islam, was not so bad or oppressive when compared with periods of equal development in the Christian world. It is conceded generally by students of Islam that Mohammed actually improved upon the condition of women in Arabia of his time. A close and sympathetic study of the Qoran corroborates this view. Many evil practices, including that of burying girls alive, are prohibited in the Qoran. Mohammed's own treatment of his wives was held up as a model of kindliness.

The restrictive life of the harem upon which missionaries dwell so long must be regarded, in the light of history, as a kind of recrudescense of religious zeal and fanaticism and as a foreign institution foisted upon Islam in the Arabic-speaking countries. It appears from various sources that Moslem women in the near past, enjoyed a beter lot, had more to say about their own destinies, sometimes to the chagrin of their husbands and the religious zealots of the time. An Arabic work of the 14th century listed nineteen Moslem women who had attained the rank of authorization (*ijazah*) to lecture on religious topics. From a description of wedding festivities and customs of the city of Hama in the 17th century taken from a Ms. of that time it seems that Moslem men and women mixed quite promiscuously. Moslem women went out to wedding parties not only unveiled, but with a generous display of their adornments and physical charms. The author who was of a religious trend of mind, condemns such practices and deplores the fact that even *muftis* and religious leaders of that community would send their wives to such weddings, unabashed and unmindful of their duties to preserve the doctrines of Islam intact from infidelistic influences! Such doings among Moslem women went on not only in Hama but in Damascus, Aleppo and other Syrian cities. In another work belonging to the same period it is mentioned that Moslem women attended the mosques of Damascus unveiled, coming out in their best clothes and with their jewelries and seductive make-ups exposed to public view. Such freedom of intercourse among Moslems still prevails in sections of Syria where the modern influences of the West have not penetrated to any great extent.

Moslem feminists make it a point that the institution of the veil, with its harem restrictions, was a foreign importation from Persian, Byzantine and Hindu sources. Any tourist who travels from the Syrian shores eastward cannot fail to notice that the veil grows heavier and the harem life more restricted as one goes farther and comes to the non-Semitic countries of Persia, Afghanistan and Islamic India. ‘Abdul-‘Aziz al-Tha‘alibi said there has never been in Arabic speaking countries anything so severe and enslaving, so restrictive of the freedom of the Moslem woman and so inimical to her full development as a human being as the *purdah* of India. Even the most orthodox Moslems of Egypt or Syria make a distinction between this *purdah* and the harem of the Arabic Islamic world. The former is more Indian than Moslem, as the free, latitudinarian life of the Moslem women in country districts of Syria or Egypt today is in fact more Semitic than Islamic.

Modern Moslem reformers have capitalized this traditional freedom of the Arab woman. Arabic literary works, including the Arabian Nights, are prolific with ungarnished accounts of this freedom, of unrestricted intercourses between the sexes before and after Islam. Famous Moslem women in the first century of Islam sometimes took part in wars and revolts and were the right-hands of their fighting menfolk. Feminine freedom often attained a height of audacity for which it is hard to find parallel except in our present-day generation. The story of the pre-Islamic princess who held a competition among Arab gallants of her time, giving her hand in marriage to the one who would most eloquently describe her charms in verse, is well known to students of Arabic literature. The poem which finally won her approval is a masterpiece of realistic description. It was a royal Arab woman also who sang:

> "By Allah I am a woman worthy of high station;
> I walk my way and strut as I walk.
> I give access to my lover to kiss my lips,
> And offer my kisses to whoever desires them."

One of the most daring feminists of her time, a patroness of poets and singers, a high-living patrician, was Sakinah, the daughter of al-Hussein and thus great grand daughter of the Prophet Mohammed. Her home in Medina was a veritable salon. She started a fashion in hairdressing, and the "Sakinah coiffure" was copied by the high ladies of her time and those who came after her in many Moslem lands.[1] Even in the courts of Moslem rulers the feminine influence was often felt, and not rarely did women wield the sceptre and take the reins of rule in their own hands.

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[1] Jibrail Jabbour, of the American University of Beirut throws interesting light on this feminine freedom in his book (Arabic) on the life and times of 'Umar Ibn Abi Rabi 'ah, the paragon of Arab love poets.

The modern feminist movement in the Arab world takes its rise partly from these historic considerations and partly from considerations which are more germaine to an industrial era and directly due to modern Western influences. It goes back to the day when Qasim Amin of Egypt, over forty years ago, wrote his stirring book—*"The Emancipation of Woman."* Since then, and especially after the first war, the modern feminist movement has made rapid progress.

As one comes out from the Cairo railroad station of Bab-al-Hadid, one of the first objects of interest to meet the eye is a heroic monument in the square almost facing the English Barracks on Queen Nazilah Street. It is a red granite statue by the late Egyptian sculptor Mahmoud Mukhtar symbolizing the "Rise of Egypt." Standing by a crouching sphinx is an Egyptian woman, gazing into the distance and lifting her veil with the left hand while her right hand rests on the head of the sphinx.

Like so many of his countrymen, the late Egyptian sculptor, when he designed this piece of statuary, must have had in mind that Egypt, represented by the sphinx, cannot rise of itself without the help and inspiration of woman. Mahmoud Mukhtar gave a concrete and symbolic expression to a sentiment that has grown rapidly in the entire Near East.

But somewhere in the numerous squares of that great Arabic-speaking city of many statues and monuments, there should be erected another statue, preferably opposite that of the "Rise of Egypt," depicting a slightly different scene: A woman, veiled and crouching on one knee, in the position of one about to rise, holds her bent and care-burdened head with one hand. Beside her, bending slightly, is the gallant figure of a man in his thirties in Western clothes and an Egyptian fez, gently lifting the veil off the woman's face with one hand while with the other he motions her to rise and stand on her feet.

This would be a fitting monument of the Egyptian counselor-at-law and writer Qasim Amin who first blew the clarion of women's emancipation in Egypt. His clear, forceful and cheering message has since then been caught up by different Eastern countries until the whole Arabic speaking world has resounded to it.

It may be somewhat arbitrary to single out this one man to symbolize an extensive reform like the feminist movement in a large section of the Near East, when so many forces as so many individual leaders in various fields had actually contributed to it. But to those who have followed the story of this reformer's fight for the Moslem woman—his valiant, almost single-handed struggle among his coreligionists, the half-hearted response which it aroused in high quarters where encouragement was so fondly expected, the heartaches and disappointments which dogged his foot-steps—the honor accorded him by Arab nationalists cannot fail of hearty assent and approval. Qasim Amin who died in 1908 broken-hearted because his message fell on almost deaf ears has now come to his own.

There were many before Qasim Amin and at his own time who championed the cause of the Eastern woman. Mohammed Jamil Beyhum, himself a Moslem feminist, names several other pioneers of feminism in Turkey, Egypt, and Syria.

Among these first place should be given to Sultan Mahmoud II, known as the Reformer, to whom goes the credit of introducing schools for girls in the Ottoman Empire. No less than two thousand women pupils in Constantinople alone attended these schools, with an annual crop of thirteen teachers. Another was Isma'il Pasha, Khedive of Egypt, who established the first school for girls in Egypt, founded by his third wife, Jasham Avit Khanum. In Syria, Butrus al-Bustani as early as 1849 raised his voice clearly and boldly in defense of the "weaker sex." The credit for woman education in the East, however, on any large and systematic scale, must go to the missionaries. The missionary schools for girls have remained even to our own day models for many a budding native school. A large number of women principals and teachers in those native schools owe their own education to the missionaries. Some women distinguished themselves as writers and poets in the early Arabic renaissance. One of these, Hind Naufal, a Christian woman of Syria, published the first magazine for women in Arabic.

But it was Qasim Amin who crystallized around his magnetic personality the hundred and one amorphous issues of the feminist movement in the Arabic-speaking world and whose name has become synonymous with it. His great service to the cause consisted mostly in that he made it explicit and brought it for vigorous discussion before the public eye. He treated of the home conditions under which the Moslem girl was brought up, of school education, of marriage and divorce evils—forecasting problems and situations which the liberation of the Moslem woman would bring in its trail—giving a ready answer to all objections raised. Many of the prophecies of Qasim Amin have been fulfilled and most of the misgivings and timid apprehensions of his critics have proven to be altogether without foundation.

The appearance of *The Emancipation of Woman* was like a bombshell in the midst of the conservative Moslem circles of Egypt and elsewhere. Viewed in the light of the tremendous progress which the feminist movement has made since then in the Arab world the demands made in that book sound today rather moderate and timid. Yet such were the backward conditions which this reformer tried to combat that a storm of violent criticism broke upon his head. He was vilified in the press, denounced from the pulpits and mocked in the streets and in the idle gatherings of the cafes and saloons. Men who objected to his views but lacked his tact and inborn good manners insisted on meeting his wife on every occasion.

Qasim Amin's book was not the outcome of an academic study of the social system, nor born from that aloof compassion of a distant outsider who only looks on the dark side of the squalor, ignorance and poverty evident everywhere. He wrote and spoke to men and women who were his brothers, sisters, cousins, kinsmen and fellow citizens. He knew of sources of strength and potential remedies within his own environment and in the historic traditions of his own people. He pointed to germs of reform in the Islamic law itself, for the emancipation of woman. In short, he spoke as a Moslem to Moslems, in a language they could understand. He himself was a devout Moslem and quoted the Qoran and Hadith in defense of his views and arguments. Qasim Amin wrote a second book, *The Modern Woman,* in which he replied to his critics and in which we catch glimpses of a liberal trend.

For a time it appeared as if the cause for which Qasim Amin gave his life had passed away with him. The time was not ripe for such a far-reaching social revolution. The spark that was needed to ignite the slumbering emotions into action was biding its time. Then the war came, and the feminist movement leaped into renewed vigor and aggressiveness. The Turkish Kemalists led in this social reform. A Turkish writer, Mufty-Zade Zia, gives us an interesting account of the accelerating influence which the war exercised on feminism in the East generally. For while the picture is that of Turkey during and after the war it applies with little variation to the Arabic-speaking countries, particularly Egypt and Syria. On his return from the United States to Constantinople, Zia Bey asked his aunt, a typical *hanum* of the aristocratic class, how the participation of Turkish women in national activities came to pass, and whether it was sudden or gradual. She replied:

> "When the war came, and all the men were called to the front, women unostentaciously stepped into the employments left vacant. As is generally the case in all movements of emancipation for which the people are really ready, the

movement started in the lower classes. Pushed by necessity, some young girls dared to apply for clerical employment in shops and offices. At the time hundreds of ladies of the higher classes were engaged in helping at home the Red Cresent and other relief works. They had studied nursing. Encouraged by the fact that their less fortunate sisters had met with no opposition and were working openly in shops and offices, they in turn offered their services as nurses. Much of the field work and hospital work of the Red Crescent was confined to them to liberate men for military service."[1]

The feminist movement in the Arabic-speaking world owes a great debt to the Turkish woman. Mme. Huda Shi 'rawi, the able leader of the feminist movement in Egypt, called Mustafa Ataturk a saviour of Islam. The Egyptian and Syrian aristocracy who were in contact with the Turkish ruling class often imitated them. In Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad and Aleppo, and even in little district capitals of the Arabic part of the Ottoman Empire, wives of Turkish officials, often of Circasian origin with blue eyes and very fair skin, set the standards of the fashionable life among Moslem Arabs. The seductive, diaphenous *yashmak* which half hid and half revealed the tantalizing charms of the feminine features was one boon heritage left the Arabs by the Turks. It was in fact one step short of complete unveiling. When the full story of the emancipation of the Moslem women is told unbegrudging credit should be given those dainty, cigarette-puffing, coffe-sipping wives, sisters and kinswomen of the Turkish officials from Istanbul, Adrianople, Salonika, and Smyrna as practical pioneers of the feminist movement in the Arab Lands.

In Syria the feminist movement was definitely associated in the minds of nationalists with the "Turkifying policy" of the Ottoman regime. Mohammed Jameel Beyhum speaks of the mission of Turkish women teachers called to Beirut by Ahmed Jamal Pasha and 'Azmi Bey, War governor of Beirut, as part of the general scheme to Turkify the Arabs. The famous Halide Edibe

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1. *Speaking of the Turks,* p. 57.

and Nikar Hanum headed the mission which must have impressed the conservative Arab Moslems of that city and repelled them at the same time for the open ostentation and radical feminism which the mission members took no effort to hid. For the Arab historian of the feminist movement adds that "because of the display of feminine adornments by those women, not familiar to us, few people patronized their schools for which untold thousands were spent."

The Egyptian Feminist Union of Cairo, with its modern headquarters on the Street of Qasr-ul-'Ayni, is undoubtedly the most important and influential of feminine organizations in the Arabic-speaking world today. Its president, Mme. Huda Shi'rawi, rich and cultivated Moslem widow of Sultan Shi'rawi Pasha, has done more to raise the morale of the Moslem Egyptian woman and direct her activities in useful channels than probably any single individual. The Union has an up-to-date magazine published in French, *"L'Egyptienne,"* runs a dispensary for poor women and a workshop and orphanage. In 1923 an invitation from the bureau of the International Feminist Union was extended to a group of Egyptian women to attend a world feminist conference in Rome. It was the first time in history that Egyptian Moslem women had represented their country in a world activity abroad. The Egyptian Feminist Union was then organized and registered with the international bureau. It is said that on their voyage homeward the members of the Egyptian delegation pledged themselves to discard the veil permanently, as they had done while abroad. Two proposals for reform, adopted by the newly organized Union, were also registered for the support of the international body. These were a minimum marriage age of sixteen for Egyptian girls, and equal opportunity of education for both sexes. Both of these proposals were subsequently passed by the Egyptian parliament.

As in China, India and other countries of the East, the feminist movement in the Arab world was an inseparable development of nationalism. The Arab woman won her emancipation not only by agitation for the general improvement of her conditions but by her active participation and sacrifice in the struggles for independence. Mme. Shi'rawi referred to this in a personal interview:

> "The first motive of the modern feminist movement in Egypt," she said, "was a political one. In 1919 when the Egyptian revolution started, the men sought our help; and we responded without flickering. We walked out in demonstrations, and after that organized a political committee of which I was chosen president. Our political activities as might be expected, had a tremendous effect and created great sensation. Four Egyptian women actually gave their lives in the memorable struggles of 1919."

Among the Arab patriots taking part in the Egyptian revolution there was a feminine unit under the leadership of Fatima al-Mohammed of the town of Kafrsur. Mme Huda Shi'rawi spoke of the early participation of Egyptian women with the nationalists.

Safiyyah Hanum, the widow of the great Egyptian leader Sa'ad Zaghloul Pasha played no small part in the rise of Egyptian nationalism; she won the endearing title "Mother of the Egyptians." This noble woman was the right hand of her husband in his struggles against British domination, contributing all her wealth to this patriotic cause. Judge Pierre Crabites, formerly of the Mixed Court of Cairo, gives this woman a unique place in the present political makeup of Egypt. "Several women,' he said, "stand out as heroines in Egypt, fighting for independence, but all of them would give first place to Safiyyah Hanum." His article in Asia magazine for January, 1937 gives an intimate view of a woman who would be considered great in any country, at any time.

In Syria as well as in Palestine and Iraq, the women are taking active part in the fight against European aggression and in the various movements for the improvement of their people's condition. In the summer of 1938 the first Arab Women's Convention was held in

Cairo to take the necessary measures for extending effective help to the Arab revolutionists in Palestine. This convention was held almost immediately after a similar convention of men in the same city—the Inter-parliamentary Arab convention. At the Arab Women's Convention a delegate from Lebanon, moved the audience to a pitch of enthusiasm, and her words were quoted throughout the Arab world, when she said in the course of her speech:

> "When men hear of a women's convention called for the discussion of the tragedy of Palestine, they picture to themselves a group of women wailing and shedding copious tears. For the first time we want to belie this notion about us. The Arab women wept once over the ruins of Alhambra, but they shall not weep again over the ruins of Palestine."

In teaching, social work, philanthropy, etc., the Arab women, both Moslem and Christian, are no longer satisfied to take a passive part. They have come forward with refreshing enthusiasm and unexpected energy and skill to participate in many activities that were supposed to be preempted by men. Not only in Turkey, but in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, there is an increasing number of women teachers, doctors, and even women lawyers. There is an ever increasing demand for women college graduates specializing in the sciences. The first English book by a native, giving an account of the Arab revolt in Palestine was written by a woman.[1]

There are misgivings among well wishers of the Arab nationalist movement that the Qoran might prove an insurmountable obstacle in the way of the full emancipation of women in the Arab world. Several considerations lead a thoughtful student of the Arab nationalist movement to discount this pessimistic view altogether. As a matter of fact the Qoran is actually quoted by modern Moslem feminists in their fight for liberty and equality. These feminists point to sura and verse in the Qoran where women are given legal rights not recognized in Christendom until a few decades ago. As the late Amir Ali, Indian Moslem jurist and scholar, pointed out in his *Legal Position of Women,* the Moslem daughter "does not depend on the foresight of her parents for a future provision. Her title in per parents' patrimony is expressly determined by law." A Moslem girl may be contracted in marriage by her parents or guardians, but the Moslem law modifies this power to the extent that "even a father cannot enter into a contract of marriage for his minor daughter which is detrimental to her interests or with a person who does not belong to the same status in life, or who is suffering from some disease." The judge has the power to stop such marriages. Nor does a Moslem woman lose her individuality when she marries. Islam had its Lucy Stoners centuries before they appeared in a Christian country. A woman's property is her own, and even her husband has no legal claim to it, to possess or to manage against her expressed approval.

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[1] *The Arab Woman and The Palestine Problem* by Mrs. Matiel E. T. Mogannam.

Mme Huda Shi'rawi turns the tables on Christian critics of Islam when she says:

> "In reclaiming her independence the occidental woman meets with several obstacles, the source of most of which is the civil law. She stands as one who is trying to rob man of some vested and acquired rights. Not so with the Moslem oriental woman who merely asks of man to open for her the doors of culture and experience, that she may the better manage her affairs and exploit rights conceded to her by the Moslem law-rights almost equalling those of man."

Comparing the Moslem stand towards women with that of Christianity it may be pointed out that the superior virtue of the new Testament stand may be greatly due to its negative nature. Perhaps if St. Paul had expressed himself in detail on legislation for women, from what little is said in his Epistles he would have been no less restrictive than the Prophet Mohammed.

There is little fear of a setback in the advance already made by woman in the Arab lands. Women's education there has made phenomenal progress. Modern Arab leaders, nationalist and feminist alike, are consolidating whatever gain has been made in the cause of the liberation of women and are pressing forward, cautiously but steadily, for further conquest. With the rapid increase of literacy, the amazing growth of the Arabic press and its increasing dependence for circulation on advertisement, with the invasion of the East by the American movies, modern styles and ways of life, the feminist movement in the Arab lands is soon coming up to the level of its sister movement in Europe and America. More important perhaps than all these is the growing economic independence of woman.

Comparatively speaking the feminist movement, both in the West and in the East, is still in its infancy. It has raised serious questions on employment, division of responsibility, equal opportunity for the sexes and the mooted question—are women the intellectual equals of men? These issues are being discussed today in the Arabic newspapers and magazines. The success of the feminist movement abroad, and particularly in Turkey, is closely watched by Arab feminists. The same problems of laxity in morals and misuse of freedom by the newly emancipated Arab woman are seriously discussed by Arab feminists. Mme. Huda Shi'rawi seeks the remedy for such evils in more education and more enlightened freedom. Self-reliance she pointed out, in one of her lectures, is the only effective guard of right conduct, thus agreeing independently with the conclusion of Olga Knopf in her book, *The Art of Being a Woman.*

Jameel Beyhum to whom we referred before holds the same opinion somewhat differently expressed. On his visit to the United States in the winter of 1939 he remarked in an interview that there is in woman a transcending power, inherent in her character. This power cannot be exhausted by whatever activity the woman happens to be engaged in. It appeared to him that when woman loses something of her traditional feminine charm she compensates for it by resort to that inherent latent power. Beyhum speaks not merely from theoretical considerations but from a happy and full experience. He is married to a woman who also distinguished herself in the emancipation of her Moslem sisters in Syria and Iraq. In the days of King Feisal, Mme. Beyhum, then Miss Nazik al-‘Abid, organized orphanages in Baghdad, and opened schools for the orphaned children of the Iraqi nationalists who lost their lives in the revolt against the British. She has not given up her work in feminism since her marriage. Beyhum's sister, Mme. Adilah Beyhum al-Jazairi, has a sucsessful school for girls in Beirut.

Opponents of feminism among Moslems of the East, blame many of the modern social evils on the discard of the veil. Among Moslem theologians of today, opinion is seriously divided on whether the veil is an instituton inherent in Islam. Those who take the view that the veil is an innovation and an imposition point out that at no time was it deterrent of vice or a help to virtue. If we accept Lane's verdict about social conditions of a century ago in Egypt, the veil was a convenient masque for the gay woman of his time. The question is not whether Moslem women should veil or unveil but whether they should have access to the light of reason—the only effective emancipation.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

INDUSTRIALISM INVADES THE ARAB LANDS[1]

In the last few chapters we dealt generally with developments of Arab nationalism which belong to the domain of world inclusiveness. Whether in literature, religion or culture generally the things that count are shared by all. Cultural values know no geographic bounds, racial distinctions or national restrictions. It is possible for Arabs or non-Arabs to expand them or change their inner trends and dialectics without the benefit of homeland. The Jews scattered throughout the world have demonstrated that it is posible to create a peculiar racial or national culture without a country. We speak of a Christian civilization and a Moslem civilization embracing countries and nationalities which often find themselves in deadly conflict for purely economic reasons. So strong is this economic factor that, in the minds of many, it has become an all-pervasive one by which they explain all changes of history, inner or otherwise.

It is in the realm of economics that nationalism assumes its exclusive nature. There is no doubt that the vexing question of what is called "economic nationalism" constitutes today one of the outstanding problems the solution of which is prerequisite for world peace. This solution, to be lasting and satisfactory must take into consideration the legitimate national aspirations of all peoples within the circle of the family of nations. For each nation to assure its own economic security often is a direct invitation and challenge for conflict, sooner or later, with some other nation. Some world order, as that to which I hinted in the introductory chapter of this book, must come into existence, lest mutual economic exclusiveness lead to mutual destruction.

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[1] For this chapter consult the series of studies in the economics of certain countries of the Arab lands conducted by the American University of Beirut under the editorship of Prof. Sa'id Himadeh—*Economic Organization of Syria* (1936); *Economic Organization of Palestine* (1938) and *Economic Organization of Iraq* (*Arabic*, 1938).

At our present stage of world development the adoption of modern industrialism by the various Arab countries falls in the category of economic necessity rather than economic nationalism. In the face of a recrudescence of imperialism and the utter failure of the League of Nations to protect the economic interests of little nations, there is no choice for the Arabs but to develop their own industries, at least to such an extent that dependence on Western industrialism and capitalism would not endanger their political independence. The Arabs must avoid the unhappy situation in the not distant future of becoming economic vassals of a few British and French capitalists, as Mexico and republics of Central America became practical vassals of American capitalists. "Neglected property," to paraphrase an Arabic proverb, "invites the thief." And undeveloped resources and industries invite the avaricious exploiter.

It would seem somewhat anomalous to speak of industrialism invading the Arab lands when we recall that such words as *muslin* (from Mosul), *gauze* (from Gaza), *damask* (from Damascus), *alcohol* (from al-kuhl) are but random reminders of the past indebtedness of Western industries to those lands. *Porphery* was exported from the maritime plains of Syria to Greece and more distant lands in Phoenician ships long before the time of Herodotus or even Homer. Until a century or more ago the Near East still held the supremacy in such industries as spinning, dyeing and weaving. In Damascus, Aleppo, Cairo and Baghdad hands skilled in the manipulation of the native looms have but to get accustomed to an electrically driven one to produce goods that compare favorably in quality and fineness with fabrics shipped from abroad. The Eastern carpenter finds it easy to turn from a hand or toe-turned lathe to one turned by an invisible *jinni*. George Khoury of Brooklyn, a shoe manufacturer of long experience, calls Damascus "one of the most self-sufficient and all-round industrial cities in the world." In no other industrial city, he said, does an artisan master all the stages of the manufacture of an article as in Damascus.

Modern industrialism has proven a purveyor of mixed good and evil to East and West alike. It has brought in its trail kings' treasures and poured them lavishly at the feet of prince and pauper, rich and poor, alike. It has also brought untold misery, oppression, wholesale slaughter and slavery to free and brave yeomen who had but recently won their liberties from armored knights and feudal lords. It caught millions unaware in the wheels of its juggernaut, snuffed out their souls and crushed their bodies in the dust. On few it has bestowed the riches of a Croesus, on the many the pittance of a Lazarus in a world of plenty. A curious *jinni* did industrialism turn out to be. First he appeared at his creator's bidding, to be his slave and messenger, then when he waxed strong he became arrogant and uncontrollable. Finaly he enslaved his enslaver.

But unless economy is made amenable to the wider considerations and principles of life it shall ever remain an enslaver of man, an enslaver of his own creation. G. Lowes Dickenson, in a delightfully philosophical dialogue, pointed out a fundamental fallacy of economic determinism which surprisingly enough is not generally recognized by students of economics and history.

It is the fallacy of building an interpretation of life on "facts" that are assumed to be facts merely because they exist, justifiably or unjustifiably, then taking these facts as reasons for rational and logical "laws" which are supposed to regulate these facts. Dickinson makes a modern man cynically point out our social and economic system to Plato thus:

> "Nothing could be more difficult to explain," says the modern man, "We have a whole science about it, which would give you great delight. For it uses mathematics to show how necessary it is that everything should be just as it is." Then further: "It assumes, to begin with, all the concrete facts, and then proves that, if they are so, the consequences must be so."[1]

Will this topsy-turvy order be repeated in the Arab lands? Will social values yield to the merciless materialistic logic of modern industry; or will industrial ececonomics be given its place as the handmaiden of life? That is what makes the next fifty years in those lands most momentous, not only for their own peoples but for the rest of the world. For I cannot help but feel that out of that part of the world from which went forth the light which lighteth every man, where love and compassion were always considered of the essence of the truly superman, where progress was subordinated to happiness and where peace—which passeth all understanding was the *summum bonum* of the individual and of the community, will yet come a formula of life which will reconcile love and progress, compassion and the conquest of the material forces for the benefit of man.

The invasion of the Arab lands by modern industrialism is an established fact. Yet the extent of this invasion and the reception with which it is being met are more significant than the fact itself or the initial success of that invasion.

Writing in the Commercial Supplement of the *Manchester Guardian* devoted to Egypt (March 25, 1933) Ismail Sidky Pasha, then premier and dictator of that country and an eminent industrialist, said:

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[1] *After* 2000 *Years.*

> " . . . . The government started a bureau to deal with the increasing amount of unemployment which, though not so serious as in countries highly developed industrially, was still causing distress and discontent. This was a new problem in Egypt, and to aid us in the solution we invoked and were willingly accorded the help of the Internationl Labor Bureau in the person of its director, Mr. H. B. Butler."

Here we have a keynote to the significant manner in which industrialism with its beneficent and baneful consequences is being met in the East. Nationalist leaders throughout, whether democratic or dictatorial, who seek to win the people have come to realize that the only sure way lies in the service of one's fellow men. It is the way of the Nazarene, of Mohammed, Confucious and the Gautama Buddha. This gospel is being put into modern terms on a scale little suspected by the great majority of Western readers.

Dr. Hans Kohn, speaking of the rise of labor unionism in the Near East, says:

> "All nationalist movements are democratic at the outset; they carry on a struggle against oppression and feudalism, and for that purpose they need the cooperation of the masses, who have to be roused to a consciouness of their national allegiance.'[1]

There is an element of opportunism in all nationalism. But there are certain considerations which, to our mind, will lessen the dangers of the exploitation of nationalism in the Arab lands by individuals who, having taken prominent parts in the rise and establishment of local autonomies, feel they have an inborn right to exploit the common people. Because of the handicaps and difficulties hedging it, modern industrialism in the East has required national sanction and support for its survival. Thus its success depends much more on the good will of the nationalists than would be the case in more industrially developed countries of the West. A good example of this is *Banque Misr,* or Bank of Egypt.

Founded in 1920 at a capitalization of £E.80,000, or approximately $400,000, it was thought in all the foreign financial circles of Egypt that the subscribed capital would hardly be enough for the salaries of its founders, who represented the cream of Egyptian wealth and society. But *Banque Misr* today not only has survived the usual hardships of a pioneer institution and weathered the severest depression that Egypt, along with the rest of the world had witnessed in several decades, but has grown to such proportions that it amazed even its own founders and patrons. In 1935 the capitalization of *Banque Misr* rose to $5,000,000 and its deposits to $60,000,000. It has sponsored half a score of native industries, such as cotton ginning, cotton weaving, silk and wool weaving, transportation, etc. Modern ships, controlled by this bank, now ply the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Egyptian pilgrims today may travel on these ships where religious services are held on board and sanitary conditions prevail. Another modern native inudstry created by this bank is the Misr Air Lines, which owns several planes and conducts aviation schools in Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said. Topping the list of its achievements is a cinema industry for the production of Arabic movies. Several of these have come out of "Studio Misr" and are proving quite popular. According to its charter, Banque Misr has the option on all stocks to be sold, and in this manner the controlling interest remains in the hands of Egyptians.

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[1] *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East,* p. 42.

No one who knew Egypt of a few decades ago, when practically all of its industries and finance were in the hands of foreigners, can fail to appreciate the change that has come upon it since the war. One cannot fail to realize also that a great deal of the success of economic projects in the Arab world generally, and throughout the East, depends as much on non-economic considerations of loyalty, patriotism and faith as on the industrial qualities and qualifications of men at the helm of those projects. Tal'at Pasha Harb and his colleagues in Banque Misr represent a leadership in the Arab world which was very rare, if not non-existent before the first world war.

In Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Palestine industries are rising, sometimes like mushroom with little sub-soil or preparation for the hazards of economic competition, sometimes smothered in the cradle by foreign capitalists who dictated the economic policies of the mandatory governments. A measure of the growth of industry in those countries is afforded us in a study made by the Egyptian Ministry of Commerce and Industry for Egypt in the year 1935.

Comparing the census of 1907 and 1927 it was shown that while the increase of the population between the two dates was 26%, and of people engaged in agriculture, constituting an overwhelming majority, was 44%, the increase of those engaged in industry was 69% and in commerce 112%.

The weaving industry in Egypt is still in its infancy, and need give no worry to the spinners and weavers of Manchester, Lancashire and Liverpool. But at the rate it is growing, it will not be long before Egypt may become not only self-sufficient in this line, but among the exporting countries. This industry is a most logical one for Egypt, where the best cotton in the world grows and where transportation is not a serious problem.

The same story of rapid, almost phenomenal growth with little variation, could be told of Syria, Palestine and Iraq. Years ago, when nationalism was still in its comparative infancy in those lands, industrialism contended against heavy odds. Some of those odds were of foreign politcal nature, some were due to the indifference, inefficiency and lack of cooperation of the people in general and to the short-sighted egotism of those who sponsored the new industries in particular.

In my boyhood days I used to hear of a glass factory that was put up by a few rich men in Damascus, and which soon was given up because, it was said, members of the corporation quarrelled among themselves about who should be president. On my last trip to Syria I was shown in the Bab Sharqi quarter of that city the deserted factory of that same glass industry, with its long chimney rising bravely among the ruins of the delapdated building. It was an eloquent symbol of that frustrated industrialism which followed the declaration of the Turkish Constitution of 1908. Today a more encouraging account of the progress of industralism in Syria could be given. It is an account that is still encompassed with internal pitfalls and external dangers, but which shows great promise. Indications are plentiful of the growth of many industries where none were before. Due to purely native initiative, and representing mostly native investment, many corporations have been started in various parts of the Arab world for the development of its resources. In many instances young men were sent abroad to study the various phases of manufacturing and marketing. In some cases the engineers and directors studied abroad and spent several years in their respective fields before taking over their duties in the new industries. An example of this is the cement factories in Damascus and Tripoli. Another is a power plant in northern Lebanon with a large part of the capital invested coming from Lebanese emigrants to the United States. A promising industry is the canning of fruits and vegetables recently established in Damascus. The modern truck is enabling Syrian peasants to sell their surplus products and creating a convenient way to transport and make these products available throughout the Near East and abroad.

In a country such as Syria which does not yet exercise control over its tariff, modern industry is experiencing sharp fluctuations. The weaving industry particularly suffered from the dumping of Japanese goods.

Before the war there were hardly any industries in Iraq, with the exception of negligible hand or home industries. Today industries of all sarts, equipped with modern plants and machines and run by electricity, have sprung up everywhere there—weaving, leather and shoes, tobacco, soap—to name some of the industries mentioned in Himadi's work. *Economic organization of Iraq.* Special mention must be made of the date packing industry, since dates are a native product next in importance only to petroleum. Iraq exports a million dinar's worth of dates a year (c. $5,000,000). Realizing the importance of this industry in Iraq's economy the Iraqi government has taken stringent steps to regulate it and bring it under sanitary control. Modern packing houses, built of brick and cement, have risen under government supervision, and a law was passed to prevent packing in private, unsanitary packing houses where government supervision is not always feasible.

A great many of the sprouting industries in the Arab countries may appear as needless duplication of effort and hopeless attempts to compete with industries vastly superior in resources, accumulated industrial experience and marketing facilities.

Sensing such criticism 'Abdul-Wahhab Pasha, brilliant late minister of finance of Egypt, said:

> " . . . . The rise of Egyptian industry is not the product of a passing crisis, nor the fruit of a temporary trouble. Rather it is the result of a convergence of stable causes . . . . It is a natural development which has taken its fixed place in our economic system."[1]

The inevitable advent of modern industrialism into the East is bringing with it new problems and new advantages and improvements. Chronic unemployment was not known in many countries of the East, though chronic pauperism was quite rife, and equally unheard of were crises due to over-production and shortage of markets. Business expansion on borrowed capital is another innovation. The standard of living has risen many-fold, while the general level of wages has not risen correspondingly, and the prices of farming commodities even less. Modern industry has enhanced the living conditions and standard of the machine laborer, leading to an increase in wages and decrease of hours of labor, due mostly to pressure of the newly organized labor unions. It has, however, increased unemployment in the old or hand industries. It has given rise to a new class of skilled laborer and made both the employer and the machine dependent for full efficiency on uninterrupted employment. For the year 1935 the average pay in the "old crafts" in Damascus was from 7 to 12 francs a day (c. 28 to 48 cents), and in the machine industries from 10 to 25 francs (40 cents to $1.00).

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[1] Al-Ahram, March 15, 1936.

The lowering of the death rate, and the closing of the doors of immigration to the Americas in such countries as Syria and Palestine, with limited areas and industrial possibilities, have given rise to another serious problem, that of over-population.

Happily the invasion of modern industrialism in the East has come at a time when Western industrialism itself is beginning to have qualms of conscience and is going through a wave of regeneration. The economic reforms in the capitalistic countries, in preference to the radical and violent changes in the totalitarian states, are being fast appropriated by Arab Nationalists. In the winter of 1934 the late Abdul-Wahhab Pasha came to the United States especially to study the workings of the NRA at first hand. Labor unionism is not only an actuality in the Arab world today, but a fact that is being solicitiously recognized, aided and guided by the native governments, not without some caution and suspicion. The agrarian cooperative movement in Egypt has grown to such an extent and is so thoroughly organized that it is becoming a model for other countries of the Near East. At the end of 1935 there were 703 agrarian cooperatives in Egypt with a total membership of 59,404. The importance of the cooperative movement in Egypt at present lies in its educational value. Considering that the great majority of Egyptian *fellahin* are illiterate and quite unaccustomed to regimentation, economic ideology or planning, the progress these cooperatives have made is great.

Through the help of the Egyptian Government and its Agricultural Bank, the cooperatives are ridding the Valley of the Nile of those rapacious usurers who had preyed upon the Egyptian *fellahin* for generations and who, like human rats from the various ports of the Levant, had infested the little farms of Egypt from the mouth of the Delta to the cataract of Aswan. The wise law promulgated by Lord Kitchner and known as the "three acre law," had helped curb the foreign usurer somewhat. But the Egyptian Agricultural Bank and the cooperatives will eventually liberate the Egyptian peasantry, except those of them, as in every land, whom no agency, human or divine, can save from the destruction of their own shiftlessness, improvidence and extravagance. As the cooperative societies prove their benefits their number will multiply. At present there is a special department in the Egyptian agricultural ministry devoted to the service and information of the agrarian cooperatives. This cooperative department in the agricultural ministry publishes a monthly magazine devoted to educational agricultural articles, statistics and news of various agrarian and industrial cooperatives at home and abroad.

The East has fallen heir not only to Western industrialism, but also to the social and economic mechanism for combating the evils of industrialism, a mechanism which took generations of strife and bloodshed to build in the West. Two fundamental considerations incline us to believe that the relations between labor and capital, and between agriculture and industry will be more harmonious than in industrial countries of the West.

One of these considerations is the reluctance with which Easterners regard business as an end in itself. The crusading zeal with which industrialists amass huge fortunes, to be spent after their death by their care-free children, does not appeal to the realism of the Arab mind. With the utility of wealth in mind, rather than wealth for its own sake or industrial power for its own sake, it is easier to bring industry into harmony with social reform. So much of the opposition for reform in the highly industrialized countries of the West that have not turned communist or fascist, comes from enormously rich plutocrats who have neither vision nor the social consciousness which would make them realize that they are trustees of other people's rightful wealth. The instinct of solialism is not foreign to the people of the East. This same instinct makes them revolt against the rigid regimentation of totalitarianism, or state socialism, which is only necessary when people lack that instinct. Emir Shakib Arslan once said that if Moslems only follow the edict of their own religion concerning *zakat* (compulsory alms or tithes for the poor) they would have accomplished all that is constructive and good in socialism.

Another consideration is the reverence and respect for government, which centuries of tyranny have impressed on the minds of the common people. Coupled with this is the paternalistic attitude which characterized so many of the old monarchies of the East. The government in those lands is not something to be always "agin"; it is something to comply with and obey. When this attitude is tempered by the inculcation of the principles of democracy and clemency we are more likely to secure definite democratic gains and reforms than when governments have to expend most of their energies in overcoming the inertia of opposition for opposition's sake.

Arab Nationalism inherited both the respect for the ruler and the moral inhibitions with which religious traditions hedged him. Paternalism in the government is not resented by the ruled classes; it is expected. Thus there is created a balance between government and citizens which is more conducive to social and economic reform than in countries where industrialism, following an unchecked democracy, has developed independently both of ruler and ruled and has become an empire within an empire, or an empire within a democracy.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

AWAKENING OF SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS

It is a long way that Arab nationalism has traveled from its earliest appearance, or even since the first world war. Describing the conditions prevailing in Egypt after the War, Valentine Chirol could see only a glimmering of awakened social consciousness in that country. It was a dark picture that he painted. Typical, and by virtue of long association with misery and poverty in the East, it has come to be taken for granted. But, he wrote:

> "The one bright spot was the capacity for self help which some of the Egyptians themselves displayed. An organization started by a young nationalist lawyer of Damietta, Ameen Effendi Youssef, showed a better way to the authorities. The cooperative association which he initiated in his own native town, one of the poorest in Egypt, where 24,000 out of a total of 32,000 were in sore need of assistance, and which he subsequently extended to Mansourah and other towns, not only in the Delta, but in Upper Egypt, laid itself out at once to discriminate between those who clearly deserve relief and those who do not, etc."[1]

Recently a prominent Egyptian nationalist, Hafiz Afifi Pasha, wrote a book under the unindicative title *On The Margin of Politics* (Arabic) which, to my knowledge, is the first articulate expression of this awakening of social consciousness.[1] This book shows plainly what is occupying first place in the minds of constructive, thinking nationalists. Afifi Pasha is not satisfied in his book to point out defects in the system of education, civil service, laws pertaining to industry and tariff, the appaling lack of social legislation for the alleviation of poverty and disease among the lower classes, but invariably points out the right remedy and the right method of dealing with the problem at hand. The importance of his book lies in the fact that it was written by a native nationalist of the aristocratic class, one-time Egyptian ambassador to Great Britain, Afifi's book is an example of a type of literature which was non-existent in the Arab lands before the world war, except in passing reference in some progressive essay or exhortative oration. Today there is a wealth of literature in the whole general field of social legislation, reference to some of which, from ideological socialistic and fascistic sources, has already been made in a previous chapter—*Reintegration of Arab Nationalism*.[2] The significance of Afifi Pasha's book lies precisely in the fact that is proceeds from a purely nationalistic, not socialistic, motive.

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[1] *The Egyptian Problem* p. 285-286. Mr. Youssef was Egyptian minister to Washington from Oct. 10, 1935 to Sept. 29, 1938.

If, as Prof. Hocking rightly states, "the condition of the common people" is the most "patent and reliable of all tests of civilization," it may be definitely said that the Arab lands are now passing this test creditably. An increasingly large number of Arab leaders find themselves in hearty agreement with the Harvard philosopher when he says:

> "However attractive the elite of any civilization may be, however refined, luxurious, intelligent, hospitable, the acceptance of squalor and ignorance and serfdom on the part of the human masses, for the sake of producing this human

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[1] The Arabic press recently reported the appearance of a similar book published in Beirut (also in Arabic) by Dr. Costi Zurayk professor of history at the American University of Beirut, on the same general theme of social regeneration.

[2] p. 70.

flower, conveys a sense of rotteness and unreality."[1]

The material evidences of social awakening often elude the observer who visits the East for the first time. A tourist who steps into Port Said or Beirut is repelled by those pestiferous peddlers and mangy beggers who swarm about him like flies in a native confectioner's shop. He is excused if his first reaction is one of disgust and depression and if he makes a mental reservation about the bruited reports of progress coming from the East. But general facts, known to those who have followed recent developments in the Arab lands, and supported by statistics, tell their own story—one that even the eye and nose cannot deny. One instance is significant:

A visitor to Damascus today may not find the City of Delight much changed in outer appearance. If he does discover change, it may not be of the desirable or esthetic sort, or it may only evoke a tolerant smile. But one change that would not appear to his sensible eye, one change that he would not even suspect unless he inquires about it, has made the difference between Medievalism and modernism in that most ancient of cities. Ten years ago most people of Damascus got their drinking water from public fountains or *sabils* that came in exposed and leaky conduits. Today they get it in sanitary water pipes directly to their homes, unexposed, from the subterranean spring ten miles away to the other end of the pipe where the Damascus housewife, stockingless and in her wooden shoes (*qubqab*), fills the earthen jar or pitcher for the family use. This single innovation has done away with cholera, typhus and typhoid fevers and other epidemics that used to infect the city periodically. Missionary and native doctors alike, warned constantly of the dangers of disease that come from exposed water, and only few listened. The rest went ahead and drank from the *sabil*, or ate of fruits and vegetables bought in the open bazaars.

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1. *The Spirit of World Politics*, p. 16.

And when they were stricken they blamed it on *nasib* (fate) or the impenetrable will of Allah. Today they know it is microbes. This elemental, and now common, knowledge to peoples of Western countries is also becoming common knowledge in the East. The project of bringing this water from the spring of *fieji* was sponsored by a corporation whose stocks were sold to the public.

The most impressive symbol of missionary infiuence in backward countries has been the hospital, with its over-taxed physicians and its immaculately white-clad nurses. The few military hospitals built by the Turks were usually ramshackle institutions with men orderlies that inspired little confidence in the patients. Before the world war there was hardly a decent native hospital in the whole Arab world with the exception of Qasr al-'Aini in Cairo. This hospital was founded by Mohammed Ali Pasha with the help and guidance of French physicians, particularly Klut Bey. Today many native-modern hospitals have risen in the various Arab countries. One of the most up-to-date and best equipped was endowed by the rich head of a Sufi order in Cairo, Dardamash Pasha, in 1930 at a cost of over $600,000. A native hospital has recently been built in Zahle almost wholly through contributions of Syrian immigrants in America. Small hospitals have risen in Beirut and other cities of the Near East. The status of the native doctors has been enhanced. It is no more the custom to go to the *franji* doctor because he is supposed to be more skilled. In Syria men like Hitti, B'aqlini, Haddad, Khayyat and Rihan are now filling vacancies left by famous missionary doctors who have passed away and who gave the best years of their useful lives for the service of that country.[1] In Egypt men like Ali Abrahim Pasha, the late Mohammed Shaheen Pasha, Tharwat

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[1] At least two Christian Arab women doctors had attained prominence before the war. One is Dr. Anastasia Barakat in Beirut and the other Dr. Anissa Sayba'a in Egypt. The latter, of Syrian decent, was employed as medical inspector in the government schools in Cairo.

Abdul-Khaliq and others, have attained international reputation. For the first time we come across Moslem women nurses and women doctors. Hospitalization is still inadequate in the East but perceptible progress has been made both in hospitalization and sanitation.

In 1927 the Egyptian Governmnet created a *Child Welfare Section*, with provisions for travelling hospitals and about thirty child welfare centers throughout the country. The fellahin women are beginning to take advantage more and more of these facilities. Instructions on child care, feeding and simple hygienic measures are given by visiting nurses and medical officers. The following figures tell a significant story: In 1933 there were 47,622 expectant mothers who attended these centers in Egypt, as compared with 38,575 in 1932, while 227,189 old cases were frequenting these same center in 1933, as compared with 171,785 of the previous year. There were also 45,031 samples of blood taken from pregnant women for Wasserman tests at Public Health Laboratories as compared with 40,605 in 1932.[1]

Iraq affords an interesting field of study in respect to the awakening of social consciousness, for almost all its progress in social reform, sanitation and rural reconstruction has been accomplished very recently, more particularly in the last decade. For we learn on investigation that from 1920 to 1931 the Iraqi nationalists were preoccupied with politics and the struggle to establish the independence of their country. Almost immediately after the Anglo-Iraqi treaty was signed in 1932 evidences of social awakening began to come to the surface. Most of the social legislation of Iraq took place after 1932. Among the masses of people there was corresponding responsiveness and ready adaptation to the new regime. Three main causes are given by an informed correspondent for this general advance of the level of social consciousness in Iraq: the comparatively great progress and diffusion of elementary and secondary education; the increase of the general wealth of the country, hence the increase of Iraqis who could devote time to social betterment and have some means to acquire it, and the influence of the social reforms of neighboring Turkey to the north. This influence was brought to bear on the Iraqis through two main channels—travelers who had visited Turkey and returned to tell about the changes in that country, and the native Arabic press.

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[1] See article by author in *The Open Court*, September, 1932.

Social legislation in Iraq, following already established patterns in democratic and socialistic states, has affected equally the agrarian and the industrial populations.

On the agrarian side the law known as the Law of the Villages and Qasabas (county capitals) has established model villages in Kut, Amarah, Diala, etc. Flowing water and electricity have been brought to hundreds of villages. The law, which has not had sufficient time to prove its effectiveness and efficiency, aims generally at the enhancement of the condition of the Iraqi peasants. This is accomplished through sanitation, such as the establishment of hundreds of dispensaries throughout Iraq, education, through the establishment of elementary and secondary schools in villages which had never had but the simple *maktabs* before, and the encouragement of initiative in social reconstruction. The last is brought about through the agency of a department of municipalities in the Ministry of Interior in Baghdad. The law encourages the creation of village councils, perhaps a conscious adoption of the village soviets in Russia. These councils discuss the various social problems of the village, and the government village teacher takes active part in the discussion and is a member *ex officio* of the council.

A fortunate feature in the agrarian situation of Iraq is the existence of vast *amiriyyah* (crown) lands, which, since the passing of the Turkish regime have reverted to the government. There is a growing sentiment among Iraqi nationalists to try some advanced agrarian reforms with these lands, which are to be developed by government funds loaned to farming families. In some cases, is is contemplated, the collective farm will be tried.

Limitation of the hours of labor, protection of women and children, compensation for injury and vacation with pay are some of the social reforms introduced by the Iraqi Labor Law. Model workers' homes, not apartments, at very modest prices and with water and electrical facilities, have been built in the suburbs of Baghdad and Basra. It is hoped that this phase of labor reform will be gradually extended to other cities in the various *liwas* (districts) of Iraq.

Since 1938 a Ministry of Social Affairs has been created in Iraq, first incumbent of which was Sami Shawkat. The interests of this ministry are varied. Most of the reforms mentioned above, and many others, are implemented by this ministry.

Exemplifying social awakening and initiative among the Iraqi people themselves is the Society of Infant Protection, with extensive membership throughout Iraq. It supplies free milk, in the natural form and imported milk powder, clothes and medicine to the poor. The society has championed "better babies" competitions in Baghdad and other cities. Women are prominent in the membership and management of this society.

Both in Egypt and Iraq the gains of social legislation and the continuity and increase in social consciousness, may be said to be assured through progress made in education, especially where the practical, social implication of curriculum subjects are emphasized. The late king Feisal was chiefly influential in encouraging the study of dietetics, housekeeping and child care in the schools for girls.

The progress of education in Iraq may be indicated from certain statistical figures: The number of government elementary and primary schools in the period of ten years, from 1927-1937, increased from 265 to 726, of which 561 were for boys and 165 for girds. In Baghdad alone the increase was slightly more than triple, from 32 to 106. The increase has been steady throughout the ten years. In number of pupils this has meant an increase from 26,706 to 86,373, and in teachers from 1051 to 2762. The ratio of women students and teachers to that of men has been about one to four. A university founded in Baghdad around 1927 has besides a college of medicine and a college of law, an engineering school, health officials school, nursing and midwife schools. It has also an elementary and primary training college for men, an elementary and primary training college for women, and a higher training college, which has had a precarious existence.

It is in Egypt, however, we find that in education, as well as in other manifestations of social awakening, most progress has been made in an Arab state since its formal independence has been recognized. It may be safely said that Egyptian education began to show signs of vitality and vigor only when Egypt was granted internal autonomy. Egyptians realized this and also realized that the system of education introduced by the British occupants of their country, and known as the *Dunlop System,* was designed mainly for the production of "subaltern officers" who knew how to take and execute commands from their superior officers. This system still prevails in the Sudan.

In 1932 a law was passed in Egypt requiring a bachelor's degree for teachers in the elementary schools, or the corresponding *'alimiyyah* degree from al-Azhar Mosque University. Compulsory and free education has made its advent in Egypt. The Egyptian ministry of education has followed the lines of a definite policy enunciated in the year 1925—namely to make all elementary education in Egypt compulsory with in a period of 20 years. Syria has a similar plan. In 1917 the ratio of literacy in Egypt was still 5%. In 1927, five years after Egypt assumed control of its internal affairs, the literacy ratio advanced to 12%, with 20% for males and 4% for females. In the Governorate of Cairo the ratio is 32%. Night schools have also made their appearance in Egypt with an enrollment for 1935 of 12,000 adult students.

The most successful example of native initiative in higher education is without doubt the Egyptian National University, now known as Fuad University. Founded in the year 1908, this first born of Arab secular universities since the days of Nisabur-Cordoba, had its humble origin as a lecture hall with precarious management and little public response. But since its reorganization after the War and its institution as a state university in 1925 it has shown steady and rapid development. What interests us here is that in the Egyptian university we find science applied for the service of the Egyptian people. Both the liberal and technical branches of the Egyptian university are supplying the government and the people with competent leaders. The following enrollment figures (1934) show a decided trend to psactical and applied sciences: Law 739, of whom 3 were women; science 346, of whom 10 were women; arts 226 men and 19 women; pharmacy 72 men, and the school of nurses 153, all women. For a country preponderantly agricultural the large enrollment in the higher Agricultural School, which is not included in the University, is encouraging. The number of agricultural students of Egypt at the time these figures were published was 1,370. This does not include the large proportion of students sent abroad for specialization in agriculture, among whom many are sent to the University of California.

The Arabic University of Damascus is still in the formative stage, with a school of arts, a law school and a school of medicine.

Recently a movement has been launched in Syria which is an expression of the most advanced and the most uplifting social ideas, and is most eminently suited to the needs of the native population. This movement is known as the "Village Welfare Service," and incorporates many of the features adopted in the social reform programs of the independent Arab states of Egypt and Iraq.

There is a touch of mystical self-negation in the circumstances that led to the inception of this project. It reminds one of the rise of monastic orders in a world torn by doctrinal strife and insatiable selfishness. In the few annual reports of the Village Welfare Service names of sponsers, leaders and active workers are deiberately omitted. The movement took rise in the confines of the American University of Beirut. Its inception was due chiefly to the inspiring leadership of a high-minded science teacher, Prof. Harold W. Close, and a group of devoted pupils consumed with the desire to "do something" for their country.

In its 1936 report the Village Welfare Service gave a general declaration of its principles and objectives:

"1—The countries of the Near East to which students of the university belong are agricultural, rural countries, and the rural population in them represents the overwhelming majority.

"2—While the village is the foundation of the country there is a marked deficiency in the village life in regard to public health, agriculture, physical exercise, home life and social life, all of which are in urgent need of reform.

"3—The lot of the village generally is neglect and disdain from the educated youth. This social obliquity has reached a point where the educated stratum, comprising physicians, pharmacists, lawyers and graduates of high schools and colleges, and even agricultural experts, are crowding the cities and completely abstaining from the life of the village and from work therein.

"4—True patriotism cannot rise on empty noise, but on productive action and silent sacrifice in the cause of social reform, so much needed in the land.

"5—'Nothing scratches thy skin as thy own finger-nail', (quoting an Arabic proverb). The fatal dependence on others to which we have been accustomed all these long years has not been productive of fruitful results. The native sons of the land must attempt their own country's reform, each of us coming forward and doing his share of duty according to his ability."

A plan of action was drawn up and four student missions were organized for work in villages during the summer vacation. About half of the students who attended the conference were young women. One of the groups consisted of women volunteers, two for work in Palestine and one for southern Lebanon. The student workers lived in tents and travelled from village to village on foot. They instructed the peasants in the elementary principles of sanitation, the proper way of raising cattle, selective breeding, pruning fruit trees, grafting, combating of insects, etc. These volunteers paid their own expenses and refused to take anything from the farmers without paying for it. An effective work of these volunteers was the covering up of exposed wells from which villagers drew their drinking water, or of exposed spring pools from which human beings and beasts drank indiscriminately. To make the peasants feel a sense of sharing and of responsibility the volunteers charged a small sum per capita for improvements, modern impliments or imported nursery trees.

Medical work receives special attention from the Village Welfare Service. In some villages they found that over 95% of the population were afflicted with tracoma. In the summer of 1935 a doctor and a graduate nurse from the American University of Beirut came to the United States for further study and research, returning to join this movement. A permanent medical centre under the auspices of the Village Welfare Service has been established on the borders of Lebanon and Buqa'.

In a country where religion, education, social improvement and medical work have been so largely given as charity by the native church or the missionaries, the object lesson of the Village Welfare Service is of utmost importance and significance. The people had been taught to look to their governments or their religious leaders for help and guidance until the spirit of initiative and self-reliance was almost atrophied. For many decades before the war literally hundreds of thousands in Syria depended for their livelihood upon money sent them by immigrant members of their families in the United States, the republics of South America or other centres of Syrian immigration. Over ten million dollars, it was estimated, poured into Syria from this source. The good which this inflow of easy gold did to the country hardly compensated for the moral harm. The Village Welfare Service is carrying out in a modern, efficient and scientific manner the spirit of a wise Arabic saying in which God addresses man: "Arise, my servant, that I may rise with thee."

Important as the direct help the Village Welfare Service has rendered, the effect of its example on the larger community has been as important, if not more. In a certain rural district near Damascus the volunteers were working among peasants who were tenants of an influential landowner. They had serious misgivings about the attitude of this feudal lord whose family for generations had exercised complete authority over their tenants. How great was the surprise of the volunteers, when having pitched their tents and started their work, the landowner himself came with his wife and remonstrated with them for their failure to visit him and seek his help.

"I know what you think," he said to the group leader. "You were afraid that I would oppose any effort to improve the condition of my tenants and to have them learn the elements of reading and writing lest their eyes be opened and they would begin to make more demands on me. But those days are gone. We now realize that the prosperity of our peasants is our own gain, and they are entitled to their rights."

An aspect of this movement holds promise of far-reaching results. In the fall of 1937 Afif Tannous, one of the founders of this movement and its general director, came to the United States to further his studies in the agrarian cooperative organizations and allied subjects at St. Lawrence and Cornell Universities. It is hoped that before Mr. Tannous goes back to resume his work in Syria the fire of his contagious zeal will kindle the hearts and fire the imagination of many of his countrymen, enlisting them in the support of this worthy cause. To many Arabs here and abroad nationalism is principally associated in their minds with political emancipation from the West. It is just as truly, and just as urgently, an emancipation from ignorance, dirt, disease and poverty.

Looking back over the ground we have covered, we see gradually emerging before us, as a scene from behind the mist, a picture that is both heroic and pathetic. It is the picture of a proud people with a glorious past struggling to regain a foothold on life's upward climb. The struggle is heightened as much by the poignancy of misunderstanding that confronts it from foe and friend alike, as by the almost superhuman difficulties that beset the awakened Arabs in their determined struggle. So much is at stake for them, so much more than liberation from the bonds of economic domination of predatory Western exploiters. One can only bow in silent revenerce before a people who a few decades ago prized their indolent comfort above all considerations, and to whom the welfare of the community or national destiny were meaningless words.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

ON THE SPIRITUALITY OF THE EAST

In the previous pages we have known the Arabs after a fashion, from the height of Pisgah, where the layout of the land could be seen in a sweeping vision, against the setting of world affairs. For a more intimate understanding a closer view is necessary.

For whether it is Arab nationalism, imperialism, world trade or socialism in their wider aspects, to understand any problem of life is to discover its spiritual bearing. It is not merely to "explain" it by its economic connotations, but to reflect on the meaning of economics itself, the relation of the material life to the cravings of the soul. It is to comprehend the things that count for man that "liveth not by bread alone," to relegate to their proper place the things that men apparently fight for, and discover the things for which men are willing to lay down their lives.

The cataclysmic changes now taking place in the East, a bird's eye view of which in the Arab lands we have had thus far, must first be understood in their proper context and philosophic import before they are understood at all. To study Arab nationalism in the last analysis is to study the spirituality of the Arabs.

Various and repeated attempts have been made to fathom the spirituality of the East, some more profound than others, some more sweeping, some more penetrating, but not always critical. Evidence of this one finds on every hand when East and West are contrasted. Thus certain concepts have come to be wrongly applied to make this contrast and distinction, concepts which, by dint of repetition have assumed a sense of finality and undisputed authority. We will examine some of them here in an effort to arrive at a more critical definition and appraisal of the spirituality of the East, of which the Arab lands are part.

One of these concepts is *idealism,* an application of which to the East is indiscriminately and uncritically made. It is almost a universally accepted view that Easterners or Orientals are idealistic, and that Westerners, by contrast, are materialistic. In a critical sense idealism may be applied to some peoples of the East more than others. Of the Arabs, as of the Chinese, it is not quite true without straining the meaning of idealism out of its accepted sense.

Strictly speaking idealism is the philosophic outlook or interpretation of life which lays emphasis on concepts rather than on experience, or rather which holds that experience and reality follow certain a priori, universal and necessary ideas. The fundamental thesis of idealism is that mind is attuned to reality, logic to fact, and therefore, is capable of leading us into truth.

In this sense idealism differs from the popular interpretation of the word as an aspiration for something that ever eludes as it ever leads us onward and upward. One may be an idealist in the critical sense of the word and not an idealist in the popular one, and vice versa. Opposed to idealism two concepts usually came to mind —materialism and realism. Without entering into niceties of philosophic distinctions we may generally say that materialism is a denial of the rationality of the universe, or perhaps more accurately that this rationality has no necessary connection with man's ultimate destiny or vocation as a spiritual being. In fact it begs the spirituality of man altogether. Realism, however, would limit the spirituality of man to the sphere of experience. It would make experience, in its widest sense, the guide to reality. Generally speaking the Arabs are realists in this sense of the word.

The Arabs were not and have not been given to ideas and ideation. On the whole they distrusted ideas and the guidance of the intellect, and placed undue emphasis on intuition, wisdom and experience. While few speculative thinkers of the first magnitude arose among them, they have produced some of the world's greatest sages and moral teachers. Their best literature, whether in the days of the Old Testament and Babylonian psalms or those of Islamic ascendency, is wisdom literature or lyrical poetry, the latter being the quintessence of experience in rythmic expression. To the Arabs, or the Hebrews before them, ideas are true or false in so far as they conform to inner experience measured by the standards of intuition, not in so far as thew conform to abstract concepts and logical syllogisms. The philosophies of the Semitic East have always been *ways* of life, not *theories* about life. The myths which to other races had intrinsic or symbolic values as *explanations* of the origin of things and the workings of the natural forces, became to the Semitic mind *parables* of nature illustrating some moral principle.

It is quite amazing to see how many writers ascribe idealism to all the East alike without realizing that it applies to certain "Easts" and not to others. Many Arab writers who speak of their East as idealistic are borrowing an uncritical usage by Western writers who apply sweeping terms of idealism and spirituality to all the East alike. An illustration of this may be taken from an article by 'Abbas Mahmoud al-'Aqqad, in which he displays a confusion of concepts. He speaks of the West as producing "on one hand capitalistic materialism and on the other communism," both of which he calls materialistic in nature. In fact, both are idealistic and both could never have come about as expressions of a philosophy based primarily on experience. They are decidedly systems of social philosophy or economics based on definite and pronounced ideas.

There is an idealism the obverse of which is materialistic, and a materialism the essence of which is more akin to what is popularly known as idealism. We of modern America can understand and appreciate this. For it is idealism that today sounds the keynote of its marvelous industrialism. In the popular sense of the word as represented in the development of industry and the spirit of adventure idealism has been the inspiration that led to the settlement of the western states. But it is equally true that idealism in the critical sense of the word, as represented in the advancement of science and the systems of social behavior and economics, made our present *material* prosperity possible.

Whenever I hear people speak of the "materialism of America" or of our "materialistic" Western civilization, I cannot help but say to myself, "Here is more loose talk about idealism and materialism!" For only a little critical thinking would convince one that we in America, or we of the modern Western world, are suffering not from an overdose of materialism—I wish to God we were!—but from an overdose of idealism wrongly prescribed. It is not materialism that stands today between peoples of the Western world and the fulfillment of a nobler and spiritually richer destiny, but a *perverse* idealism that has left its moorings and is drifting aimlessly in a sea of false concepts. Nazism, communism and half a dozen other isms under which the world is groaning today are systems of ideas—an idealism gone haywire. It is an idealism that has lost contact with the realities of life. And as in the West the great failing has been unbalanced idealism, so in the Arab lands the great failing has been stagnant realism that touches on crass materialism.

An old Moslem theologian of Tripoli, Syria, once said to me that Easterners were "gluttons of materialism," by which he must have meant gluttons of realism that turned materialistic. In the same vein a Chinese thinker, Hu Shih, decries the vaunted idealism or spirituality of China when he reproachfully asks: "What spirituality is there in a civilization which tolerates such a terrible form of slavery as the 'ricksha coolie'?" etc.[1]

It is a long and complicated discussion, that of determing the causes of the decline of the East or the failure of the West. There may be many causes, some fundamental and some contributory; but underlying all, one may detect a major and fundamental cause—the lack of proper correlation between realism and idealism, each of which developed independently is capable of great havoc.

Less often the East is spoken of as mystical—a very mischievous word. In contrast the West is spoken of as practical or realistic. Volumes have been written about mysticism, leaving the reader as perplexed and unenlightened as before. The common expression that something is mystifying bears testimony to this confusion in the minds of most people on mysticism, which has nothing to do with mysteries or mystification. On the contrary, mysticism is a contemplative or intuitional striving after the simple and essential realities of life and of the universe, stripped of all the impediments of sense or reason. In general two distinct types of mysticism have developed in the East and West alike—speculative and psychological.

Speculative mysticism may be defined as an immediate and intuitive perception of reality, a way of escape from the dreary emphasis on dogmatic and ritualistic religion. Psychological mysticism is a turning away completely from and a distrust of speculative theology or philosophy in an effort to extricate the perplexed soul from the nexus of reason and logic. One is a sort of super-metaphysics, the other a super-human leap into the realm of ineffable spiritual experience. It is important for our purpose to distinguish between the two types, for one of these two types is characteristic of the Semitic people of the Arab lands, while the other is quite foreign to their nature. Both types have their values. Speculative mysticism brings more intellectual honesty and initiative of thinking, depth and vision into the realm of arid, sterile intellectualism. Both in Christianity and in Islam the writings of such speculative mystics as Swedenborg and Ibn al-Arabi were great contributions to a clear insight into the very essence of religion. Psychological mysticism, on the other hand, keeps the goal of reality clear by insisting on spiritual experience, rather than spiritual knowledge—gnosis.

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[1] *Whither Mankand* p. 28.

Both also have their dangers and disadvantages. Speculative mysticism becomes so convinced of its deeper, more profound insight of religious truth, that, Narcissus-like, its conception of reality turns into dogmas and doctrines which differ little from the ones from which it had recoiled. Psychological or practical mysticism is so suspicious of the guidance of reason that its way of life degenerates into empty symbols, puerile ceremonies and meaningless rituals. History of mysticism in Islam—Sufism—amply illustrates this process in the degeneration of once great schools of moral intuition and discipline into dervish orders centered around empty ceremonies of dancing and singing, fantastic display of ecstacy artificially induced. The whirling dervish became a term of approbrium deservedly applied to those orders.

Man has not yet reached, in his rational thinking or roundness and soundness of experience, a stage where he can translate ideas into experience or experience into ideas as readily as one would do with a geometric equation. For this reason no system of philosophy is complete and no school of mysticism in itself is all-sufficient and satisfying.

It is obvious that while ideas are not in themselves realities, and could never be mistaken for such, they are our most convenient keys to reality, the "Open

Sesame" which we carry about with us, without weighting ourselves down with the burden of reality wherever we go. Like paper currency, they save us the cumbersome inconvenience of barter and exchange, and like paper currency, too, they are worthless unless backed by the gold of experience. To conceive of the possibility of a system of speculation that spurns and repudiates ideas without itself using ideas is a self-contradiction.

While both types of mysticism developed among Arab Moslems, psychological mysticism was more kindred to the Semitic mind and expressed itself in most beautiful and sublime religious literature. This is also true of the Hebrews at the height of their spiritual development as portrayed in the psalms and prophecies of the Old Testament. Both in the matchless, fervid poetry and spiritual exultation of the psalmist and in the subtle psychological analyses of spiritual states and moods of the Moslem Sufis, it was the pychological approach to religious truth at which the Semitic mind proved most adept. Probably the Moslem Sufis of the formative period between the 8th and 12th centuries were the world's greatest psychologists of religion. As early as the 10th century it was evident that the psychological school of Abu-Qasim al-Junayd, and not that of a wild and speculative mystic as al-Hallaj or Abu-Yazid al-Bistami, was to dominate the mystical thought of Islam. It was this school which in turn influenced the great al-Ghazali, author of the famous summa of Moslem theology known as the *Revivification of the Sciences of Religion* (*Ihya 'Ulum al-Din.*)

This great Moslem theologian, known to the schoolmen of the Middle Ages as Algozel, rendered a distinct service to Islam at a time when it was spiritually and politically at a low ebb. For through his wealth of mystical lore and his keen philosophical insight he infused the dry and conventional theology of his day with a refreshing spirit. His *Revivication* was in truth a spiritualization of the traditional sciences of Islamic theology—*tradition,* exegisis and the sciences of disputation. The process by which al-Ghazali performed this alchemy consisted essentially of finding a deeper, which in reality meant a more human and psychologically sounder, sense behind the apparent sense of the *tradition* or the Qoran. It was the method of al-Junayd and his school, which accepted the traditional materials and worked them into more subtle and spiritual creations.

Tackling the same subjects that other Moslem theologians had tacked before him, al-Ghazali showed a prodigous capacity to discover interpretations undreamt of by his predecessors, and some of which have never been excelled and have a modern ring to them when read even in our age and generation. He divided his great work into four *Quarters* (*Rub*‘) one dealing with worship (prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, etc.), one dealing with ethics or practical theology, one dealing with "the destructives" (evils and the desires that lead to them) and one dealing with "the deliverers" (virtues or antidotes for the "destructives." Throughout the pages of his voluminous *summa* it is the psychologist in al-Ghazali which surprisingly strikes our modern fancy and interest, and not strictly the theologian. In this respect it would be a most fruitful endeavor to compare al-Ghazali's *summa* with that of the great Christian thologian, Thomas Aquinas, who came over a century and a half later.

How psychologically keen and accurate and how refreshingly modern to our ears al-Ghazali sounds today, may be surmised from the following condensed translation, taken from the early pages of his first quarter, dealing with learning and the duties of the teacher and pupil:

> "The first office (duty) of the teacher is compassion towards the learners, to treat them as he would treat his children. Said the Messenger of God: 'Verily I am to you as the parent is to his proginy. It is for him to be intent on saving them from the fire of the Last Day, which is more important than the saving by the parents of their children from the worldly fire. . . . The second office is to imitate the lawgiver (Mo-

hammed) in not asking any reward for teaching, or seeking praise therefrom, but to teach unto the countenance of God, and in desire of His proximity, not to feel in himself that he is doing them (pupils) a favor, but to take the view that they are doing him the favor. For theirs is the favor if they cultivate their hearts. For to draw near unto God through sowing learning therein is like unto one who lends you the soil to sow therein for yourself. . . . The third office is to begrudge no counsel to the learner, in that he should prevent him from putting himself out to attain a rank (in learning) before he has deserved it, from occupying himself with some esotoric knowledge before he has mastered the obvious. . . . The fourth office, which is an intricate point in the art of pedagogy, is to restrain the learner from evil habits by way of allusion, as much as possible, and not openly, through mercy not rebuke. For openness rends the veil of respect and breeds boldness. . . . The fifth office is for the teacher in charge of a science not to disparage in the soul of the learner the other sciences. . . . The sixth office is to limit oneself to the understanding of the learner; not to offer him that which his mind has not attained, thus shying him away or befuddling his mind, etc."

Referring particularly to this chapter in the Ihya G. F. Moore once said to this author its translation would be "an eye-opener to many Americans." It is gratifying to learn that one of Prof. Hitti's colleagues and former students, Dr. Nabih Faris, is working on a full translation of the *Ihya*, which would prove a rich mine of spiritual wisdom. It will also prove that, because al-Ghazali was not as critical in his approach, nor metaphysical in his interest, as he was subtle in the analysis and evaluation of religious experience, his *summa* leaves much to be desired. Side by side with the deepest wisdom, and on the same page one finds scores of traditional superstitions repeated with the unawareness of a simple, uncritical believer.

Much has been written, especially by English orientalists on al-Ghazali and Sufism. A general survey of this literature, however, leaves one with the impression that altogether too much importance has been attached to the speculations of the Sufis, and not enough to their moral teachings, impregnated with spiritual insight. Perhaps that is what the late head of all the

Sufi orders of Egypt, Sayyid Abdul-Hamid al-Bakri, meant when he once told this author that Islam is in need of modern Western psychologists who would apply their scholarship to a fresh study of Sufism. I said to his eminence that it would be more feasible to start with modern Sufis who are steeped in the literature of the great masters and have them acquire modern psychology and apply it to the material they know as no others could.

We appreciate the influence of Sufism on Islam, and on the whole culture of the Moslem world, upon discovering that almost all the great poets of Persia were Sufis, or thoroughly impregnated with Sufism. This is true even of Omar Khayyam, who could not be called a Sufi, but who shows in many of his quatrains decided influence of the Sufis. In our own times the writings of Gibran K. Gibran were definitely and thoroughly influenced by Sufism. Gibran was a great admirer and constant reader of the Sufis, and was said to be an authority on Ali, whom the Sufis claim as their spiritual progenitor.

It is in the general realm of religion, or spirituality, that we encounter the worst confusion in the contrasing generalizations about East and West. And here again we find ideas and values applied surreptitiously to one part of the East because they prevail in another. The East is thus sweepingly characterized as spiritual without any effort at a critical evaluation of this spirituality or at a definition of its component factors.

Spirituality is a relative term and no people, not even savages, could be altogether devoid of it. It is of the very essence of all culture and all human achievements. The peoples of the East are spiritual, as are the peoples of the West. There are distinctions, however, in spirituality not only in extent but also in variety. Perhaps we can make this clear if we ask ourselves what spirituality is. Does it mean devotion to things of the spirit in excessive or utter disregard of the body and things pertaining thereto? Or does it mean the development of the spirit through cultivation of spiritual values, through discipline of the emotions and will? The distinction is not an academic one. The former, which is usually accompanied by the view that matter is unreal and the body impure, is a spiritual philosophy. The later, which gives due place to the body and its fundamental needs, and has an uncanny faith in things material, is spiritual *art,* a way of life. Hindus and Greeks at certain stages of their histories followed the former, the Semitic people, preeminently, followed the latter. Theology flourished in the one, religion, spiritual and moral experience, in the other. In the prophetic teachings of the Old Testament, as in the teaching of Jesus of Nazereth or of Mohammed there is just enough theology to hang thereupon the moral precepts of those great teachers and seers. In Hinduism, Pauline and Patristic Christianity there is just enough ethics to illustrate the doctrinal and sacramental dogmas of their respective theologies.

Even allowing for the materialistic and practical nature of all primitive religions, reflected in the early history of the Hebrew people, one is impressed by the humanistic and pragmatic interpretation of religion, even at the height of their development.

Not only in the primitive folk-tales of Abraham, Issac and Jacob do we find the "bargaining" quality in the relations between Jehovah and his chosen people, but also in the most sublime of the Psalms, in the quasi-theological book of Job, as well as in the major and minor prophets themselves. The promise of earthly rewards, long life and worldly hapiness is almost always linked with righteousness and piety. We are all familiar with the story of Jacob and the dream he saw at Bethel on his way to his uncle Laban. H. G. Wells remarks:

> "Other races and peoples have imagined diverse and fitful and marvelous Gods, but it was the trading Semites who first began to think of God as a Righteous Dealer, whose promises are kept, who failed not the humblest creditor, and called to

account every spurious act."[1]

On a higher plane of religious evolution, when the Hebrew prophets began to conceive of Jehovah not only as the God of the chosen people of Israel but of all peoples of the inhabitable earth, this human element is sublimated and universalized. The Hebrew theology as developed by their great prophets, particularly the Second Isaiah, was a theology inspired by a deathless faith rooted in the heart of man. The suffering Messiah was in truth the suffering Judah who, in the face of the most baffling and discouraging catastrophes that defied all rationalization, clung to Jehovah unto the bitter end. This theology reached its highest peak in an utterance of Job—"Though he slay me, yet will I believe in him!"

In the gospels, where already non-Semitic theological ideas disparaging human nature and the world had made their incursion on Palestinian Judaism, this simple, practical view of spirituality is not lost sight of. In a deeper sense than usually appreciated Christ was the fulfiller and perfector of the Laws and the Prophets—of their spiritual humanity or human spirituality. We find Jesus living a normal, not an ascetic, life, eating and drinking with sinners. An illuminating passage in the Gospels makes Jesus reply to some of his carping critics that whereas "John (the Baptist) came neither eating nor drinking, and they say, He hath a devil, the Son of Man came eating and drinking, and they say, Behold a man gluttonous and a winebibber, a friend of the publicans and sinners." Paraphrasing this in our own language, we may imagine Jesus saying to his critics: "John came to you with a foreign gospel of asceticism, and you stamped it as incompatible with your practical Semitic nature and mentality. Why then do you condemn me, who, like the rest of your prophets, did eat and drink and walk the way of all sane men; whose religious teachings did not arise from a dualistic conflict between spirit and matter, between this world and the world to come?"

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[1] *Outline of History,* p. 411.

Considering that Jesus lived in an age when the Jews were subjugated by an overwhelmingly superior power, when a superhuman savior, Messiah, was expected to come in a miraculous manner to deliver God's people, the practical universality and sanity of the Nazarene loom far above his eschatological utterances. For the cornerstone of the teachings of Jesus, when all is said and done, is love of God and love of our fellow men, as God's children. The late Dean W. W. Fenn, of the Harvard Divinity School once said that some day Jesus will be recognized as the discoverer of the law of love, just as Newton is recognized as the discoverer of the law of gravitation. The Harvard divine, who was heir to a rich human tradition of religion, thoroughly understood the mind of Jesus as an objective and realistic scholar would.

> "The point of prime importance," said Fenn, "where one is dealing with this deepest experience of Jesus, is the sort of man in whom it is found. And the realism of Jesus is the best surety for his idealism. . . . So, quite in the spirit of the Hebrew prophets who were his spiritual predecessors, he ascribed his thought and feeling to God and in God's name spoke as God's prophet."[1]

It has been repeatedly pointed out that whereas the Hebrew prophets arrived at monotheism through the uniformity and universalization of the principles of Justice, the contemporary Greek philosophers arrived at the same monotheism through the concept of the unity of the universe. To Xenophones God was The One, the noumenal unity through a universe of diverse phenomena; to Aristotle he was the first or causeless cause. To the Hebrew prophets or to Jesus of Nazareth, God was the companion and the father of man, an idealization on a sublime scale of the best and truest in human nature.

A little over six hundred years later, another prophet, so different, yet in many respects like Jesus, rose in the wide and open spaces of the Arabian Desert. And here again we see that pragmatic quality of religion, the humanistic interpretation of things spiritual, asserting itself in the natural habitat of the Semitic race—Arabia.

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[1] *The Theological Method of Jesus,* p. 68.

Islam was a reversion to the pragmatic and humanistic gospel of the Semitic mind. It was a return to a simple unitarianism closely linked to the moral nature of God and of man. Salvation in Islam again centered around good conduct, virtue, and compassion. In the prevailing Christianity of that time it had wandered far away from that simple concept into one completely foreign to the Semitic mind.

The Significance of Islam does not lie in the monotheism which Mohammed taught his unlettered followers, the concept of paradise which he conjured for their sensuous fancies, or the borrowed doctrines of fatalism, predestination and absolute submission to the will of Allah. It lies in the life of the prophet and his *suhabah,* companions, which became the *sunna,* traditional law of the faithful, humane teachings of the Qoran, the considerate laws which it promulgated for the followers of the Prophet. In these things the humane genius of a Hammurabi, the moral sterness of an Amos, the healing benignity of a Hosea, are seen marching on to newer victories from Yathrib and Mecca, from the original home of all the Semites.

In short the Arabs are as religious or spiritual, as the Hindus, Greeks or Germans; but their religion tends to the practical and ethical rather than to the speculative and theological. When Christ was questioned by the Sadducees about the life hereafter, he simply pointed out that God was the God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob. He placed the evidence of immortality on experience, not on rational considerations. God was the God of the living, not of the dead. Could God have any significance to those who experience Him not? Similarly when Arab doubters came to Mohammed to ask him about the soul, he dismissed the whole baffling enigma by saying, "The soul is my Lord's concern." The great Gautama Buddha is said to have given a similar answer when asked about the soul by one of his favorite pupils.

The Semitic people, in the realm of the spirit—in religion, art or literature—flew a middle course. Their spiritualism was touched with the saving grace of practical materialism. their materialism was redeemed by an inward gravitation to the deep and elemental cravings of the spirit. If one were to sum up the dominating characteristic of the Semitic people one could think of no better or more fitting description than to call them the *spiritual pragmatists* of the world.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

THE MIDDLE TERM OF HUMANITY

It was not an historical accident that the three religions which had the most profound influence on the present civilization of the world sprang from the hearts of shepherds, peasants and caravan men of the Semitic race. It was the essence of their variegated experiences, the result of deep reflection upon the essential and relevant realities of life. Under a serene blue sky and with physical environments conducive to a life of sufficiency and leisure, the Semitic peoples had time to reflect. They reflected and applied their reflection to their every day life and the life thereafter by analogy. Their pragmatism and realism sprang largely from this physical environment. It was an *adequate* philosophy which explained the distant realities of life in terms of realities nearer at hand. The biblical ideal of life, in which each is pictured to be "under his vine tree and under his fig tree" was also an ideal condition of life which kindly nature seemed to have bestowed on its "favoured sons." This is particularly true of that part which bordered the Mediterranean Sea and turned its back against the bleak, forbidding rigors and privations of the desert.

The "spiritual pragmatism" which in the last chapter we found to characterize the Semitic peoples of the

Arab lands, also made them the natural mediators between peoples of extreme types of civilization—between the nullifying spirituality of India and the unrelated speculation of Greece. It made of them the interpreters of humanity to humanity, and the world's foremost missionaries.

The expression, "a bridge between three continents," applied to Syria has been used frequently in a narrow, physical sense. In a deeper sense that country, predominantly, and others of the Fertile Crescent, are a "spiritual bridge." The peoples of those lands, fittingly and properly, may be called *The Middle Term of Humanity.*

By a curious process of reasoning and false analogies, or mistaken mental asociations, the Semitic inhabitants are often either pushed too far eastward into an Orient to which they do not belong, or pulled into the orbit of a Western domination inimical to their true destiny.

Through Christianity, the influence of the Semitic East attained a universality in the Western world which left its deepest impress on all institutions and phases of Western civilization and life. The origin of this influence, again because of its association with Christianity, is so easily forgotten and overlooked. There is no difficulty in the minds of Westerners in tracing the origin of the Western epic, drama or sculpture to Greece, to Homer, Sophocles or Phidias. But because Christianity to most Westerners is God-inspired and transcending all mundane considerations, we forget the influence of an Hammurabi, an Isaiah or a Jesus on Western concepts of ethics and law, affecting as they do every aspect of daily life and routine. We fail to recognize the close similarity, despite distance of space and time, between American puritanism and the Old Testament, between English non-conformism and Arab moral indigation.

Also, through Islam, the Semitic infiuence of the Arabs, extended eastward through Persia into India and China, even into the Malays and the Philippine

Islands. In a religious sense a whole new world, a vast empire, was annexed to Islam. But this annexation was not lasting, and in time the non-Arab constituencies of Islam separated and followed their own local and racial destinies. Yet the close association and interactions through centuries of Arab and non-Arab Islamic nations influenced Arab Moslems and their culture as much as Islam influenced the Mongol or Hindu life and culture. To the present day, in literature, in certain manners and institutions, even in food and dress, we notice this influence in the Arab lands. The Arabs, albeit, are no more akin to Mongols or Hindus than they are to the Germans and English. The religions of the Semites, whether Christianity or Islam, helped in unifying many peoples of diverse origins, but also took the local color of the convert races.

By the time Islam came on the scene the *urban* centres of Syria and Egypt—the centres through which culture and civilization are usually transmitted from generation to generation—had become thoroughly Hellenized, whereas, as Hitti points out in his history, the great mass of the Semitic inhabitants had clung to their native Semitic culture. With the Islamic conquest a spiritual "chemical process" was set in motion with far-reaching consequences. The Arabs found it so easy to assimilate the Semitic populations of these countries, and to be assimilated by them. Through this population, too, they were able to assimilate the Byzantine or Hellenic civilization which for centuries had pervaded all the lands that we now call Arab lands or the Arab world. A similar process was taking place in the Eastern wing of the Moslem empire, where the Semitic population of Iraq was acting as a medium of transmission and assimilation between the Iranean and Hindu cilvilizations on one hand and the Arab invaders on the other. It was the Christian Semitic sectarians—particularly Jacobites, Nestorians, Copts—who made the advent of Islam into the Semitic countries a comparatively easy and peaceful conquest. And it was from among those sectarians that the first translators of Greek and Persian works of medicine, philosophy and literature were made.

By their own native instincts as world traders and caravaneers, and because of their comparative lack of a cultural background in their original habitat, the Arabian Peninsula, the Arabs of the Islamic invasion and of the Middle Ages became the world's greatest and most logical assimilationists of their time. Hitti who finds that the Arabs "in a larger measure than the Jews have preserved the characteristic features and mental traits of the (Semitic) family," also quotes another authority to show that they were greater assimilationists "than any stock before or since."[1]

The mediatory and humanistic characteristics of the Arabs were commented upon by many orientalists and thinkers. Of especial interest, because it comes from one whose study of the Arabs was incidental, is the recent testimony of an anthropologist, the late George Dorsey.

Whatever may be the private opinions held by the author of that stupendous and stirring book, *Man's Own Show—Civilization,* Dorsey eloquently demonstrated that the Arabs were the world's great empiricists in science, and the world's great humanizers. His penetrating understanding of the Arabs and of Arab genius, for one who is not primarily an orientalist, is almost uncanny.

> "Christian writers," said Dorsey, "in their zeal to 'civilize' the savage world might learn a lesson by pondering what might have happened to civilization had there been no savages to save it after the Christian fathers and their savage German converts had done their best to destroy it."[2]

In the above passage Dorsey was speaking of the Arabs, and the role they played in the revival of learning in Europe, and particularly of the refreshing sense of realism and practical sanity which they introduced

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1. P. K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs,* pp. 4, 8 and 153.
2. *Man's Own Show—Civilization, pp.* 639-640.

in the Western world. The special contribution of the Arabs, Dorsey rightly recognized, was in *empirical* science. To quote again:

> "The Renaissance of Art in Italy blinded us to the Renaissance of Science in Spain. For it was to Spain, to Seville, Toledo, and especially to great Cordova, capital of science, that students went to sit at the feet of the only masters of science then in Europe."[1]

Dorsey speaks of the Arabs as the first "chemotherapists," another evidence of their natural trend to empiricism in their scientific outlook. Dr. Max Meyerhof of Cairo, authority on Arab medicine, sums up the legacy of Islam in the science of medicine by saying that it was the legacy of Greece "increased by many additions mostly practical."[2]

> "There was psychological stuff," writes Hocking, "in the tribesmen of Mohammed and Khalid which enabled them to take the position of masters of arts, recognizing greatness of a great heritage and doing with it something better than faithful transmission."[3]

It is because they were imbued with this "psychological stuff" that the Arabs were eminently able to understand other philosophies, to assimilate the heritage which fell to them, and to do something with it "better than faithful transmission."

In this aspect of their development and of their contributions to civilization the Arabs, with greater freedom and felicity than in the case of the post-exilic Jews themselves, were the logical successors of the Hebrew prophets and Talmudists. For the Hebrew prophetic tradition, with its intense humanism, was greatly handicapped by a narrow Jewish nationalism which seemed to belie the universalism of the prophets. Christianity, centering around the figure of the Nazarene, carried forth the torch of Semitic spirituality. At its start, however, Christianity was faced with this paradox: before it could become universal it had to be *Hellenized.* it had to subordinate its Semitic ethical message to the concept of the Logos, and to adapt itself to the frantic desire for an assurance of immortality. Thus St. Paul, who desired to know among his followers "only Christ and him crucified" shifted the centre of gravity in Christianity from the Sermon on the Mount to the cross that was lifted up on Golgotha. Attracted first by its message of salvation, however, Christians came to admire and to assimilate the great practical truths of the Gospel of the Nazarene.

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[1] Ibid., p. 645.

[2] *The Legacy of Islam, p.* 344.

[3] *The Spirit of World Politics, p.* 448.

The Jews, in the meantime, driven to cover and bearing on their frightened faces the marks of a people accused of the murder of Christ, began to spin and respin the wisdom of their Talmud in weird designs that lost their original universal appeal and were fraught with particularistic traditions and fanciful superstitions which this harrowed people fondly hugged to its bosom.[1]

The conquest of Islam again brought the Semitic spirit into ascendancy. A prophet with sword in hand led a *jihad* against the infidel world and cleared away the jungle of theological syllogisms, religious rites and values that had become hollow mockery. From the standpoint of the progress of thought it is significant that theological knowledge in Islam was no longer the monopoly of an hierarchal class set aside from the human herd by the laying of hands and the mumbling of a sacramental formula. As there was no celibacy in Islam so there was no priesthood and no priestly knowledge that was distinct and different from any other form of knowledge.

Because of this unity of knowledge and faith in the substratum of human experience, it was possible for the Moslem theologians and thinkers to invade Greek philosophy and exploit it more properly and freely, and more intelligently, than even the Hellene inheritors of that same philosophy. Greek philosophy began to be discussed by Arab orthodox scholastics and Arab heretics alike in the mosque and in secular schools with an academic freedom unequalled even in our modern days of vaunted intellectual freedom. Dr. George Sarton sums it up when he says:

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[1] See Lewis Browne, *Stranger than Fiction.*

> "The immense cultural importance of Islam lies in the fact that it brought finally together the two great intellectual streams which had flown independently in ancient times. . . . . Now for the first time in the history of the world, Semitic religion and Greek knowledge actually combined in the minds of many."[1]

And thus what the Jews could not do except furtively and as persecuted radicals, agnostics, atheists and nihilists, and often with confused judgment and a strange mixture of narrow nationalism and radical universalism, the Arabs did in the face of the sun.

While fully realizing that Islam incorporated into itself foreign elements, and that many of its most prominent builders and heroes were not Arabs racially, it must be said that it did this not by an artificial process of borrowing and accretion, but by a vital one of *assimilation*. Their philosophy of life was by its very nature universal. It had the capacity to assimilate whatever elements it neded from the outside, and by an inward process to make them parts of itself.

This explains a feature of their conquests and colonization of other peoples that has attracted the comments of many historians. We refer to the ease and naturalness with which the Arabs fused with the peoples they conquered, intermarrying with them and in time losing their own identity among them. But before doing so they left those subject peoples more ardent Moslems than the apostles of Islam themselves, more enthusiastic admirers of the Arab spirit than sons of the desert. As Dorsey put it:

> "The Moslems not only came, saw and conquered; they remained to intermarry with the 'natives' and be conquered. They planted Islam's seed deep in the soil."[2]

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1. *History of Science and the New Humanism,* p. 97.
2. *Man's Own Story, Civilization, p.* 644.

The process of assimilation that went on for centuries in the Arab lands was also a process of universalization that levelled national and racial barriers before it. The Semitic people, unlike the Hindus and Chinese, or the Germans and Slavs, lived on the cross-roads of the march of humanity. In such an environment that almost excluded national seclusion and security, it is difficult to see how a "tough idiosyncrasy," which Prof. Hocking rightly considers as one of the essential conditions of a national culture, can be fully developed. This has been accomplished by identifying the racial and national peculiarties and idiosyncrasies with tenets of a universal religion which the Arabs proceeded to conceive as applicable to and binding on all mankind. They repeated a process by which the Jews before them had managed to preserve a culture both universal and particular. Yahweh, discredited in Judah, became the Lord of all the nations; Christ crucified in Jerusalem became the Savior of Mankind. Likewise Mohammed sent to preach the One God to the Arabs of Qureish, to arouse the moral insensibilities of a mercantile aristocracy and of incessantly warring tribesmen, became a "guidance to the worlds." The Arabs, breaking the bounds of their desert-hemmed terrain, repeated in their conquests of the Byzantine-Iranian world what the Jews had done under their Babylonian-Roman subjugation. They identified their nationalism with their religion, which subconsciously and tenaciously they conceived of as the one and only religion for all men and all time. In this way they felt justified and reconciled with themselves in borrowing from nations embracing their religion elements that were totally lacking in their own culture, or foreign to their Semitic genius. At the same time they required of their converts to adopt their peculiar traditions as universal. The only difference between the Arabs and the Jews in this respect was that the former did, through conquest, impose their language and religion on other nationalities, while the Jews did not. What was universal in

Yahweh and the Bible became the heritage of the Gentiles. But in Islam Arabic became the medium for the transmission of Greek, Persian and Hindu cultures—philosophy, science, literature and art—the while it was the sacred tongue of the Qoran. Arabic literature and lore received an unction of universality. The naivete with which some Arab reactionaries today assume that so many foreign elements in Islam are inherent to it is surpassed only by the naivete of the view that the Qoran itself is not a product of a particular race, the outcome of a particular time and of particular environments, but one that had "descended" on Mohammed from heaven through the mediacy of the archangel Gabriel. Religion has this pretension about it which secular literature does not and cannot claim.

This sense of universalism, this facility and innocence, with which the peoples of the Arab lands "helped themselves" to the particularistic as well as the universal elements in the cultures of their neighbors has led some critics to deny them any culture of their own. Andre Servier, a French writer and avowed apologist for French imperialism asserts that the Arabs lack imagination in their racial make-up, and consequently that they have not been able to produce great art or great literature. "Purely Arab literature," says Servier, "is devoid of all invention. The imaginative element apparent in certain works, such as the Arabian Nights is of foreign origin." Thus Servier "accounts" for what he calls the "utter sterility of the Arabs" in art, literature, science and philosophy.[1]

Servier represents a tendency among some Western orientalists, missionaries and imperialists, to disparage the Arabs racially and to show that the progress made by the Arabs in the Middle Ages was due mostly to non-Arab—Persian, Turkish, Afghani—Moslems. Frankly I do not claim to speak with authority on this subject, in which race and culture conveniently are exchanged and interchanged. But I suspect that in the case of some so-called Persian Moslem philosophers and scientists the place of birth is not sufficient to indicate racial origin. It has to be first established that Abu Hamid al-Ghazali was not only born in Tus, but that his parents were not Arabs who had migrated to Persia and settled there after the Arab invasion. The same could be said of al-Khawarizmi, one of the greatest mathematicians and abstact scientists of his time or any time. We know, however, that some racial Arabs reached heights of eminence in such subjects as philosophy, the theory of music, optics, etc., which required more than "observaiton and realism," to which Servier limits the Arab mentality. Al-Kindi, of the ninth century A.D., was a pure Arab of al-Kindah tribe, and the first of the great Arab or Moslem philosophers. Similarly Ibn Rushd, the Averroes of the Middle Ages, whose influence on the development of philosophy and theology among the scholastics of Europe and on the rise of liberalism, is greater than that of any one single Moslem, was an Arab. He was born in Cordova in the year 1126 A.D., and belonged to the Andalusian period of Moslem rule which gave rise to many a distinguished Arab name. Under the Fatimides of Egypt, an Arab dynasty, science and philosophy also flourished. One of the foremost scientists of all time was Ali al-Hasan Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen), a physicist and mathematician. Born in Basrah c. 956, he was called to Egypt by al-Hakim to regulate the annual flow of the Nile. We are told that almost all Medieval writers on optics base their works on his principal opus, translated into Latin under the title *Opticae thesaurus*.

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[1] *Islam and the Psychology of the Musulman*, p. 12.

Neither did the Arabs lack in imagination, as a careful survey and examination of their literary productions would show. Why the Arabs did not develop the drama, or why their epic remained on the plane of the semi-poetic narrative of the *'Antarah* romance and the *Migration of Beni Hilal,* has its explanation in extraneous historic considerations, and has no reference to the imaginative capability or incapability of the Arabs. One of these historic, accidental, considerations is the fact that the Arabs, partly due to the tenets of the Islamic religion, idealized the Arabic tongue and discouraged the translation of the literary works of the Greek masters. Several years ago I pointed out in an Arabic press article that Suleiman al-Bustani's translation of the *Iliad* came one thousand years too late! Had it been translated instead in the golden age of the Abbaside period, it might have changed the whole course of Arabic literature.

Proof of Arab imagination is not wanting. They produced some of the most beautiful lyrical poetry and fanciful tales the world has ever known. One of the most interesting of purely imaginative works of Arabic literature is accorded us in *Risalat-ul-Ghufran* (*Epistle of Forgiveness*) by Abu-l'Ala al-Ma'arri. It seems so obvious that if Abu-l'Ala had before him the Greek epic pattern and the Greek tradition of epic poetry, he, and not Dante, would have been the first to give the world a *Divine Comedy*. But Dante had his Virgil, and his model of the Aeneid and Abu-l'Ala had the handicap of a somewhat stereotyped literary tradition which imposed the Qoran as its beau ideal of eloquence. Father Miguel Asin makes the *Epistle of Forgiveness* one of the sources which inspired Dante in his immortal epic.

There still remains for us to explain why the Arabs, as the Hebrews before them, seemed to restrict their literary genius to religious rhapsodies, lyrical poetry, the short story and wisdom literature. And I think the explanation suggested in a previous chapter is a satisfactory one. The spiritual, practical nature of the Semitic people made them impatient of anything that had no direct bearing on life and its proper utilities. They saw life from a pragmatist's point of view, a point of view which has its limitations and handicaps, not least of which is a depreciatory attitude towards art for art's sake.

We speak of East and West, of Anglo-Saxons and

Semites, when we are beginning to realize more and more that the distinctions which separate one race from another are at best contingent and always variable. It was an Arab Pan-Islamist, al-Kawakibi, who said that the "period of the incubation" of a culture or civilization is seventy-five years. Whether this idea is original with him or not, there is great truth in it. Man, untramelled by physical and economic limitations or by systems of thought which have lost their reason for being, naturally seeks the fuller life, which is both practical and theoretical, material and spiritual, particularistic and universal. He aspires for the benedictions of peace and the serene life, and for those blessings which seem only to be wrung out by struggle and conquest.

It is convenient to think of the Spirit of Mankind as developing along two main lines of evolution—instinct and intelligence—a distinction which Henri Bergson worked out in his great philosophical work *Creative Evolution.* When life strayed too far from the wise guidance of life-intimate instincts it went amuck. On the other hand instinct, because of its complete absorption in and identification with life, exhausted all its energy in self-preservation and self-propagation. It had little time left for progress. It became atrophied and shrivelled up like a hermit crab on the sand of time.

On the higher plane of human evolution, instinct became represented in the spiritual insight and intuition of the East, particularly India, while intelligence developed into science and philosophy, first organized and systematized in Greece. The Arabs partook of the qualities of both.

In the light of what has preceded, the modern manifestations in the Arab lands are, at first, puzzling. The nationalists in those lands seem confused and lost between two worlds of ideas and values. The old world of values, so familiar and secure as the snow capped Mt. Hermon in the distance, is suddenly swept aside in a current of new ideas and new determinations that are more devastating than the Goths and Huns.

The old truths of experience, the wisdom that has withstood the vicissitudes and ravages of the centuries have not died. They will not surrender completely to the new and untried values. Whether in the East or whether in the West, only the impediments of the old will finally be counted among the missing.

We are witnessing today a universal hunger for a "working" philosophy of life in which often West goes East and East goes West. H. G. Wells may well call this "the age of confusion," but it is a confusion that preludes and presages an age of clarity and vision. And in this "age of confusion" the East is seeking its salvation with cautious and steadied feet, selecting and harmonizing between its own best traditions and the tried results of Western science and Western institutionalism. Gandhi, with his spinning wheel, becomes not only a living protest against the indolent passivity and the enervating *Karma* of his own people; but also a standard-bearer of a revolt against unscrupulous imperialism and devastating industrialism. In this light the "potential" and the "latent," which Prof. Hocking emphasizes throughout his book, *The Spirit of World Politics,* become of so much importance in the evaluation or criticism of present developments in the East.

What the final outcome will be, only a prophet can foretell. This prediction, however, may be ventured—that in the final reconcilation between East and West, the Arab lands will play an increasingly important role.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

CHARACTER, TECHNOLOGY, PROGRESS

In the medley of idealogies that resound today on the Eastern shore of the Mediterranean fundamental issues are sometimes confused. Youthful nationalists easily forget that the success or failure of a nation depends more on deep-rooted traits and traditions than on efficiency of equipment or mastery of technology. There is some truth and great danger in a statement which a well-informed Syrian observer made to me: "You can be anything in Damascus as long as you are a nationalist. Almost any sin could be forgiven you except the sin of being pro-French." And yet it was another Syrian observer—a late cousin of mine, Jurjis Katibah, less cynical and more mature, who also observed that while a decade or two ago the emphasis of nationalist leaders had been on the necessity for economic development, today you hear them speak more and more of the need of character. The poet Ahmed Shauqi embodied this nationalist craving in an oft-quoted couplet:

> "To character a nation owes its whole,
> Take that away, and you have taken all."

But one may pertinently ask what character, what psychical qualities, impulses and traditions do the peoples of the Arab lands stand in so much need of today? For it cannot be denied that the peoples of these lands do possess admirable character, virtues which have won universal praise. An American who occupied a high station in Egypt once remarked that the Arab is an inborn gentleman and quickly recognizes a gentleman of other nationalities. Comparing the virtues and vices of various nationalities was quite a pastime among travelers and writers of a past generation. The world war has taught us to be more modest in our opinions of others and more cautious in our condemnation, if less generous in our praise. We are beginning to realize how closely character is related to behavior which, in turn, differs with environment and the traditions of the past. Different behavior gives us different standards of character and ethics. We are groping towards some universal code of character and morality. In the meantime these differences in the standards of character must be taken into consideration. When we speak, for instance, of the Arab gentleman, we must realize that he is quite different from the Anglo-Saxon one. Modern Arab writers often do not take the trouble to translate the word "gentleman" when they speak of the English or American type. The same is true of the more American word "sport." The English words are given in transliteration. The Arabic equivalent of a gentleman who conforms to the best code of Arabic ethics is expressed in such words as *"halim,"* implying forebearance, or *"karim,"* implying liberality or *"shahm,"* implying magnanimity.

As extremes are usually effective in illustrating a point, it may not be amiss to recount here two little stories or anecdotes of rare and extreme types, one illustrating Eastern character at its best, the other Western character at its best.

The first story is taken from an ancient book expounding the teachings and extolling the virtues of Moslem mystics: A Sufi married a comely woman whom he loved dearly. One day his wife was stricken with smallpox and her features were marred by the terrible pock marks that follow as an after-effect of this disease.

Simultaneously, the Sufi complained of pain in his eyes, and after a few days he told his family that he was blind. A few years later his wife passed away and immediately the Sufi regained his normal sight. His family and friends, surprised at this strange coincidence, asked him how it was that he was stricken blind after his wife's sickness and resumed his sight immediately after she died. To this he calmly replied that he had not been blind at all, but had pretended to be so lest his wife be grieved at the thought that she was no more beautiful in his sight!

The other story, not less moving is illustrative of character of a different category. It is modern and must be quite familiar to many of my readers.

It is said that a captain of a Scottish company wishing to send one of his men on a hazardous errand, called them together at attention and explained to them the nature of the errand, asking for a volunteer. Then he said that to save them the embarrassment of volunteering out of deference to him, he would turn his face away and whoever wished to volunteer would take one step foreward. When the captain turned his face again to the company, he found that not one was out of line. He chided them for what he took to be lack of the spirit of self-sacrifice and patriotism on their part, until the sergeant said:

"Please sir, the whole company moved one step forward!"

The two stories, different and seemingly unrelated as they must appear at first thought, are truly typical —the former of character in the Arab lands the latter of character among certain peoples of the Western world. The company of Scottish soldiers may be of much coarser stuff and not quite so spiritually refined as our Moslem Sufi but they are of the type which has made the British Empire a dominant force in our world today. You can conceive of the same type engaged in a scientific expedition, a social reform project, a laboratory experiment for the determination of the cause of an epidemic, keeping peace among the natives of India, or subjugating an insurgent tribe in the heart of Africa. Somehow you cannot conceive of a company of Sufis doing these things.

The Arabic word for character, *akhlaq,* is in the plural. It has a wider meaning and psychologically sounder connotations than the English word. The latter almost immediately suggests a *type* of moral qualities such as enterprise, determination, perseverance, fair play, justice, cooperation, coolness of temper and loyalty to a common cause.

If you examine these traits carefully, you will find that every one of them is lacking somewhat in depth and spiritual finesse. Enterprise and perserverance are excellent qualities, but only when exercised in a right cause and with the best motives. The history of British imperialism is full of examples of unscrupulous adventure—enterprise in a wrong cause, excellent character wasted on some ignoble or unrighteous end. Fair play is an admirable virtue, the very essence and bulwark of our modern democracies. but it does not go quite far enough. It is formal and stiff and lacks that warmth which comes from the charitable intent. In fair play many a contestant has been foully downed. With some sympathy and understanding many a retiring soul could have been retrieved and might prove of superior mettle. Justice, as the Arabs themselves and the Greeks before them perceived, is the pillar of the state; but it cannot be called the highest sort of morality. Justice often becomes unjust, and even cruel when divorced from considerations of mercy and forebearance. Honesty is another of those cool, pietistic virtues which leave a gap in the all-round character of the truly superior man. One can be just honest enough in his dealings with his fellow men to be dishonest with one's better self. One can be an honest yet selfish, indifferent sort of person who might see a wounded man by the road and pass him by. And loyalty could become a terrible vice, a curse and a menace when applied to a narrow cause or principle, conflicting with the well-being of the larger community and with the higher ideal. Patriotism, which is loyalty to one's country and community, could as well be immoral and wrong, as it could be moral and right.

Now let us turn to traits of a different category, another aspect of character which we associate more readily with the East. In this category we find such virtues as magnanimity, liberality, compassion, self-negation, forgiveness and brotherly love. I hope it is not laboring the point to claim that these virtues or traits go further in their implications than the former ones. There is a fine spiritual side to them that suggests something beyond *duty* and proper dealings with our fellow men. They are virtues of the "second mile" of which Jesus spoke in his sermon on the Mount when he said: "And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain."

To say, therefore, that the crying need of the Arabs today is for character is to say something that is ambiguous and meaningless, unless we indicate what kind of character it is they are especially in need of. Obviously the type of character they need is that which they have lacked. A Syrian teacher and sage once said that individualism which is pointed out by Western critics as a trait of weakness in the East, a handicap to progress, is in reality a sign of strength, of moral robustness and fortitude. The keen need of the East today is for cooperation and team work, and for virtues that make for social coherence and national strength, rather than for those that enoble and exalt the individual. In the East as in the West the gospel of individual salvation is rapidly giving way to one of social salvation, social justice and amelioration.

Somebody is going to make a great discovery one of these days. He is going to prove from an intelligent and critical study of history that the antithetical attitude of mind which expresses itself in an "either-or" choice of loyalty or conduct has created more havoc in the world than the breaking of all the commandments of the decalogue. There is nothing enigmatical or paradoxical, for instance, in saying that the true object of all social coordination and cooperation should be the bringing into being of wholesome individuals; that wholesome individualism cannot come about, in the long run, except through the agency of organized and self-disciplined communities. In fact, the aim and end of the individual, his consummation, is expression in the community life through what the American philosopher Josiah Royce called "loyalty to the community." The old controversy, whether the hero makes his social environment or whether social environment makes the hero, loses its edge when we remember that no hero can be a hero for himself, nor by himself. It overlooks the only pertinent point, namely the alternating action of the individual on society and of society on the individual, each charging the other and being charged thereby. A hero is both the product of society and its producer; the end and means of social progress. And for the same reason a balanced and sound society needs both the qualities that exalt the individual and those that make for social discipline. To emphasize either set of traits, either category of character is to create centres of disturbance and weakness that result in inevitable failure, both for the individual and for society.

An undue emphasis is made nowadays in the Arab lands on those qualities which are associated with success, in the material and social senses, and coordination of social functions. This conscious trend towards the ideal of success, for the past generations associated in the minds of Westernized Arabs and other peoples of the East with the Anglo-Saxon and Germanic peoples, has found expression in the translations of success stories and articles in the popular Arabic press and in the appearance of several books, mostly translated from English, that belong to the same class. One of those books that enjoyed popularity long before the war was *The Secret of Success* by Samuel Smiles.[1] Another book, from the French, was *The Secret of Anglo-Saxon Superiority,* translated by Fathi Zaghloul, a brother of the famous Egyptian nationalist. In this book a French writer, Edmund Demolins, essayed to analyze the secret of this superiority and found it in the English system of education, with its emphasis on sports, which cultivate the spirit of teamwork, fortitude and self-reliance. When the King-Crane Commission was making its investigations on the wishes of the Syrians for the kind of government to be established in Syria, a Christian lay reader, appearing with a group of coreligionists, said: "If a mandate must be, then let it be an English or American mandate, for what Syria needs most in its critical period of transition is the inculcation of those qualities of social discipline and efficiency we associate with the Anglo-Saxon people."

This particular gentleman, and innumerable others like him, would have been shocked if the choice had been made to him between Anglo-Saxon character and Arab character. To him, and to most Arab nationalists today, it is not a question of substituting one set of character for another, but the acquirement of lacking ones to supplement qualities which all true Arabs endear and cherish.

The danger, however, exists, especially among some selfish industrialists or over-zealous Westernizers, of deprecating those qualities of the spirit which have given the East its real distinction and which, through the teachings of Christianity, are supposed to regulate the conduct even of successful Anglo-Saxons. This is a greater danger, indeed, and leads to greater disaster than one which is implied in adopting Western technology without the success virtues that go with it.

The whole thing hinges on our interpretation and outlook on what is popularly called progress, or success. In view of two world wars taking place in a quarter of a century, arising in Europe and of whose blame Western democracy cannot be wholly absolved, wars that are directly linked with industrialism and material progress, our concept of progress or success is in need of serious scrutiny and revision.

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[1] The original English title is not indicated.

Let us for the moment disregard the question raised by Briffault—the relative recency of those success qaulities in the English people and their dependence on industrial supremacy and affluence. No matter how it rose, and how relatively recent, the ideal of success for our modern world is one which has captivated millions and is imitated in the East with varying degrees of success, or failure.

Our paragons of success, usually of the Anglo-Saxon race, assure us that if we keep at a thing assiduously, with minds alert to new opportunities and new develments, never despairing, always cheerful and optimistic, observing the rules of the game, we will succed. But it is good Arab wisdom to ask oneself, before expending so much physical and psychic energy, whether the result would balance the time and effort invested. There is such a thing as success which is dismal failure, and failure which is magnificent success. We hear very often the expression that "time is money." If it were it would be very cheap indeed. It is much more precious than that; it is the very stuff of life itself. A practically-minded Arab could dampen the enthusiasm of one who would preach this dictum in season and out of season by simply saying: "If time is money, I will spend time; it costs nothing." But this reply is not so clever or subtle as it may appear. Spending time, to use another Anglo-Saxon expression, is serious business. It implies more than a passive reception of pleasant stimuli, a sort of esthetic osmosis, as some oriental hedonists would construe it. For to translate sensations into intelligible experience, the only enjoyment worthy of rational beings, is to imply a stock of experiences and ideas in terms of which the new sensations would be translated. These ideas and experiences in turn imply the expenditure of mental—even physical-effort, attention, application and continued interest; they imply the expenditure of further time.

The question still remains, how much time to spend, what experiences and ideas to acquire, and how much of them. And to this there is no specific answer. It depends on the innate capabilities and tastes of the individual, as well as on the intrinsic values of those experiences and ideas in terms of social expression. Life is an art, if also a science, and one cannot lay down cut and dried rules for art. But one may keep in mind the Latin adage that art is long and life is short. The typical American business man may have in the back of his mind the happy idea that once he makes his "million" he would retire and "take life easy." He usually finds, when the time comes for him to retire, that he enjoys little else besides. He had not paid the price of leisure; he had not prepared himself for the proper spending of the time that now lies heavily on his hands. He had not taken time to acquire the necessary experiences and ideas—the necessary education—with which to enjoy the leisure he had worked so hard to save. Here is a mystery of time: You cannot buy it; you cannot redeem it except with time. Things worthwhile take time to possess and to enjoy.

But the care-free Arab who would ridicule the hustling and bustling Westerner, who would denounce the incessant struggle after the trivial and non-consequential, hardly fares any better in the end. He fails to recognize the paradox of life itself which makes the attainment of the worth-while possible only with the mastery of much that is not worth-while in itself, of tedious details that may appear to be superfluous and irrelevant, but the neglect of which may lead to spiritual apathy, if not atrophy. For if the process of the reversion to the "essential" and "worth-while" in life is followed to its logical conclusion where will it lead? Of a certainty to that abstraction of mystical unity, to that ecstasy of sublimated emotions which consumes itself in the transient exultation of the moment. The reaction from this moment of psychical transfiguration, unless the emotional urge is channelized and utilized is invariably a state of spritual depression, pessimism and nullification. Thus, the tireless Westerner who goads himself into the pursuit of the "many" needless things, and the Easterner who assiduously goes after the "one" thing that is needed—the super-salesman and the whirling dervish—meet in the same Nirvana of ennui and futility.

Fortunately, we are dealing with extreme types. The "typical" American business man turns out, in most cases, to be a mythical creature, and the mystically-minded gentleman of the Arab lands, or the libertine hedonist, usually is a much saner and soberer person than our first impression of him would lead us to assume—a man of keen worldly interests and cultivated tastes.

The art of leisure has lent to the people of the East its peculiar artifices for avoiding the pitfalls and dangers of the strenuous life. The "gospel of relaxation" which William James preached to a nation of harried and restless people, need not be learned anew by the peoples where it has had its influence on them, for good and for bad, these countless generations. A sense of poise and a subtle instinct for experiential, spiritual values are certainly among the boons of leisure which the Arabs have gained. What the Arabs already possess need not be given up for what the West has to offer. Organization and technique are things that can be acquired by peoples accustomed to leisure, just as truly as the riches of spiritual experience can be gained by those whose traditions are of adventure and progress.

CHAPTER TWENTY

THE PERSONAL AND IMPERSONAL IN DEMOCRACY

Democracy is one of those vexacious and illusive words that have brought in their trail endless controversy, strife and bitterness of spirit. In these days it has become a rallying shiboleth. Many crimes are committed in its name, and many dark and sinister treasons are hidden in the folds of its covering mantle. Like patriotism and nationalism, with which it is akin, democracy has become a dogma, and often they who are most voluble in its confession are its most insidious enemies. Yet like the old dogmas of theology the dogma of democracy must pass the test of reason and prove its worth before the bar of critical analysis. They who treat democracy as a sacred cow that must not be touched on pain of ostracism and disgrace, even persecution, at the hands of the sentimentalists and rogues, are not friends of democracy, anymore than the fanatics who burned heretics at the stake were friends of God and His church.

One fact of history may be assumed conclusive, from the earliest dawn of the cave-dwellers to the year of grace nineteen hundred and forty. This fact is that democracy, as any form of goverment conceived by the ingenuity of man, has been a failure. It does not lessen the depressing effect of this discovery to call it a comparative success, or to show that it is the best form of government thus far devised. It is a fact that no people have proved to be "fit for democracy" for any length of time. Neither the Greeks or Arabs of old, nor the English, French and Americans of our own time, have shown any remarkable aptitude for the assumption of the enormous responsibilities involved in the democratic role. The farmers, laborers and bourgeois have not proved themselves wiser, more humane and more considerate of their own welfare when they have ruled in their own name, generally speaking, than those who ruled them against their own wills. And before our own eyes we see that no despot could be more ruthless than a proletariat who comes to power. If democracy is pointed out in our modern history as a comparatively successful experiment—as in our United States—one could cite longer periods of history in India, China, or under Moslem caliphs where the rule of a just and merciful monarch was productive of as much human happiness and material welfare.

What appears as a phenomenal success of democracy in some instances must be credited to the momentum of human efforts through the ages, through which the ordinary shiftless, indolent, indifferent, stupid voter is carried along on the stream of time. The illusion is heightened by straining the definition of democracy and overlooking flagrant violations against it, in the name of efficiency and progress.

Let us admit that democracy has failed, for in so admitting we may place ourselves on the right path to discover the cause or causes of failure, and attempt a remedy. As a prelude to this we may point out a characteristic of democracy which is not always remembered by those who discuss this subject. We refer to the dual nature of democracy which inevitably combines the personal and impersonal. Whether in democracy or kingship, some person or persons must finally give the word of authority and command. It is not surprising nor paradoxical that the president of the United States should have more power than the king of England, or that many of the presidents in the republics of South America have been dictators long before Europe heard of Mussolini or Hitler. The only difference between a knight or feudal lord and a member of parliament is that a number of people, to all appearances, delegated their authority to a person who becomes in effect a knight or feudal lord. If it takes a revolt to depose a king or baron, let it be remembered that a clever rogue and glib orator can keep his rule over his constituents with the help of slogans and promises as effectively as some lords kept their serfs from revolting by the whip and the sword.

Yet, the very concept of rule, democratic or otherwise, implies impersonality. In democracy this impersonality is emphasized as its distinctive feature. A member of parliament, an elected judge or a president of a republic, is said to be ruling or acting not in his own name, but in the name of his electorate or constituency. The divine right of man, of the people, takes the place of the divine right of kings. The whole rise of democracy was in effect against the one-man rule, a rule in which the impersonal was completely subordinated to the personal and thoroughly abused thereby. The temptation to abuse the personal element in democracy, however, is present not only with the elected ruler, but with the elector as well. A tacit conspiracy between the two creates a vicious circle that is hard to break. This gives rise to an ever-present dilemma in democracy: either liberty, the essence of the personal, is sacrificed for efficiency and discipline, which are impersonal elements necessary for the success of democracy, or efficiency and discipline are sacrified for liberty. The conflict between the two—the personal and the impersonal—has given democracy more headache and heartache than anything in its brief and checkered history.

Relatively speaking the success of democracy in some of the countries of western Europe—England, France, Scandinavia—or in the United States, has been due to the predominance of one or more of those qualities which we studied in the previous chapter as exemplified in the Anglo-Saxon peoples, and which, for a better name, we may call institutional virtues. We note that these virtues make not only for individual success, for triumph over the hardships of life, but also for stability and progress of the community and nation. They are indispensable traits for a successful democracy, though not sufficient in themselves for the realization of the abundant life, and often lead to strife and conflict. The application of impersonal rules or laws on a wide scale in society is the conserving force and sole justification of that system of checks and balances between public and private control known as democracy. It rests on a conception of justice that may not be of the highest order and that often goes awry, but is tolerable, workable and contains in itself the elements of self-correction.

The Arab sense of justice, however high or admirable, was a personal and individualistic one. It depended for its interpretation and for its execution on the will and disposition of the individual. In the West, which inherited that remarkable institution of Roman laws, an impersonal concept of justice was developed. The impersonal concept of justice fits in logically with the general idealistic philosophy of the West. Justice itself becomes an idea, a principle, a working technique, applied impersonally, hence often blindly and indifferently and, in a humane sense, unjustly. And here again we come to an impasse which once more illustrates how dangerous it is for abstract laws or ideas to run independently of experience, or for life to be divorced from the guiding rule of impersonal laws or ideas. We find Prof. Hocking cautioning against either extreme when he says:

> "The personal element in law is hard to keep in its place: a system of justice requires a note of impersonality; the legal and social burden of the modern world cannot be carried

without the rules and fictions of equality which enter into all organization. It remains true that every law by itself is an abstraction, and that to live on abstraction alone is the prescription of social death. Fortunately, personality is the sort of thing which, rightly taken, can absorb an unlimited amount of the impersonal. The problem is capable of solution. In working it out, Orient and Occident are destined to assist one another."[1]

Neither in our Western democracy nor in the totalitarian states which reacted against it has sufficient cognizance been taken of the personal element. Inversely, the excessive emphasis on this element has been the biggest obstacle in the adoption of democratic institutions in the Arab lands. Somehow, even the most Westernized Arabs, including those who have spent decades of their lives in the United States, have not been able to rid themselves of this personal element sufficiently to allow the mechanism of democracy to work without constant interference and friction. The injection of the personal element has marred the finest intentions and the sincerest motives of upright and capable Egyptian and Syrian nationalists. It explains so much of the unnecessary squabblings, the petty rivalries and personal favoritism, which have often unfairly represented them as a backward people.

The younger generation in the Arab lands are beginning to realize this quite earnestly and seriously. They have learned that in the long run and for the security of social order it is sounder wisdom to submit to majority rule, even when wrong, than to split up into different camps, each sincerely believing to be in the right.

Back of this apparent incompatibility with impersonal democracy is undoubtedly the high individualism of the Semitic peoples generally. The Arabs who are democratic in spirit, recognizing no social castes or ultimate authority, find it hard to obey democratic rules, to subordinate their individual wills to the will of a group, or to an abstract principle.

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1. *The Spirit of World Politics,* pp. 36-37.

Much has been written to confirm and to deny "Arab democracy." A Zionist writer flatly rejects the claim that Arabs are democratic, without making the distinction between democracy as a sense of fundamental equality among men, and democracy as an advanced institution of government which often violates the principle of this equality in spirit.[1]

It may be paradoxically contended that Arab democracy, or equalitarianism, in some of its aspects, is an antithesis of Western democracy as an institution. The theory of "the divine rights of kings" actually played a greater role in Western history than in that of the Arabs and Jews before them. In fact it is incompatible with the racial genius of the nomadic Arabs or with Semitic religion, whether Judaism or Islam. The King, even the very title was abhorrent to the Arabs, was always a person in the Semitic countries, while in the West he tended to become a symbol and even an idea. Arab democracy refused to recognize supremacy save that of spiritual quality and personal worth. No social, racial or economic handicaps are supposed to stand between one and the working out of his human potentialities. A shepherd of Tekoa could rise to be the prophet of Israel; a negro poet could be honored by the proud aristocracy of the Umayyad court; a Mamluke slave could rise to highest rule and be the real power behind the caliphate of Islam. The Qoran beautifully expresses it: "He is more favored by Allah among you who is more righteous."

But this potential equality also means that none is actually to be recognized as superior whose innate or acquired spiritual superiority does not assert itself and force its own recognition. It is the submission, voluntarily or by coersion, of individuals to other individuals, which is but a shade removed from autocracy and despotism. Arab democracy is not incompatible with a high regard for aristocracy, particularly the aristoc-

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1. *On the Rim of the Wilderness,* by Maurice Samuels, p. 41.

racy of the spirit and of the mind. Inherently, aristocracy must be a thing of quality and attainment, not a thing of possession and conquest. When only clothes and circumstance distinguish the Colonel's lady from Mrs. O'Grady then indeed they are sisters under the skin in a truer sense than the proverb intends to imply. I see a real danger in that essentially materialistic philosophy that seems to deny all fine distinctions between persons and makes success a matter of "taking advantage of opportunity." When the flagrancies and irregularities of some of our capitalists were being aired in the Senate in the spring of 1933, I wrote:

> "The East, which has often fanatically and secretly despised the West, in spite of the wonderful progress the latter has made in science, culture, economics and social control, usually entertains a suspicion that there are certain fine, moral sensiblities, certain marks of spiritual grace, often lacking in the makeup of Western civilization . . . We do not by any means imply that such flagrant practices are not common among business men of the East. We do imply that the East, with its inborn moral frankness and realism, refuses those guilty of such practices the distinction of nobility and class superiority. And while a great deal of injustice may be involved in such an attitude; and while a great deal of charlatanism passes in the East for spiritual aristocracy, it is nevertheless true that the East does insist that morality should come before respectability, that things spiritual take precedence over things material."

It is conceivable for Arab democracy to bow before a hero, to prostrate itself before a superman, but it is not conceivable for it to surrender to a glorified Babbett or a little corporal, in the name of *patria,* some vague ideal or vaunted destiny. The Semitic East may fight for a religious cause under the banner of a God-inspired fanatic, but it fails to understand how millions are killed in a war "to make the world safe for democracy." Personal democracy may crystallize into an institution, and it may adopt aims and principles divorced from personal considerations, but the personal appeal is always there; the personal inspiration, through tradition, is always the guiding light.

Inversely, the impersonal, idealistic concept of democracy cannot be sustained for long without breaking into the personal. With the presence of power, the temptation to use it for *personal* ends, proves too strong for the average mortal. Congressmen, governors, mayors and judges who exercise their offices in the name of an impersonal constitution find it easy and natural to imagine that they are there because of some innate worth and personal advantage. Only men of the highest integrity can truly be democratic.

Justice and democracy themselves are only the ruling conditions of the ideal objective of society—the happy life. They have no justification when they fail to attain that objective. Justice becomes a bitter irony when, because the way the law is construed, it absolves the man who steals by the millions and remands behind bars the hungry one who steals a loaf of bread. Democracy becomes a mockery when, because of its "hands off" policy and resentment of bureaucracy and control by individuals, leads to sweat shops, riotous strikes and wholesale unemployment. The fallacy of this sort of justice or democracy lies in the realization that the personal subvenes the impersonal in almost each case. Our democratic laws are shot through with personal considerations and show the trails of personal greed and avarice on every page. Democrats are most inconsistent people, because they are usually selfish. For a law to be truly democratic, it is not sufficient to have been passed by a majority of a ruling body. It must rest on the most ultimately impersonal considerations, moral principles, the truth of which is immediately recognized and tacitly accepted, and from which there is no appeal.

The paradox of it is that it was in the East, and for our Western world in the Semitic East, where this divinely impersonal concept of justice and sovereignty was perfected, and not in Greece or Rome where law was discussed impersonally and democracy conceived of as a theory of government. The personal application of the divine law lent dignity to the judge and executor lacking in our democratic courts and ministries. For to the mind of an upright Moslem *cadi* it is not thy law or my law that he sits in judgment to decide thereby between thee and me, but God's own law. A sense of *personal* responsibility in interpreting this law rests upon his shoulders that is not unlike the responsibility of a doctor of divinity who expounds a point on theism. A jury in this respect is unthinkable, and a lawyer who is committed before hand to defend a client regardless of his guilt or innocence is an absurdity.

I am not for a moment contending here that democracy should be discarded, or law-making should be taken away from the hands of the people's representatives. On the whole and in the long run democracy is a safer form of government. Even *cadis* are amenable to corruption, as a common Arabic proverb implies: "Bribe unloosens the *cadi's* turban." And many a *fatwa* was conceived in iniquity to uphold the hands of injustice and oppression of a despot caliph. Nor is it a question of choosing between the Western and Arab types of democracy; between personal authority and impersonal law; between spiritual excellence and social progress. For taken separately either alternative has proved wanting and inadequate to solve our complex social problems, and will prove more inadequate the more complex our society grows. The problem to be seriously faced by our present generation is to find a formula of social control which would enable the individual to be part of a social organization and yet remain an *individual;* to secure a democracy that is impersonal in the application of law and solicitous of personal merit and worth in the choice of those who apply it. Such a formula would include the respect for personal worth characteristic of the East, and the identification of self with society through loyalty to a common ideal—the welfare of the community.

Democracy is not only a form of government; it is in a more real sense the content of government. This content, which in an early chapter we found to be identical with the essence of nationalism—the self-expression of a homogeneous community—must be the chief concern and ultimate objective of democracy as form. Sometimes this content is iluusory, and often it leads to inefficiency and chaos, but the illusion is of the very life of democracy, stronger than the most patent and obvious material realities.

Democracy as form is impersonal, and should always be so; democracy as content is personal, intimate and self-assertive. When the balance between one and the other is lost they who live by democracy suffer. And because of this, because of the impatience of men and women who are not democratic at heart, it is possible for individuals to assume control of the machinery of government and subvert democracy to such an extent that it will take a revolution to restore it. Our totalitarian forms of government are a logical sequence of people unwilling to exercise the arduous duties imposed by democracy, to assume the responsibilities that liberty demands of them.

The only remedy lies in education, in inculcating the fundamental principles of self-rule in the body politics, in realizing and emphasizing the cardinal doctrine of democracy and its corner-stone, namely that your freedom ends where the freedom of somebody else begins. This is but another form of the Golden Rule, and for its fullfilment both the personal and impersonal qualities that make for a full and abiding democracy are necessary.

CONCLUSION

"He that killeth with the sword must be killed with the sword."

There is no more tragic aspect in the history of the last two decades than the alarmingly accelerating capitulation of the principles of light and love to those of darkness and hate. There is a moral blackout in the world today far more fearful than any physical blackout in the capitals of Europe. It seems as if all things that men of a previous generation had thought to be permanent and indisputable are shaking to their foundations under the terrific bombardment of doubt and sweeping cynicism.

Even those who revolted against the old regime of economic exploitation, oppression and the incurring dangers of war, resorted to the same methods of deceitful diplomacy and brutal force used by their enemies. The great fallacy of communism was, first the tacit then the avowed acceptance of the very same political philosophy and economic system it had gone out to combat.

It is not a question here of pacifism or militarism. There is a pacifism that is ignoble and a militarism that is sublime. Revolt, as a last resort, is the duty of every patriot and of every believer, and often it assumes the hallowed dignity of sacrifice on the cross of duty. It is a question, rather, whether we deify force and bow down to it as the almighty principle that governs our lives and the whole of creation. It is whether any trust has been left in our hearts towards our brethren in humanity, fellow travelers through the vale of tears and the shadow of death. It is the admission that only force counts, and only material gains and material well-being should be taken into consideration. The materialism of communism or fascism mocks and belies their humanistic motives and spiritual, religious-like loyalty. That is the amazing paradox of our time. As for old imperialism, it is passing away as surely as the passing away of an eclipse. It cannot stand the crushing weight of its own inconsistency. Even its most loyal and devoted friends should be happy at this prospect.

Who is to blame for this inversion of values, for this faithlessness, for this atheism?

Not Clemenceau, nor Lloyd George, not Wilson, not Lenin, not Mussolini, not Hitler, not Baldwin, Churchill or Chamberlain!

It is you and I, who live in democracy and thrive by it the while we deny and defy it a thousand times a day. There is no more dangerous man than one sitting next to you in a church pew who mumbles the responses of holy writ—of peace, love and foregiveness—with a heart full of malice, of devious ways to spoil his neighbor, of hypocrisy that nullifies all religion and morality.

A state may be separated from church, but no democracy can live by the gospel of self-interest, however enlightened, or dignified by any other name. Certainly no democracy can stand for long save on the rock foundation of morality.

Friends who have perused the manuscript of this book suggested a conclusion in which definite solutions be given out, at least for that part of the world with which it deals, the Arab lands. On careful reflection I have decided that this will not avail. The general plan suggested in the introduction is, to my studied consideration, sufficient and universal enough to serve as a working basis. It is the good intent that is needed, not the detailed delineation of a plan, however good and equitable. It was the lack of this good intent, of unswerving devotion to the principles of justice and right, that were the ultimate cause of the failure of the League of Nations, and the break down of collective security.

And as, on the whole, we have cast our lot with democracy, in spite of all its shortcomings, so, on the whole, our sympathies go to the Allies in this second world war. These sympathies, however, as the sympathies of millions who, perforce must look on as thousands, perhaps millions, of our choicest young men are mowed down with machine gun bullets or blown to bits with heavy explosives, are not given unqualifiedly. In the name of those who have given the supreme sacrifice, and those behind them who are ready to step in their places, it is given in the cause of justice and lasting peace.

At the end of the last war the victorious Allies failed to keep the pledge to those who fell in Flanders' fields. May God forgive them and have mercy on the souls of nameless millions, even of soldiers and sailors, who knew not how to guard and defend the heritage of liberty and democracy bought with the blood of their own companions.

Far be it for this writer to be vindictive or vengeful. His only hope and prayer is that when this war is over the sun of peace and righteousness, with healing in its wings, will shine forth again over our miserable, unhappy little world. Should the Allies win, it is the duty of every one who participated in the conflict on their side, however remotely and indirectly, to make sure this time that democracy and justice shall not be bartered and sacrificed on the alter of selffishness and greed, around the table of a "peace conference."

Should the totalitarian states come out victorious all hope is not lost. Let us not lose faith in human nature. Out of the jaws of ruthless tyranny the sweetness of goodwill and peace will come forth. Men cannot be so depraved as to surrender completely to the dark and brutal forces that lurk in the human heart, vestiges of the beast in us that have defied all reason and silenced the still small voice of the moral ought in us. Every true soldier, on the battle-field and behind the lines, should be a Mithraist, a believer in the final triumph of the forces of goodness and righteousness.

The practical philosophy of the Semitic world, embodied to us in that simple and sublime charter of the spiritual life, the Sermon on the Mount, the wisdom of the Magi that has spoken to the human race through prophets, poets and sages of all lands, is still the crying need of our distracted world. Their message calls to us, as it has called these countless generations: There is no substitute for justice, there is no rule of conduct that can take the place of the divine command, Love thy neighbor as thyself.

The tendency in Western thinkers has been to treat democracy, law, individual liberty, as concepts. Let us now try the Eastern approach which would examine first the contents of these concepts, and evaluate them in terms of human experience and happiness. We are surely interested in the preservation of individual freedom; but it must be the reality of this freedom, not merely its legal form and logical limitations. We are deeply concerned about democracy, but not that deceiving mirage which substitutes the tyranny of the many for the despotism of the one.

If a positive and definite proposal should be offered it is that responsible thinkers throughout the world, who have the welfare of our human race at heart, should get together for a thorough examination of the concepts and premises underlying the conflicting systems and ideologies that have broken down in a hopeless impasse. A re-examination of democracy, socialism, nationalism, international law, the limitation of sovereignty, free trade, a unified code of labor, and a hundred other issues that affect the lives of the Hottentot in the heart of Africa and the Anglo-Saxon on the banks of the Thames or Hudson River. Our world politics are way behind our advanced ideas of sociology and economics. The time has come for petty practical men in the seats of the mighty to step down and turn over their tasks to men of ideas and vision. It is not conceivable that this would be done voluntarily, or could be done immediately. A transition is necessary a transition during which the minds of millions should be trained by free and open discussion, by appeal to simple decency and reason, preparing them for the taxing duties of democracy. At least this consuming missionary zeal the democracies could learn from the dictatorships.

Midway between the extreme of *laissez faire* which has characterized our disorganized democracies, and total control, lies the middle path of a guided and self-disciplined democracy, socialism or whatever name it may go by, which would prepare the way to a world community of free nations. Towards this end let all men and women work who believe in the essential soundness of human nature and the workability of universal peace. Reason has not abdicated, and the heart of man has not turned to stone.

TAMM

(With the kind permission of Prof. Elihu Grant the following list of questions has been taken from his recent brochure, *Palestine Our Holy Land*, and is used here not merely to uphold the claim of the Arabs to Palestine, but to correct popular fallacies and misapprehensions of the Arabs and Arab nationalism. Prof. Grant, who spent many years of his life in Palestine, as an educator and archeologist, and who has shown keen interest in the cause of the Arabs, particularly in their cultural development, is indisputably an authority on Palestine. Through his many contacts with biblical scholars and, lately, Zionists and their sympathizers, as well as Arab nationalists—he is in an advantageous position to discover the general state of knowledge on the vexing problem of Palestine and its place in the scheme of Arab nationalism, as reflected in these questions, the answers to which, naturally, are in the affirmative—Author.)

IS IT TRUE?

That an Arabian country is one in which the overwhelming majority of the people is Arab?

That Palestine is as surely in the Arabian designation and the Arabian consciousness as Kent would be in English?

That until forty years ago the desire of Jews for Jerusalem and Palestine was a religious one similar to the Christian devotion?

That Herzl's passion was not at the first for Palestine?

That Political Zionism stands always for sovereignty and is a drug destructive of Jewry?

That before 1914 Palestine was one of the safest places in the world for Jews to live?

That the pre-war, Arabic speaking Jews were more oriental, more truly Jewish than the recent immigrants?

That the hills, even Jerusalem itself, are less desirable to materialistic Jews than the plains and shore of Palestine and that this is a reversal and denial of the old time Judaism?

That Tell-Aviv is far from being a sample of the finest, truest Jewry?

That historic Judaism is not older than the Babylonian Exile?

That one makes a funny case who claims David and Solomon as Jews?

That Judaism is a highly evolutionary product out of and away from the Hebrew past? Jews may be said really to have begun in Palestine with the Second Temple, in the Perisian period?

That the Jewish genius is religious and ethical and that when they go worldly they should have no more consideration as heirs of the Bible than other politicians, merchants, concessionaires?

That to claim everything in addition to religious freedom, that is to say, when they claim a race, a nation, a politics, an economics and separate from the human race on these material lines while at the same time asking to be treated as religious and the pets of the divine is to go wrong?

That what was put forth as the voice of Britain and America about Palestine was utterly unknown to the vast majority of the people of these countries but was the highly specialized propaganda of a small sect among us?

That the Balfour Declaration was a steal, a piece of trading engineered by a powerful clique, deceptive in its terms, and substantially illicit?

That the loud professions by Europeans and Americans of their pity for suffering European Jews did not lead them to take any considerable numbers to themselves but led them to try to paralyze Arab rights of resistance while tens of thousands of Jews were forcibly fed into Palestine?

That the Palestinian native people were taxed these 20 years without representation and choked with more and more immigrants without representation? (Taxation and immigration without representation equals what?)

That a specious selective democracy is preached by many orators and writers who choose democracy for themselves and refuse it to Palestine?

That President Wilson's "Crane-King Commission" made a thorough-going study of Palestine's wishes and found the people heavily opposed to the Zionist scheme?

That, when such doings were begun, nine-tenths of the citizens of Palestine were Arabs and one-tenth or less were Jews but that it was British politics that enabled the latter to usurp?

That the Zionist organizations of London and America meddled with the military authorities in Palestine to the great embarrassment of the latter and to its eventual recall so that a regime more favorable to Jews might be set up?

That thousands of devout Jews in England, and America fought vigorously against political Zionism and the Balfour Declaration?

That politically minded, worldly Jews had an undue share in forming the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate scheme for Palestine?

That a few American Jews through certain highly placed persons in Washington and New York pretty nearly dictated British policy on Palestine?

That there are two kinds of Zionism in Palestine, the pre-war religious kind of old fashioned Jews and the post-war and often irreligious kind?

That commercial advantages, concessions, oil, etc., etc., had too much to do with England's treatment of the Arabs?

That many, many Jews have been disillusioned by the actual conditions in Palestine and have willingly paid their expenses back in order to escape Zionism over there?

That the government of Palestine for over two years under a mandate that did not exist was an illegal government and that it was during that time that atrocious miscarriages of justice and wrongs upon the native people were founded?

That this illegal government awarded the Rutenberg concession to harness the waters of the Jordan and Auja rivers?

That the substitution of civil for military government in Palestine was largely because the military was accused of being favorable to the native people while the civil government to be set up would be more amenable to political Zionism? That the civil government as set up was in anticipation of the Mandate not yet legalized and so was an illegal government?

That the Palestine problem did not exist 25 years ago but was an importation from Europe?

That European quarrels and wars were dragged across the Holy Land to the great suffering of the native people?

That the Holy Places in Palestine are more properly the charge of Christians and Moslems than of Jews?

That the so-called "historic connection" of Jews with Palestine is exceedingly thin and of less importance than the claims of other people?

That "economic absorptive capacity" is a high-sounding piece of persiflage designed to cover inhumane theft of a people and their rights?

That a large number of British officials favor the native cause but are often recalled to England if their attitude becomes clear?

That a top-ranking British judge was recalled, largely because he spoke out judicially rather than politically about an outrage on the Arabs of Jaffa?

That a guilty foreign element made a scape-goat (for their own propaganda) on the highest Moslem religious person in Palestine? That he is now in exile?

That without charges or trial scores, yes hundreds, of Palestinians have been arrested, interned, exiled?

That government policies and methods have deepened divisions and irritated to exasperated revolt the native farmers, gardeners, and citizens of Palestine who have been beaten down with ruthless cruelty?

That thousands of Palestinians are well educated in European and American schools and universities and that the agricultural skill of the Arab farmers and gardeners of Palestine stands comparison well with any argriculturalists with comparable capital in the world?

That land tenure in Palestine is a native right and necessary to the well-being of the Palestinians a large part of whose country is rock and waterless?

That a peasantry such as Palestine's should have a voice in the changing of their economics from agriculture to industrialism?

That Palestine is about the size of New Hampshire or Vermont and already more densely populated?

That even if you include Trans-Jordan Palestine would not be larger than Massachusetts and is much less fertile?

That foreign Christian influence in Palestine before 1914 was considerable and not of a mercantile inspiration.

That so-called Jewish "historic-connection" was broken more than 18 centuries ago and that other historic connections are greater?

That the Zionist real-estate holdings in Palestine have mounted to 333,333 acres of which 80,000 acres only are in the hills?

That out of 400,000 Zionist Jews in Palestine only 4100 are farming in the hill country?

That Zionists today from other countries care more for fat Canaanite lands than for Zion?

That Arab orange growers always had and still hold supremacy in Palestine despite European and American capital and crowding?

That modern, materialistic Zionism profanes religious, idealistic Zion?

That Palestne is Arabia's nearest sea-edge on the Mediterranean?

That Palestine was until very recently the southern part of Syria and should not have been severed from larger Syria except for the fantastic geography of Zionists?

That the Arab Awakening of the last hundred years, with its sequel of sacrifice to the death during the World War and since, is ignored by Zionist publicity?

That Arab capacity for government and experience therein have scarcely been questioned until it was to the selfish advantage of European and American Zionists to malign?

That Arab cultural, literary interests have been vigorous and fruitful for a century and particularly, with American sympathetic understanding, since the middle of the 19th Century?

That learned Jews whether in the Middle ages, the Renaissance, or in these modern times, know and acknowledge much about Arab civilization but have been blasted into silence about it by the roar of Zionism?

That in 1211 A. D., Saladin received courteously three hundred rabbis from England and France who inquired about the outlook for Jewish immigration into Palestine in sharp contrast with the blundering brutal onrush of modern Zionists without enquiry of the inhabitans?

That in 1267 A. D. there were two Jews known to be in Jerusalem, in 1730 a thousand, and in the whole of Palestine in the 1880's about 20,000 and under decent conditions of courtesy and consideration for the native people they might have continued to increase with perfect safety?

That thousands of the best religious and moral Jews agree largely with the above? But that they suffer persecution at the hands of worldly Jews?

That to combine religious claims with claims of race, nationality, economics and politics is a gross form of state-and-church?

That modesty is not the private virtue of any one group but in the long run may be sincerely commended to any?

That Palestine is not the property of England nor yet of the Zionist organization but of Palestine's people?

That the Mandate as forced upon Palestine has been a disgrace to the whole mandate—theory-and-practice?

That Zionistic Jews are not democratic where they have power, as in Palestine, where they have no notion of releasing their minority grip established by police and the military and never by Parliament, upon the majority population of Palestine?

That Palestine was placed under mandatory not to help or save it, but solely to establish Jewish nationalistic ambitions there of Jews who did not live there?

That Palestine's misery these 25 years has been solely European in origin?

That Arabs so far from being natively hostile to Jews have seen the quota of Jews in Palestine rise from less than 10% to more than 30% of the population and are willing for peace's sake to let that status alone?

That most Jews left Palestine through the historic ages, voluntarily and not because of exile?

That no Bible statement or promise ever contemplated stuffing Palestine with all sorts of Jews, disobedient as well as obedient, to the creation of cruel moral wrong? (Read the book of Amos in your Bible.)

That the myth of a "pure race" is hopelessly outdated, contrary to facts?

That ignorance of Palestine, its races, its history has been exploited by high-pressure salesmanship for the Zionist theory, to a scandalous degree?

That it is the magnanimity of the Arabs rather than British administration that accounts for the quieting of the country from the date of the outbreak of the second European War?

101 BOOKS ON THE ARABS

(The following list of books in the English language on the Arabs and Arab lands is based on selections kindly submitted by various authorities, including Profs. Hocking, Jewett, Grant, Hitti and others, and edited by Dr. George I. Kheirallah and the author. Various factors were taken into consideration in determining the final selection. In general the aim was a proper balance between readability, importance and scholarship. In many cases, especially in folk-lore and travel, books were chosen because of their historic importance, and not because they indicate necessarily conditions still in existence. —Author.)

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM

A dictionary of the Geography, Ethnography and Biography of the Mohammedan peoples, prepared by a number of leading Western orientalist. Begun in 1913.

Published under the patronage of the International Association of the Academies.

HISTORY OF THE ARABS—Philip K. Hitti.

Best general history of the Arabs, written by one who has successfully combined the technique of scholarship with thorough knowledge of Arabic sources.

Macmillan & Co. Ltd., London, 1937.

THE ORIGIN OF THE ISLAMIC STATE—Philip K. Hitti.

Being a translation from the Arabic, accompanied with annotations, geographic and historic notes, of *Kitab Futuh al-Buldan* by al-Baladhuri.

Columbia University Press, New York, 1916. Two volumes.

AN ARAB-SYRIAN GENTLEMAN, USAMAH IBN MUNQIDH—Philip K. Hitti.

Translation of the memoirs of an Arab knight of the time of the Crusades.

Columbia University Press, New York, 1929.

HISTORY OF THE MOHAMMEDAN DYNASTIES OF SPAIN—Pascual de Gayangos.

Being a translation in two volumes of *Nafh al-Tib* of Maqqari.
Printed for the Oriental Translation Fund, London, 1840.

A HISTORY OF EGYPT IN THE MIDDLE AGES—Stanley Lane-Poole.
Standard work on Egypt under the Arabs.
Methuen & Co., London, 1901.

THE ARABS—Bertram Thomas.
A readable and brief history of the Arabs from antiquity to our present day, with an appendix on the Racial Origins of the Arabs.
Doubleday, Doran & Co., Garden City, N. Y., 1937.

MOORISH REMAINS IN SPAIN—J. Lane.
Brief record of the Arabian conquest of Spain, with particular account of Mohammedan architecture and decorative art.
London, 1905.

ARABIA AND THE BIBLE—James Montgomery.
Survey of the particular relations between biblical history and Arabia.
University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1939.

THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE HOLY LAND—Sir George Adam Smith.
Still an authority on a subject that has been affected by recent excavations in the Near East.
A. C. Armstrong & Son, London, 1907.

LANDS OF THE EASTERN CALIPHATE—G. Le Strange
A standard work on the historical geography of the eastern Moslem empire.
Cambridge Unifersity Pres, 1930.

KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE IN EARLY ARABIA—William Robertson Smith.
Traces the system of male kinship through an earlier stage of matriarchy.
Cambridge University Press, 1885.

THE MEANING OF THE GLORIOUS KORAN, AN EXPLANATORY TRANSLATION—
Marmaduke Pickthall.
This translation enjoyed the confidence and help of Moslem theological authorities of al-Azhar, Cairo, to whom the translator submitted his ms.
Alfred A. Knopf, London, 1930.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS—George Foot Moore.
In two volumes. The second volume comprises the history of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, in their proper perspectve.
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1913-19.

DEVELOPMENT OF MUSLIM THEOLOGY, JURISPRUDENCE AND CONSTITrTIONAL THEORY—
Duncan B. Macdonald.
Standard work on the subject.
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, N. Y.

LIFE OF MAHOMET—Sir William Muir.
A standard work.
Smith, Elder & Co., 1894, London, 3rd revised edition.

ISLAM: BELIEFS AND INSTITUTIONS—Father H. Lammens, S.J. Translated by Sir E. Denison Ross.
A lucid and delightful book by a great authority.
Methuen & Co., Ltd., London, 1929.

THE SPIRIT OF ISLAM—Amir Ali.
History of the evolution and ideals of Islam, with a life of the Prophet, written by a great Moslem authority.
Christophers, London, 1922.

MOHAMMED AND ISLAM—Ignaz Goldziher.
Translated from the original German by Kate Chambers Seelye.
An authoritative work.
Yale University Press, New Haven, 1917.

ISLAM AND THE ARABIAN PROPHET—
G. I. Kheirallah.
A biography of Mohammed as known to the Arabs, and an explanation of the tenets of Islam from a

Molem viewpoint.
Islamic Publishing Co., New York, N. Y.

CONFESSIONS OF AL-GHAZALI—
Being a translation of al-Munqidh by Claud Field.
John Murray, London, 1909.
In Wisdom of the East Series.

O YOUTH—
Being a translation of al-Ghazali's work on pedagogy by George H. Scherer.
American Press, 1933.

STUDIES IN ISLAMIC MYSTICISM—R. A. Nicholson.
An important phase of the spiritual development of islam treated by a recognized authority.
Cambridge University Press, London, 1921.

KASHF AL-MAHJUB—Ali Ibn Uthman al-Hijwari.
The oldest Persian treatise on Sufism. Translated by R. A. Nicholson. (E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series.)
E. J. Brill, Leyden, 1911.

THE RELIGIONS OF MODERN SYRIA AND PALESTINE—Frederick Jones Bliss.
An intimate and scholarly study by a son of the founder of the American University of Beirut.
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1912.

PRIMITIVE SEMITIC RELIGION TODAY—
Samuel Ives Curtiss.
Research in religious folk-lore of Syria, Palestine and the Sinaitic Peninsula by a biblical authority.
Fleming H. Revell, Chicago, 1902.

THE SYRIAN CHRIST—Abraham Mitrie Rihbany.
An interpretation of biblical messages and life of Christ in terms of current Syrian folk-lore and the Eastern mentality.
Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1916.

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INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE—
George Sarton.
Two volumes in three. Contains the fullest account of Arabic science down to end of 13th century A.D.

by one who is considered the foremost authority on the history of science.
Baltimore, 1927-31. A third volume probably in two, containing history of Arabic science in the 14th century will appear in 1941-42.

THE ORIENT UNDER THE CALIPHS—
Being a tranlsation of the well-known work of Alfred Von Kremer—Culturgeschichte des Orients, by S. Khuda Bukhsh.
Calcutta University, Calcutta, 1920.

OUTLINES OF ISLAMIC CULTURE—
A. M. A. Shustery.
An account of Islamic culture by a prominent Moslem authority.
The Bangalore Press, Bangalore, India, 1938.

ISLAM AND THE DIVINE COMEDY—Father Miguel Asin Y. Palacios.
Being a study of the Moslem sources of Dante's Divine Comedy.
Translated and abridged from the Spanish by Harold Sunderland.
John Murry, London, 1926.

ARABICA AND ISLAMICA—U. Wayriffe.
Containing a life of Mohammed, translations of selections from al-Hadith and Arabic prose and poetry, including Risalat al-Ghufran by Abu-l-'Ala al-Ma'arri.
Luzac & Co., London, 1936.

IBN BATUTAH—Tr. by H. A. R. Gibb.
Being the account of a Moslem traveler of the 14th century, in Asia and Africa, more complete and accurate than the famous travels of Marco Polo.
McBride & Co., New York, 1929.

THE ISLAMIC BOOK—Sir Thomas Arnold and Adolph Grohman.
A study of the history of book-making and Binding in Moslem countries from the 8th to the 18th century A. D.
Leipzig, the Pegasus Press, 1929.

THE LEGACY OF ISLAM—Edited by Sir Thomas Arnold and Alfred Guillaume.
Contains valuable and scholarly contributions by Barker, Gibb, Nicholson, Farmer, etc.
Oxford University Press, 1931.

LITERARY HISTORY OF THE ARABS—Reynold A. Nicholson.
Still the best general work of its kind in the English language.
Cambridge University Press, London, 1930. Formerly published by T. Fisher Unwin in 1907.

PANCHATANTRA—Arthur W. Ryder.
Translation in prose and verse from the original Sanskrit of the collection of fables known to the Arabs as *Kalilah wa Dimnah*, and through the Arabs influenced European fable literature.
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1925.

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM—T. J. de Boer, translated by Edward R. Jones.
Excellent brief survey of Arab philosophy.
Luzac & Co., London, 1933, new edition.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE ARABS TO EDUCATION—K. A. Totah.
A Ph. D. desertation by an Arab educator.
Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, 1926.

ARABIAN MEDICINE AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE MIDDLE AGES—Dr. Donald Campbell.
Extensive study of Arab medicine and Arab physicians who influenced the history of medicine in Europe.
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., London, 1926. (In Trubner's Oriental Series.)

ARABIC THOUGHT AND ITS PLACE IN HISTORY—De Lacy O'Leary
An important work, has excellent account of the Syriac translators and the transmission of Hellenic culture to Europe through the Arabs.
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., London, 1922.

(Trubner's Oriental Series.)

MOORISH HOUSES AND GARDENS OF MOROCCO—
Jean Gallotti.
Descriptive work on the patois and gardens of Morocco.
W. Helburn, New York, 1925.

THE BOOK OF THE THOUSAND AND ONE NIGHT—
This great work of fiction and fantasy is available in the masterly translations of Sir Richard Burton, Dr. J. C. Mardrus, or Edward William Lane. The translation by Lane has valuable notes.

ARABIAN ROMANCES AND FOLK-TALES—
H. I. Katibah.
In the opening tale gives an account of the rise of Jinni, according to popular Moslem theology.
Charles Scriber's Sons, New York, 1929.

WHITHER ISLAM—Ed. by H. A. R. Gibb.
Collection of articles dealing with modern movements in the Moslem world.
London, 1932

AN EGYPTIAN CHILDHOOD—Taha Husein. Translated by E. H. Paxton.
An autobiographical sketch by one of the foremost living Arab scholars and modernists.
Routledge & Sons, London, 1932.

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THE PENETRATION OF ARABIA—D. G. Hogarth.
A record of the development of Western knowledge concerning the Arabian Peninsula.
Alston Rivers, London, 1905.

PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF A PILGRIMAGE TO AL-MADINAH AND MECCA—Captain Sir Richard F. Burton, edited by his wife. Memorial edition in two volumes.
Burton was the second European to have visited Mecca without embracing Islam. The first according to Burton himself, was M. Bertolucci, Swedish Consul at Cairo. Burton's trip was made in 1853.

Tylston & Edwards, London, 1893.

TRAVEL IN ARABIA DESERTA—
Charles Montagu Doughty.
New and definitive edition of a great work, with an introduction by Col. T. E. Lawrence.
Jonathan Cape, London, 1936.
Frst published in 1888.

ARABIA DESERTA—Alois Musil.
Referred to by Philby as one of the foremost works of its kind.
American Geographical Society. Oriental Explorations and Studies, New York, 1927.
Published under the patronage of the Czech Academy of Sciences and Arts and of Charles R. Crane.

THE DESERT AND THE SOWN—
Gertrude Lowthian Bell.
Description, comments and reflections by a long resident in Arab lands on Syria and the Syrian Desert, as reflected in conversations with natives.
William Heinemann, London, 1907.

BEDOUIN TRIBES OF THE EUPHRATES—Lady Anne Blunt, Edted by Wilfred S. Blunt.
Said to be first account of its kind since Xenophon.
Harper & Brothers, New York, 1879.

THE FELLAHIN OF UPPER EGYPT—Winifred Blackman, fellow of the Royal Anthropological Institue, etc., with a foreword by R. R. Marett, and many illustrations from the author's photographs.
George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd., London, 1927.

LAND WITHOUT SHADE—Hans Helfritz, translated from the German by Kenneth Kirkness.
Being travels in South Arabia and Yaman. First part, dealing with Hadramaut, the author entitles "The Chicago of the Desert" because of its many-storied buildings.
Hurst & Blackett Ltd., London, 1935.

THE SOUTHERN GATES OF ARABIA—Freya Stark.
A journey in the Hadramaut. The author has been called a logical successor of Gertrude Bell.

E. P. Dutton, New York, 1936.

ARABIA FELIX—Bertram Thomas.
With an introduction by Col. T. E. Lawrence and an appendix by Sir Arthur Keith, being an account of his crossing the Empty Quarter.
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1932.

ARABIA—H. St. John B. Philby.
Treats of the rise of Wahhabism and of the Second Wahhabi Empire under Ibn Sa'ud.
Ernest Benn, Ltd., London, 1930.
In The Modern World Series.

SHEBA'S DAUGHTERS—H. St. B. Philby.
Account of recent travel through undiscovered parts of southern Arabia.
Methuen & Co., London, 1939.

ARABIA INFELIX, OR THE TURKS IN YAMEN—G. Wyman Bury.
Macmillan & Co., 1915.

YESTERDAY AND TODAY IN SINAI—Major C. S. Jarvis (governor of Sinai.)
Deals with the bedwin Arabs of Sinai, Southern Palestine and Transjordan.
Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1932.

THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE RWALA BEDOUINS—Alois Musil.
An authoritative and first-hand account of the manners and laws of a tribe considered among the purest of Arabs, racially.
American Geographical Society. Oriental Exploration and Studies No. 6. New York, 1928.
Published under the patronage of the Czech Academy of Sciences and Arts and of Charles R. Crane.

PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF A JOURNEY THROUGH CENTRAL ARABIA DURING 1862-63.
William Gifford Palgrave.
An important travel book containing first-hand information on the Wahhabi movement.
Macmillan, London, 1883.

PETRA: THE ROCK CITY OF EDOM—M. A. Murry.

An excellent work on the Nabatean capital, "The Rose City."
W. Hoffer, London, 1939.

AN ACCOUNT OF THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF MODERN EGYPTIANS—Edward William Lane.
Revealing intimate knowledge and side-lights of Egyptian life of the author's time.
Paisly Press, London, 1889.

UNEXPLORED SYRIA—Richard F. Burton and Charles F. T. Drake.
A rare work, being the account of visits to the Libanus, Tulul el-Safa, the Anti-Libanus, the Northern Libanus and the 'Alah.
Tinsley Bros., London, 1872.

MAKER OF MODERN ARABIA—Ameen Rihani.
An intimate and sympathetic account of Ibn Saud and Saudia Arabia by an eminent Arab literary man and poet. One of the best books on the subject.
Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston and New York, 1928.

AROUND THE COASTS OF ARABIA—Ameen Rihani.
Sequel to *The Maker of Modern Arabia.*
Constable & Co., Ltd., London, 1930.

ARABIAN PEAK AND DESERT—Ameen Rihani.
Account of the author's travels in Yaman.
Constable & Co., Ltd., London, 1930.

AN ACCOUNT OF PALMYRA AND ZENOBIA—William Wright.
An enchanting book of travel and history, rare.
T. Nelson & Sons, New York, 1895.

A PILGRIMAGE TO NEJD—Lady Anne Blunt.
Portrays Central Arabian life and customs during the eighties.
T. Murray, London, 1881.

FIVE YEARS IN DAMASCUS—J. L. Porter.
Contains accounts of the history topography and antiquities of Damascus, researches in Palmyra, Lebanon and the Hauran.
London, 1855.

FIFTY-THREE YEARS IN SYRIA—

Henry Harris Jessup.
Autobiography of an American missionary. Has intimate sketches of noted figures in the early Arabic renaissance.
Fleming H. Revell, New York, 1910.

THE REMINISCENCES OF DANIEL BLISS—
Edited and Supplemented by his eldest son.
Reminiscences of the founder of the American University of Beirut.
Fleming H. Revell, New York, 1920.

THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE—Elihu Grant.
A refreshingly sympathetic study of the Palestinian peasants from one who knows them intimately through years of residence.
Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, 1921.

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THE ARAB AWAKENING—George Antonius.
Authoritative and thorough account of the rise of Arab nationalism, written by an Arab with access to political and diplomatic documents. Contains the first authentic and complete translations of the famous MacMahon-Husein correspondence.
J. B. Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1939.

A HISTORY OF NATIONALISM IN THE EAST—
Hans Kohn.
Antedating Antonius' work, but wider in aspect.
G. Routledge Sons, London, 1922.

NATIONALISM AND IMPERIALISM IN THE HITHER EAST—Hans Kohn.
One of the most thorough and understanding studies of the conflict of Arab nationalism with Western imperialism.
George Routledge & Sons, London, 1932.

THE SPIRIT OF WORLD POLITICS—
William Ernest Hocking.
One of the most profound studies of present developments in Arab lands by a great living philosopher.

Macmillan Co., New York, 1932.

SEVEN PILLARS OF WISDOM—Col. T. E. Lawrence.

Final personal account of one whose exploits in Arabia during the world war made almost a legendery figure.

Doubleday, Doran, New York, 1935.

ORIENTAL ASSEMBLY—T. E. Lawrence.

Edited after his death by his brother A. W. Lawrence, containing hitherto unpublished articles by Col. Lawrence, and a chapter which was suppressed when it was written as an introduction to *Seven Pillars of Wisdom.*

William & Norgate Ltd., London, 1939.

PERSONAL HISTORY—Vincent Sheean.

Comprising account of the Rif uprising and an intimate and objective description of the riots in Palestine in the summer of 1929.

Doubleday, Doran & Co., New York, 1934.

THE INDEPENDENT ARAB—Major Sir Hubert Winthrop Young.

Deals mostly with Iraq after its independence, and in retrospect. Major Young served under King Feisal and Sir Percy Cox.

John Murray, London, 1933.

THE NATIONALIST CRUSADE IN SYRIA—
Elizabeth P. MacCallum.

An able and objective account of the Syrian revuoltion of 1925.

The Foreign Policy Association, New York, 1928.

SOME ASPECTS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY OF NATIONALS IN THE NEAR EAST—
Helen Clarkson Miller Davis.

A collection of documents bearing on the relation of state to religion in countries of the Near East.

Harper & Brothers, New York, 1938.

BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA—
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